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presidential campaigns have focused a great deal of attention on China. Indeed, before
the 2012 presidential election, media coverage of China was particularly high and largely negative due to
campaign rhetoric about how China was stealing American jobs and ruining the U.S. economy.
Using a nationally representative, pre- and post- election panel, I explore how
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the way the country is depicted in the media lead individuals to change their opinions of
it. Results indicate that media valence does affect opinion; the increase in negatively-valenced coverage of
China in advance of the U.S. presidential election increased the
degree to which individuals perceived China to be a threat. I also find that an increase in
positively-valenced coverage of China increases perceived threat from China.
I also use an original survey experiment to offer causal evidence that negativelyvalenced
media about foreign countries negatively affects opinions toward those
countries—and their citizens. Here, I focus on political advertisements, examining
whether exposure to presidential ads, aired as part of the 2012 campaign, cause
individuals to have more unfavorable opinions of both China and Chinese people.
I also test whether these ads cause people to discriminate against Chinese citizens and Asians, more generally.
Results indicate that negatively-valenced media about a country causes people to perceive it as more
threatening and to view it—and the people dwelling in it—less favorably. I also find that it causes people to
discriminate against Chinese and Asians on an individual level (rather than broadly as a group), evaluating
Chinese and Asian college applicants less positively.
These studies highlight the power that media can have on American opinion of
foreign countries and show how negatively-valenced media used during the course of
ordinary campaigning can affect discrimination and Sino-U.S. relations.
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ABSTRACT 
 
CHINA IN THE MEDIA: EFFECTS ON AMERICAN OPINION 
Laura R. Silver 
Diana C. Mutz, Ph.D. 
 I explore how the tone of media coverage affects opinions of foreign countries by 
studying a particular case: the People’s Republic of China. I exploit the fact that recent 
presidential campaigns have focused a great deal of attention on China. Indeed, before 
the 2012 presidential election, media coverage of China was particularly high and largely 
negative due to campaign rhetoric about how China was stealing American jobs and 
ruining the U.S. economy.  
Using a nationally representative, pre- and post- election panel, I explore how 
these changes in media valence affect opinions of China. I use an original content 
analysis of mentions of China on U.S. political television to examine whether changes in 
the way the country is depicted in the media lead individuals to change their opinions of 
it. Results indicate that media valence does affect opinion; the increase in negatively-
valenced coverage of China in advance of the U.S. presidential election increased the 
degree to which individuals perceived China to be a threat. I also find that an increase in 
positively-valenced coverage of China increases perceived threat from China.  
 I also use an original survey experiment to offer causal evidence that negatively-
valenced media about foreign countries negatively affects opinions toward those 
countries—and their citizens. Here, I focus on political advertisements, examining 
whether exposure to presidential ads, aired as part of the 2012 campaign, cause 
individuals to have more unfavorable opinions of both China and Chinese people. I also 
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test whether these ads cause people to discriminate against Chinese citizens and Asians, 
more generally. Results indicate that negatively-valenced media about a country causes 
people to perceive it as more threatening and to view it—and the people dwelling in it—
less favorably. I also find that it causes people to discriminate against Chinese and Asians 
on an individual level (rather than broadly as a group), evaluating Chinese and Asian 
college applicants less positively.  
These studies highlight the power that media can have on American opinion of 
foreign countries and show how negatively-valenced media used during the course of 
ordinary campaigning can affect discrimination and Sino-U.S. relations. 
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CHAPTER 1 – UNITING THE CONCEPTS OF MEDIA VALENCE AND AMERICAN 
PUBLIC OPINION 
 
Does media coverage affect American views of foreign countries? Foreign 
countries regularly operate in a manner that suggests that they think American media 
have a strong influence. Governments have poured money into public diplomacy 
campaigns to affect how their country is covered in American media, with activities 
ranging from billboards (Elliott, 2011) to cultural tours (J. Zhang & Cameron, 2003) to 
the expansion of domestic media outlets in foreign countries. These include Russia 
Today, which broadcasts across Europe and the United States and was designed to serve 
as a “soft-power tool to improve Russia’s image abroad and to counter the anti-Russian 
bias the Kremlin saw in Western media” (Ioffe, 2010). China’s Central Television 
(CCTV) also set up headquarters in downtown Washington D.C. in 2012 to “capture the 
attention and perhaps the hearts and minds of viewers throughout the United States” 
(Farhi, 2012). This past spring, the Chinese government even interviewed global public 
relations firms, seeking expertise about how to combat what they see as “unfair” 
treatment by the foreign media (Tham & Miller, 2016). 
 Yet despite these presumed effects, there is limited evidence that media coverage 
affects Americans’ opinion of foreign countries. This is particularly true with regard to 
media valence—defined here as how positive or negative the media coverage is, or the 
affective elements of the coverage. Instead, two still largely unconnected streams of 
research have dominated the field. First, communication research shows that foreign 
governments and their sponsored public relations campaigns can influence how their 
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country is covered in foreign media (Kiousis & Wu, 2008; S. Lee & Hong, 2012; 
Manheim & Albritton, 1984; X. Wang & Shoemaker, 2011; J. Zhang & Cameron, 2003). 
Public diplomacy activities, such as billboards in Times Square, foreign politicians 
appearing on 60 Minutes, and foreign government-sponsored dance programs overseas, 
can change the amount and tone of American media coverage about the sponsor country 
(J. Zhang & Cameron, 2003; X. Wang & Shoemaker, 2011). But this research stops short 
of examining whether the media content, in turn, affects opinions of the foreign countries 
sponsoring the public relations campaigns. 
 Second, political science research does show that public opinion of foreign 
countries matters, affecting individuals’ policy preferences and purchasing habits 
(Amine, Chao, & Arnold, 2005; Berinsky, 2009; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990; Klein, 
Ettenson, & Morris, 1998; Page & Bouton, 2008; Sides & Gross, forthcoming). For 
instance, people are more likely to purchase goods from countries they look on favorably 
(Amine et al., 2005; Klein et al., 1998), and when they have negative opinions of a 
country, they are more likely to support aggressive policies toward that country (Hurwitz 
& Peffley, 1990). Still, this scholarship ignores the antecedent: namely, how do people 
form their opinions of these foreign countries?  
The connection between these two streams—whether the media affect how 
individuals think about specific foreign countries—has not been adequately explored. 
Research indicates that media influence whether individuals think a country is 
important—an agenda-setting effect. The ways in which a country is covered affect the 
criteria individuals use to think about it—a priming effect. But do the media persuade 
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people to think more positively or negatively about a foreign country? Does the tone in 
which a country is covered affect whether people have favorable opinions toward it? 
 Despite limited evidence, there are a number of reasons why one might expect 
media valence to affect public opinion of foreign countries. First, the media are the 
primary means through which individuals get information about foreign affairs. Whereas 
there are myriad ways to acquire information when forming opinions about the domestic 
context, individuals typically have limited personal contact or information from which to 
draw when forming opinions about issues beyond their own borders. An individual can 
decide whether or not the economy is improving by looking at a paycheck, the cost of 
gas, the person next door who can’t find a job, or any number of other factors. However, 
a person cannot draw on these sources to figure out how to feel about South Korea or 
Albania. Instead, as suggested by media dependency theory, one must rely on media for 
these impressions, looking to images like those on the nightly news to form opinions. 
Dependency theory literature suggests that the mass media influence people’s 
conceptions of social reality more when they have less personal experience with it—
especially when the domain is foreign, like views of foreign conflicts (Ball-Rokeach & 
DeFleur, 1976; Cohen, Adoni, & Drori, 1983; Tsfati & Peri, 2006). Particularly with 
regard to distant events with uncertain implications for an individual’s daily life, citizens 
generally lack the time and incentive to inform themselves and thus are primarily 
dependent on the media—as well as elites—to tell them what they need to know about 
foreign policy (Baum & Groeling, 2009; Berinsky, 2009; Brody, 1991; Potter & Baum, 
2016).  
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Yet despite presumed effects, it is difficult for scholars to document media effects 
in this domain. First, while Americans are primarily media-dependent for information 
about foreign affairs, they now opt out of news at higher rates than in the past (Prior, 
2007). During the broadcast era, even those with little interest in public affairs tended to 
hear key headlines and be exposed to breaking global stories; today, this is no longer the 
case. Large segments of the population may choose not to expose themselves at all to the 
news.  
Second, the growth of channels as well as the expansion of online sources mean 
that people may be looking in very different places for their information about foreign 
countries (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2007). It likely would have been easier to find 
persuasive media effects when most foreign coverage came from the same overseas 
bureaus and wire services: a country would then have been covered in one, relatively 
unified way. But today an individual who wants to find information about China can 
watch the nightly news, CNN, CCTV, or even log onto Weibo and communicate with 
Chinese foreign nationals with ease. These two changes in the media environment—less 
overall exposure to foreign news and greater diversity in the sources to which people may 
be exposed—mean that people are likely to see very different amounts and types of 
content, complicating the analyst’s ability to link exposure to opinion. 
 Third, there have also been concurrent improvements to transportation, giving 
Americans more firsthand experience overseas. According to the Department of 
Commerce, more than 60 million Americans have traveled abroad each year for most of 
the past decade (Martin, 2015). While this segment still represents a relatively small 
percentage of the overall population—and most are headed to only a handful of nearby 
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countries like Mexico, Canada, and Caribbean islands—it nonetheless complicates the 
ability to determine media effects, since these visits likely have a very large effect on 
people’s opinions of the places they visit.1 
 Moreover, Americans tend to know and care little about foreign affairs—a 
consistent finding for decades (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1997; Pew Research Center, 
2007; Rosenau, 1961). Even if people are dependent on the media for information about 
foreign countries, if they aren’t interested, people may not pay enough attention to the 
information to be affected by it, which may mitigate any persuasive effects. Instead, 
views of foreign countries may be formed in part by initial impressions in schools or by 
static images and stereotypes. For example, pluralities mention the Eiffel Tower, Great 
Wall, and maple leaves, when asked what springs to mind for them in considering 
France, China, and Canada, respectively (Committee of 100, 2012). These images are not 
front-page news; almost no one mentions political relationships, trade deficits, or even 
current politicians as items they consider when evaluating these remote places. When the 
question was asked about China in 2007 and 2012, despite major changes in the country’s 
global position vis-à-vis America, its successful hosting of the Olympics, and other key 
events, Americans had nearly identical top-of-mind considerations (Committee of 100, 
2012). This suggests that opinion of foreign countries may be based on more long-term, 
fundamental opinions and less on short-term news stories.  
                                                          
1
 While the literature about study-abroad tends to rely on small-scale, qualitative research, evidence 
suggests that studying overseas affects people’s opinions of the country in which they study, as well as the 
citizens of that country (Alreshoud & Koeske, 1997; Carlson & Widaman, 1988; Kumagai, 1977; Sell, 
1983). 
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The importance of media effects on public opinion toward other countries 
 
Why is it important to understand whether and how the media affect American 
opinion of foreign countries? First, to understand how Americans may be susceptible to 
overseas influence. Countries spend millions of dollars both to try to boost and also to 
monitor their favorability in the United States. If there is clear evidence that changes in 
the valence of media coverage affects how favorably people view foreign countries, it 
means that countries may be able to alter how Americans see them. This suggests that 
well-targeted public diplomacy efforts, such as country-branding, opening media outlets 
overseas, or even advertisements in the U.S., may have an effect on foreign policy 
attitudes. Properly understanding this connection is imperative in an era when foreign 
countries may be purchasing media outlets covertly, broadcasting in the United States 
without revealing the foreign sponsorship, as required in the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act (Qing & Shiffman, 2015).
2
  
Moreover, public opinion of foreign countries can affect foreign policy attitudes 
related to that country (Hartley and Russett, 1992; Hill, 1998; Sobel, 2001; Wlezien, 
1996). For example, when individuals have positive attitudes toward a country, they are 
                                                          
2
 In the United States, the clearest example of covert broadcasting is a radio station that broadcasts over the 
D.C. area and is majority-controlled by China’s overseas propaganda radio station, despite not being 
registered as such (Qing & Shiffman, 2015). More recently, a similar case in Australia, suggests that this 
may be a growing problem. At the end of May, Australian and Chinese media outlets signed a series of 
“cooperation agreements” and memorandums of understanding. Deals include promises by Sky News 
Australia to share video and online news content for People’s Daily (the Chinese Communist Party’s 
flagship newspaper) and to publish China Watch, an eight-page insert sponsored by Communist Party in 
The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, and Australian Financial Review (Wen, 2016). However, the first 
insert that ran carried a full-page article supporting China’s claims in the South China Sea and was 
presented with no indication that it was paid content, let alone purchased by the CCP. Moreover, these 
deals—reported widely in the Chinese press—were not covered at all in the Australian mainstream media 
(Fitzgerald, 2016). In an era of growing embedded and native advertising and when traditional revenue 
streams are faltering, these types of deals raise concerns about the ways in which China’s overseas 
propaganda arm may be influencing global media coverage and the ways in which this influence may be 
hidden from news consumers.  
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more likely to support humanitarian engagement and trade with that country; and positive 
opinions of a country may lead to more willingness to intervene on their behalf 
(Berinsky, 2009). Favorability toward Afghanistan was a key predictor of Americans’ 
willingness to commit troops to be part of a United States international peacekeeping 
force in the country in the mid-2000s (Page & Bouton, 2008). Negative opinions are 
related to supporting more aggressive policies toward that country (Hurwitz & Peffley, 
1990; Sides & Gross, forthcoming). While politicians may at times ignore these opinions 
while formulating policy, it is nonetheless worth understanding the relationship. 
  History also suggests that unfavorable opinion of a country can negatively affect 
individual people from that country. While there are extreme instances, like the Japanese 
internment during World War II, there are also more recent occurrences. For example, the 
1980s in the United States were an era of “Japan bashing” (Morris, 2013). Fears of 
Japan’s economic rise led to the mistreatment of Japanese and Japanese-Americans in the 
United States. In one particular case, tensions boiled over in Detroit, and a man—thought 
to be Japanese—was bludgeoned to death for his perceived role in the decline of the auto 
industry (F. H. Wu, 2012). The period immediately following September 11, 2001 was 
also one of intense mistreatment of Arabs and Arab-Americans due to unfavorable 
opinions and fears emanating from Middle Eastern countries (Cainkar, 2004). 
Understanding how the media affect opinions of foreign countries—and, in turn, citizens 
from that country or people who share that cultural heritage—is extremely important in 
an increasingly globalized world and in a country like the United States, which is home to 
many immigrants and their descendants. 
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The case of China  
 
In this dissertation, I explore how media valence affects opinions of foreign 
countries by studying a particular case: the People’s Republic of China (PRC). There are 
a number of reasons that this is a useful domain in which to study contemporary media 
effects. First, the economic strength of a country, bilateral trade flows, and a country’s 
size and military power are all strong predictors of American news coverage (Jones, Van 
Aelst, & Vliegenthart, 2011; Kim & Barnett, 1996; S. Lee, 2007; H. D. Wu, 2000). As 
the world’s second largest economy, its most populous country, and one of the fastest 
growing military powers, China is one of the most reported-on countries in the U.S. 
media. Moreover, few Americans have traveled to China, so there is likely to be a high 
degree of media dependency (Committee of 100, 2007). Attention to news about China 
and interest in the country may also be higher than for other countries, because China 
makes people anxious and anxiety is known to heighten attention (Byrne & Eysenck, 
1995; Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; MacLeod & Mathews, 
1988). For example, more than half of Americans currently consider China a major threat 
according to the Pew Research Center, and more name China as a danger to the United 
States than any country other than Iran (Pew Research Center, 2015). 
 However, these same factors also make China a difficult case through which to 
study how media valence affects opinion change. The fact that China is covered more by 
the media than many other countries and that individuals perceive a great deal of threat 
emanating from it suggest that opinion toward China may by be less malleable than 
opinions toward lesser-known countries. Whereas minimal media exposure to 
information about a country like Azerbaijan or Guinea might sway American attitudes, 
9 
 
the public likely has clearer impressions of China and may therefore be less influenced by 
media valence. Americans may have limited specific information about China, but they 
have clear impressions of aspects of Chinese history and culture, such as the cuisine, the 
Great Wall, and the size of both the landmass and population (Committee of 100, 2012). 
This limited knowledge base is particularly true among older Americans, who tend to be 
more negative toward China, likely influenced by their recollections of the 1989 
Tiananmen Square incident (Aldrich, Lu, & Kang, 2015; Tien & Nathan, 2001; Xie & 
Page, 2013). Thus China provides a “hard test” for documenting media effects. 
 But outside of these reasons, the China case is also extremely important because 
of the significance of the Sino-U.S. relationship. Prominent China scholars bemoan the 
“mutual strategic distrust” between Chinese and American publics, calling it the greatest 
threat to the bilateral relationship—arguably the most important bilateral relationship in 
the contemporary world (Lieberthal & Wang, 2012). The policy community is concerned 
that anti-China rhetoric causes foreign publics to view China more suspiciously. They 
argue that this may, in turn, create a self-fulfilling prophecy; rhetoric condemning China 
as an aggressive power may cause it to be more aggressive if foreign leaders see its 
strength as suspicious and take actions to block its peaceful rise (Dwoskin & Zhao, 
2012). Moreover, growing evidence suggests that Chinese and Chinese-Americans in the 
United States are being mistreated because of a sense that China poses a threat to the 
United States. Actions range from high-profile arrests of Chinese-Americans, wrongfully 
accused of spying for Beijing (Bhattacharjee, 2015; Perlroth, 2015) to increased rejection 
of Chinese investment deals in the United States (Hanemann & Rosen, 2016; Solomon, 
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2016) to heightened racialized comments (“China Joins Furor Over Fox News Host’s 
‘Chinaman’ Comments,” 2014). 
 
Overview of dissertation 
 
This dissertation explores the question of how media valence affects opinions of 
foreign countries, by focusing on the case of China. I explore the effects of media valence 
across two types of coverage: (1) television content featuring the country and (2) political 
advertisements aired by the presidential candidates in the 2012 election. Using both panel 
survey data and experiments, I test the proposition that 1) media valence of China 
influences opinions of the country, and 2) that these opinions are consequential for the 
treatment of Chinese people and Asians, more broadly. In lieu of a separate methods 
chapter, I explain the methodology for each individual study as part of the chapter in 
which it is covered. These studies are united by a shared independent variable—media 
valence about China—operationalized in distinct ways, and influencing multiple 
outcomes.  
In Chapter 2, I explore what is known from previous research about whether the 
media affect opinions of foreign countries. I focus on the gaps in the literature, 
demonstrating that nearly all the work to date has been on agenda-setting, priming or 
framing. I elaborate on the limitations of existing studies, highlighting how the work 
relies primarily on cross-sectional analysis, stopping short of offering causal evidence 
that media valence affects public opinion of foreign countries.  
 In Chapter 3, I exploit the fact that recent presidential campaigns have focused a 
great deal of attention on China. Before the 2012 election, media coverage of China was 
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particularly high and largely negative due to campaign rhetoric about how China is 
stealing American jobs and ruining the U.S. economy. I use a nationally representative 
panel survey that straddled the 2012 election and an original content analysis to explore 
how these naturally occurring changes in the valence of coverage of China affect 
opinions of the country.  
 In Chapter 4, I use an original survey experiment to explore whether negatively-
valenced media about foreign countries cause negative opinions toward those countries 
and their citizens. Here, I focus on political advertisements, examining whether exposure 
to presidential ads, aired as part of the campaign, cause individuals to have more 
unfavorable opinions of both China and Chinese people. I further test whether this 
relationship is mediated by anxiety—an emotion the campaigns sought to play up with 
regard to China (Caldwell, 2012; Harwood, 2012).  
In Chapter 5, I rely on this same experiment to trace the downstream 
consequences of these changes in opinion. In particular, I examine whether the 
negatively-valenced media coverage of China in political ads, which cause people to feel 
more negatively about China, also cause people to discriminate against Chinese citizens 
and Asians. I test this proposition in the context of university admissions.  
  Finally, Chapter 6 concludes by discussing the limitations of the dissertation as 
well as the larger implications of how media valence about China affects Sino-U.S. 
relations and prejudice toward Asians in the United States. It also focuses on how this 
dissertation may help to narrow the gap between the fields of communication and 
political science. 
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CHAPTER 2 – NOT PERSUASIVE: PAST STUDIES OF MEDIA AND AMERICAN 
PUBLIC OPINION OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
 
The question of how media affect perceptions of foreign countries has interested 
scholars for at least a century. In 1922, one of the fathers of communication, Walter 
Lippmann, offered a seminal observation that continues to be prescient: “the only feeling 
that anyone can have about an event he does not experience is the feeling aroused by his 
mental image of that event” (1922, p. 13). In the midst of the Cold War, Kenneth 
Boulding similarly contended that it is one nation’s image of the hostility of another, not 
the ‘real’ hostility which determines its reaction (1959). However, these scholars—and 
most of their contemporaries—were journalists and theorists, focused primarily on 
explaining how individuals might form opinions of things distant from themselves, rather 
than testing their propositions. While they all believed that media played a, if not the, 
crucial role in opinion formation about foreign countries, it was up to future scholars to 
offer evidence.  
The empirical researchers who have followed in their footsteps have focused 
primarily on agenda-setting, priming, and framing. Agenda-setting is the theory that the 
public perceives topics as more important when they are more heavily emphasized by the 
media (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Priming is typically defined as “changes in the 
standards that people use to make political evaluations” (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987); in 
other words, the media suggest to people which factors they should use to think about 
particular issues. Framing is a theory that posits that how an issue is characterized in the 
media can influence how the public understands it (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).  
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The emphasis on these three types of media effects rather than persuasion is likely 
due to the fact these effects tend to be easier to document (and, for quite some time, 
scholars thought that persuasion was unlikely and that these were the only real media 
effects). Little is known about the persuasive effects of media on opinions of foreign 
countries. Few studies have attempted to measure and examine the valence with which a 
country is covered. Those that have done so have been primarily correlational studies or 
addressed non-American populations. In the sections that follow, I highlight the most 
relevant existing literature on media coverage and opinion of foreign countries while 
focusing on the absence of strong causal inferences about how media valence affects 
perceptions of foreign countries. I begin by discussing studies on agenda-setting, priming, 
and framing, then discuss the existing persuasion studies and their limitations. I conclude 
with a discussion of persuasion studies in the non-American context.  
 
Agenda-setting effects 
  
Rather than looking at what the media cover about a given country or how they 
cover it, most scholars to date have focused on the effects of sheer amounts of coverage. 
For example, there is a correlation between the number of stories about a given country in 
the newspaper and the perceived importance of that country in public opinion surveys 
(McNelly & Izcaray, 1986; Reilly, 1979).
3
 While it makes sense that if a country is 
covered more in the news, the public is likely to find it more important, these studies 
                                                          
3
 While not directly related to favorability of foreign countries, a corollary in the agenda-setting literature is 
the relationship between the amount of foreign affairs coverage in the newshole and the perceived 
importance of foreign affairs in general. A content analysis of major newspapers and the percentage of 
Americans who report foreign affairs topics as the most important problem facing the country shows  a 
strong correlation between the two (Soroka, 2003). However, there is no examination of particular 
countries.  
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typically lack sufficient controls to ensure that the relationship is not simply a legacy of 
omitted variables. For example, the American media cover countries more when they 
have stronger economies, larger militaries, or greater landmass (Kim & Barnett, 1996; S. 
Lee, 2007)—all of which are likely related to perceptions of importance, regardless of the 
amount of coverage they receive (their key independent variable) or media valence (my 
key independent variable).  
This early research also focused on the amount of news coverage a country 
received without taking into account whether people were actually exposed to the 
coverage. Subsequent studies attempted to remedy this omission by incorporating 
people’s news consumption into the models, examining whether more media exposure is 
related to perceived importance and opinion of foreign countries. For example, scholars 
looked at how many hours a week an individual reported consuming the news and his or 
her opinion of West Germany (Semetko, Brzinski, Weaver, & Willnat, 1992). They used 
amount of news consumption as the key independent variable (the hours an individual 
reported watching the nightly news and reading the newspaper), rather than how much an 
individual saw about West Germany, arguing that West Germany was covered 
extensively on the media because the study was set around the time of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. Using this measure, they found no relationship between amount of exposure 
and favorability toward West Germany. On the other hand, the authors did find a 
relationship between reported attention to the news and favorability, though this 
relationship could as easily be the result of higher education levels (known to be related 
to lower levels of ethnocentrism and isolationism)—which was not controlled for in the 
model.  
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Priming and framing effects 
 
There has also been priming research on media coverage and opinion of foreign 
countries, showing that the context in which countries are covered affects how 
individuals evaluate them (Brewer, Graf, & Willnat, 2003). Undergraduate students who 
read articles about terrorism featuring Iran and Libya have a closer relationship between 
their anti-terrorist attitudes and their opinions of Iran and Libya than students who did not 
read these articles. Similarly, after reading stories about Mexico and Colombia and their 
respective drug cartels, favorability of these two countries is more closely linked to anti-
drug attitudes, indicating that the media can influence the criteria people use to evaluate 
countries. However, these studies stop short of demonstrating that the media valence 
persuades individuals to hold particular opinions of countries.  
Scholars have also done framing experiments to look at whether coverage 
showing countries as having either cooperative or conflictual relationships with the 
United States affects opinions of those countries (Brewer, 2006). In one such study, 
manipulations featured headlines, such as “U.S., China Agree on Little Beyond Fighting 
Terrorism” or “U.S., China Stress Common Interests.” When the U.S. is presented as 
cooperating with China, favorable attitudes increase relative to the control. The opposite 
holds true when the relationship is depicted as conflictual. However, much more than just 
the nature of described relationships varied across the manipulations, so differences may 
be due to factors other than variation in the way bilateral relations are presented. 
Moreover, treatments were generated by the author, rather than actual, real world media 
content, which may affect the study’s external generalizability. Additionally, all of the 
treatments involved references to the United States, raising the issue of whether the 
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observed effects are due to media valence, differences in bilateral relations, or something 
else entirely. Nonetheless, such studies offer suggestive evidence that the content and 
valence of media coverage about China may well affect American favorability of China. 
 
The limits of persuasion-focused studies 
 
Few studies in the American context have focused on persuasion—essentially, the 
media influencing not just what people think about (agenda-setting) or the context in 
which to think about it (priming and framing), but rather how to think about it, positively 
or negatively. Studying persuasion requires examining how countries are depicted—the 
valence of coverage—as well as how this valence affects favorability toward the 
countries.  
Such research is relatively limited, though there are a few notable examples. First, 
in one study of media valence, individuals were asked to rate 26 countries on a feeling 
thermometer ranging from 0 to 100 (Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004). The scholars then 
looked at all references to those 26 countries in major periodicals, coding them as 
positive, neutral, or negative. While negative coverage of countries correlated with 
negative views of the countries, the same was not true for positive or neutral coverage. 
While the authors argue that the relationship between the negative coverage and negative 
ratings suggests a persuasive media effect, this conclusion does not account for factors 
that might lead to both negative coverage of a country and negative public opinion. For 
example, past or present wars with a country may lead journalists to write about the 
country negatively and also for individuals to hold negative opinions of it—even if 
individuals are never personally exposed to negatively-valenced media. Indeed, there is 
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no accounting for what an individual was exposed to. Additionally, the authors treated 
the amount of positive, negative, and neutral valence separately, despite the fact that a 
given individual would be likely to encounter all of these various types of coverage in his 
or her media diet. It is also unclear why the authors found an effect for negative, but not 
positive coverage. Ultimately, the rudimentary way in which the relationship between 
media valence and opinion was tested and the extremely likely omitted variable bias 
inherent in this study mean that it stops short of providing a compelling demonstration of 
how media valence affects opinion of foreign countries. 
Another, still unpublished study offers some suggestive evidence that media 
valence is related to public opinion about foreign countries (Willnat, Metzgar, Tang, & 
Lodato, 2013). Here, the authors conduct a detailed content analysis of how China is 
depicted in The New York Times, Washington Post, and on CNN, CNN.com, and NBC. 
Using an opt-in, online survey, they asked respondents how many minutes they spend a 
day, on average, (1) watching TV news, (2) reading printed newspapers, (3) reading 
online news, and (4) listening to radio news. Notably, this measure obscures the major 
differences they found across outlets on a given platform in their own content analysis, 
including between CNN and NBC and The New York Times and Washington Post.
 4
 They 
also asked people how interested they were in China, with responses ranging on a four-
point Likert scale from “not at all interested” to “very interested”. They then modeled the 
effects of self-reported exposure to various media on opinions of China.  
                                                          
4
 One other study that uses similar media measures (and no content analysis) to examine favorability of 
China does so by modeling whether knowledge mediates the relationship between exposure and attitudes. 
They find that media exposure increases knowledge about China, which in turn increases negative opinion 
of the Chinese government, albeit not the country itself (Gries, Crowson, & Cai, 2011). 
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They find that those who consume more online news are more likely to believe 
that China is an adversary to the United States and that it poses a military threat to the 
U.S., and those who listen to more frequent radio news are more likely to believe that the 
United States shares values with China. But there is no relationship between media 
exposure and internet or newspaper consumption, even though they theorized that media 
valence on any of the various news platforms should have similar effects on public 
opinion.
5
  
However, the study suffers from a number of key limitations. First and foremost, 
while they measure the tone of the media, this information is never incorporated into the 
models of how media affect opinions. Second, these results are cross-sectional, leaving 
open the possibility of a spurious relationship or reverse causality. For example, the 
relationship between greater media consumption and perceiving more threats from China 
could be driven by differences in political interest or knowledge. Moreover, individuals 
who feel more threatened by China or who hold more negative opinions of it may be 
seeking out more information about it, rather than having media exposure cause those 
opinions. Third, the differences that the authors find across media platforms are under-
theorized.
6
 While they argue that this effect is likely due to the differences in the way 
                                                          
5
 Media valence for certain platforms is found to be related to some dependent variables and not others, yet 
the differences are under-explored. 
6
 The findings also contrast with another study of public opinion of China, though no content analysis was 
conducted in this secondary case. Rather, individuals were asked whether they had read or heard news 
about China from newspapers, TV, radio, or websites in the week prior to the survey. Those following 
“broadcast media—either radio or television, or both” had more negative feelings about China. There was 
no discernable relationship between newspapers and websites on opinion—yet the differences, once again, 
were under-theorized (Aldrich, Lu, & Kang, 2015). This paper was singled out by a subsequent scholar, 
who declared, “it is important to understand the factors that influence the news in order to appropriately 
consider the potential effects of the news on public opinion. It is a problem to draw conclusions about 
media effects on China’s image in the news from a cross-sectional survey of public opinion without any 
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China is discussed across the particular outlets that they code, they know little about how 
China is covered on the programs that individuals actually watch, because they never ask 
which outlets people watch, looking instead at a few exemplars. Without actually 
focusing on exposure, it is difficult to conclude that the media are affecting different 
opinions about China, rather than other factors causing people to seek out information 
from different platforms.  
 Another study focused on how media valence affects Americans’ opinions of 
foreign countries also focuses on China (X. Wang & Shoemaker, 2011). In this study, the 
unit of analysis is an opinion poll (group-level), rather than an individual’s opinion 
(respondent-level), and the authors look at changes in the valence of coverage and 
Americans’ aggregate opinion of China over time. They examine all references to 
“China,” “Chinese,” or “Beijing” in headlines in The New York Times, Washington Post, 
and USA Today and code whether the stories are negative, neutral, or positive. These 
scores are then averaged across all three outlets for every three-month period of time and 
matched to each public opinion poll. However, the authors argue that U.S. media 
coverage of China should be a mediating factor—influencing Americans’ opinions of 
China, but also influenced by China’s public relations efforts, as well as its country 
characteristics, including both economic strength and political freedom. Examining this 
mediated relationship, they find only a weak relationship (outside the conventional 
bounds of statistical significance) between valence and Americans’ favorability of China.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
accompanying analysis of the news conducted in the period leading up to the survey and even then, any 
suggestion of a causal relationship is untenable without panel data” (Semetko, 2016).  
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 Not only is the strength of the relationship limited, but the unit of observation is at 
the group-level, so anything that affects both aggregate opinion toward China and 
valence of media coverage could explain away the relationship. For example, there are 
events and changes—country characteristics, as the authors call them—which affect both 
coverage and opinion of China, and there is a stronger relationship between these 
characteristics and favorability over time than between media valence and opinion.
7 
In 
fact, it is possible that the relationships documented in this study are not due to the media, 
but to changes in Sino-U.S. relations, the way China is taught in history classes, or other 
factors entirely.
8 
While there are theoretical reasons to believe that the media valence of 
an individual’s media diet should also lead to these changes in opinion of China, the 
aggregate data used in this study stop short of demonstrating that relationship.  
 
Persuasion in a non-American context 
 
Although evidence within the U.S. context is weak, a body of “anti-Americanism” 
literature examines how the valence of coverage of the United States in the Middle East 
affects views of the country among foreigners. Before proceeding, it’s important to note 
that while these studies suggest the potentially powerful persuasive effects of the media, 
there are nonetheless at least three key differences between Middle Eastern media 
systems and that of the United States. First, although satellite usage has grown markedly 
across the region in recent years, the average number of channels that individuals receive 
remains significantly lower than in the U.S. (Kraidy, 2002; Sakr, 2001). Second, 
                                                          
7
 As the timing of their study encompasses the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, this is not surprising. 
8
 Subsequent scholars have criticized this study for the possible “ecological fallacy” built into the design, 
arguing that research focused on aggregated views of China in the U.S. cannot provide reliable information 
on how the American people’s views of China may change (Aldrich et al., 2015). 
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particularly at the time of some of these studies, those who watched TV—especially 
those who had access to satellite and cable TV stations—comprised a higher 
socioeconomic group than those who did not, suggesting that much of the variation found 
when looking across different groups of media users may actually have been due more to 
educational differences (Nisbet & Myers, 2010). Third, some of the most well-known, 
widely accessible channels across the pan-Arab media market have known biases with 
regard to their coverage of the United States and other foreign countries (Nisbet & 
Myers, 2010). This bias is important, since it means that individuals may be able to 
expose themselves selectively to foreign-affairs coverage that agrees with their existing 
opinions of foreign countries in a way that may not be possible in the U.S. media context. 
The United States also occupies a higher percentage of the newshole in Arab media than 
most foreign affairs coverage does in the United States, suggesting that this type of 
selection may be easier for overseas audiences than for American ones. 
 In fact, how foreign countries are covered is so well-known that the scholars of 
one particular study did not do a content analysis of their channels of interest: CNN, 
BBC, and Al-Jazeera. Instead, they simply looked at the differences between those who 
opted to expose themselves to Western media channels or independent, pan-Arab news 
channels and made assumptions about the content (Nisbet, Nisbet, Scheufele, & 
Shanahan, 2004). They argue that coverage of the United States on Al-Jazeera is 
significantly more negative than on BBC or CNN and that Middle Eastern Muslims 
(located in the nine countries polled as part of the Gallup Poll of Islamic Countries) who 
watch Al-Jazeera as their primary news channel are likely to have more negative 
perceptions of the United States. While they found their hypothesized relationship 
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confirmed, they note that even with controls, the relationship is unlikely to be causal 
because of the selection effects inherent in choosing to watch the different stations.  
 Building upon this work, a subsequent study sought to account for selective 
exposure by looking at how transnational Arab television exposure to Al-Jazeera and Al-
Arabiya affected anti-American sentiment as a function of political identification (Nisbet 
& Myers, 2011). These authors argue that political identity moderates the relationship 
between media exposure and opinion formation—and thus model both preference for 
watching a given station and exposure to that station. After controlling for preference for 
these stations and looking at how opinion varies as a function of the number of days that 
individuals report watching these transnational media, they find that a preference for Al-
Jazeera is associated with greater anti-American sentiment, and the opposite is true for 
Al-Arabiya—a station with a relatively more pro-U.S. orientation. While these findings, 
once again, suggest a persuasive media effect, controlling for self-reported preference 
cannot eliminate the possibility of selective exposure.  
Taken together, it is clear that there are few studies in the American context that 
can compellingly demonstrate a link between the valence of media coverage of foreign 
countries and public opinion toward those countries. Moreover, no studies show a causal 
relationship between media valence and favorability of foreign countries—a surprising 
lacuna, given that Americans are heavily dependent on the media to form opinions about 
foreign affairs and remote places more generally. In the chapters that follow, I use a 
nationally representative panel survey and content analysis, as well as two unique survey 
experiments, to offer new evidence about how media valence affects American views of 
China.  
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CHAPTER 3 – HOW COVERAGE OF CHINA DURING THE COURSE OF THE 2012 
ELECTION CHANGED OPINIONS OF THE COUNTRY: A PANEL STUDY 
 
Despite Americans’ dependency on the media to form opinions of foreign 
countries, little is known about whether the valence of media coverage of a foreign 
country causes Americans to feel differently about it. Yet foreign countries are spending 
millions of dollars trying to influence the American media landscape, opening their own 
television stations, launching public relations campaigns, and more. The underlying 
strategy presumes that if foreign countries can change the way they are presented, that 
Americans will change their opinions and that policy toward the country will become 
more favorable in some way. This raises the question: Do changes in the valence of how 
a foreign country is covered cause Americans to feel differently about it? 
Drawing upon a unique content analysis and a representative panel survey of 
Americans, I offer some of the first evidence that the valence of coverage of foreign 
countries in the media affects the way those countries are perceived. I do so by exploiting 
a moment when the People’s Republic of China was heavily covered in the U.S. media 
accompanied by a notable shift in the valence of coverage: before and after the 2012 
American presidential election. In the sections that follow, I review what is known about 
how media valence affects peoples’ opinions of foreign countries and explain the factors 
that make my selected case particularly advantageous for exploring this research 
question. After describing the methodology and analyzing the results, I conclude with a 
discussion of the implications for foreign public relations and propaganda campaigns in 
the United States.  
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The difficulties of finding persuasive media effects 
 
The vast majority of studies that have examined how the media affect American 
opinions of foreign countries have examined agenda-setting, priming, or framing, rather 
than persuasion. Studies have demonstrated that increased coverage of a foreign country 
leads Americans to believe that the country is more important to the United States than 
prior to the enhanced coverage (McNelly & Izcaray, 1986; Reilly, 1979; Wanta et al., 
2004). Further, experiments show that when countries are presented in a certain way—
such as written about in the context of the drug trade or terrorism—they are then 
evaluated more in the context of individuals’ pre-existing attitudes about these issues 
(Brewer et al., 2003). Opinions are also affected by whether countries are presented as in 
conflict or cooperation with the United States (Brewer, 2006). Results suggest that media 
priming and framing affect public perceptions of foreign countries, even if persuasion 
studies remain limited. 
So why does persuasion evidence remain relatively spare? This is likely due to the 
difficulty of studying persuasion in a non-experimental context, given problems of 
selection bias and statistical power. First, with regard to selection bias—or “selective 
exposure,” as it is typically known in the communication context—it is difficult to 
establish convincingly that media exposure caused particular effects if individuals sought 
out particular media because they were consonant with existing beliefs (Iyengar & Hahn, 
2009; Stroud, 2010). For example, while there is evidence that exposure to positively-
valenced news about America is related to more favorable opinions of the country, and 
more negatively-valenced news is related to the opposite in the Middle East, this may be 
because audiences of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya select their news source on the basis of 
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the tone of its coverage of the United States (Nisbet & Myers, 2011; Nisbet et al., 2004). 
If individuals are simply seeking consonant information, that choice limits the ability to 
demonstrate that media valence has effects on opinion. 
 Second, observational studies of media effects often suffer from insufficient 
power to detect media effects if they are present, since media effects tend to be small in 
magnitude (Zaller, 2002). Moreover, effects are often non-monotonic, meaning that the 
effects of more media may not be linearly related to the dependent variable (Zaller, 
1992). Outside of choosing the proper relationship, there is often insufficient change in 
the content of an individual’s media diet over time to be able to detect effects, 
particularly without precise media measures that can capture the existing variance (Zaller, 
1996). This is particularly likely to be the case with regard to media coverage of foreign 
countries, because international news typically makes up a relatively small segment of 
the American newshole (Van Dijk, 2013). For example, studies have shown that China is 
covered more than most others on American media because of its size, military strength, 
and economy (Kim & Barnett, 1996; S. Lee, 2007). Yet, even as one of the most covered 
countries, it typically occupies no more than 2% of prime-time nightly newscasts (Seib & 
Powers, 2010; Willnat & Luo, 2011).  
 
Selecting a case study: The PRC 
 
 For methodological reasons, it is important for me to choose a time period when 
the valence in coverage changed, as my focus is on documenting how valence affects 
opinion. If there is no change in valence, it cannot explain any observed changes in 
opinion. Changes in the amount of coverage are not theoretically necessary. But, given 
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the limited attention foreign countries receive in the American newshole, finding a time 
period with higher rates of coverage of foreign countries also helps, as it makes it more 
likely that ordinary Americans will have been exposed to at least some coverage about a 
foreign country.  
Anecdotal accounts of the 2012 presidential election suggest that coverage of 
China was substantially higher prior to election day and that valence was primarily one-
sided: negative (“Bill for China Ads in U.S. Election: $54.3 Million,” 2012; Harwood, 
2016). I will explain the theoretical importance of these particular factors below in more 
detail. I will then confirm that these anecdotal accounts were correct in the results 
section, before turning to how media valence affected American opinion. 
 
Increased coverage 
 Journalists, scholars, and pundits alike all noted that China attracted a great deal 
of attention during the 2012 election. Both President Barack Obama and former Governor 
Mitt Romney focused extensively on how the country was “stealing American jobs” and 
“ruining America’s economy.” In all three presidential debates, for example, China was 
mentioned more than any other country. Campaign speeches by both candidates 
frequently referenced China, as candidates vociferously argued over who would be 
“tougher,” making assorted promises about forcing China to play by international trade 
rules, standing up to cheating, and branding the country a currency manipulator (Paletta 
& Davis, 2012). The country also featured prominently in campaign ads; those 
referencing the country totaled nearly $55 million (“Bill for China Ads in U.S. Election: 
$54.3 Million,” 2012). 
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 Because of its prominence in campaign rhetoric and the increased attention during 
this period, China was covered outside the typical “foreign policy” segments—including 
channels that rarely feature foreign countries. For example, presidential debates were 
widely quoted in snippets on the news. Campaign ads featuring China were aired during 
entertainment programs. Candidate debates and speeches featuring China even aired on 
talk shows and were pilloried on The Daily Show, Saturday Night Live, and other satirical 
programs, as well as highlighted on “softer” news programs like The View. Thus even 
with declining news viewership (Prior, 2007), most Americans were likely exposed to 
some content about China over the course of the 2012 campaign.  
 
Changes in valence 
 In order to document whether the valence of coverage of China affects opinions 
of the country, it is imperative to locate a moment when valence changes. One recent 
content analysis of American media coverage of China found, for example, that three-in-
four headlines about China were neutral, while the remainder were primarily negative 
and almost none were positive (Willnat et al., 2013).
9
 Most of this coverage also tended 
to be about the country’s internal politics and foreign policy (Willnat & Luo, 2011; 
Willnat et al., 2013).  
 Yet, during the campaign season in advance of national elections, there appears to 
have been substantially more negative coverage. Referencing the pre-election rhetoric, 
                                                          
9
 A more recent, unpublished content analysis confirms that there is substantially more negative coverage 
of China than positive on CBS, NBC, and Fox television. However, this study follows a different 
methodology than most others, focusing not on all references to China, but on those where China is the 
protagonist in the news story. Results indicate that of the 9,070 stories focused on China in the past five 
years, 27-52% of CBS stories, 22-60% of NBC stories, and 25-55% of Fox stories were neutral or positive, 
and the rest were negative, with percentages representing the amount per year on each outlet (Semetko, 
2016).  
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Robert Kapp, former president of the U.S.-China Business Council, declared that China 
had never before been used as such an obvious punching bag for American politicians 
(“It’s China Bashing Time Again,” 2012). Republican and Democratic strategists alike 
emphasized that ads featuring China were purposefully designed to play into the public’s 
sense of economic anxiety (Harwood, 2012). Ads routinely featured music to heighten 
anxiety, and their content focused on how Americans were being duped, manipulated, 
and cheated. Romney, for example, mentioned “cracking down” on China whenever they 
“cheat” four separate times in the first two presidential debates (Paletta & Davis, 2012).  
 
One-sided valence 
In addition to increased coverage, China’s relationship with the United States and 
the threat it poses to the American economy were among the very few campaign issues 
on which Romney and Obama espoused similar opinions. While the candidates disagreed 
vociferously about who would be tougher on China, nearly all statements about China, 
from both campaigns, had a similar, negatively-valenced message: that China was 
threatening the United States economically and that America needed to “stand up” to the 
Chinese. Whether or not Americans know what type of policy would actually constitute 
“standing up” to China, the sentiment underlying the message is clear: China is bad, 
taking advantage of America, even lording over it from a higher position. Many pundits 
observing the campaign described the policy prescriptions offered by the candidates as a 
form of “outbidding,” where they progressively pulled one another toward more militant 
stances about China (Kadlec, 2012). For example, following Romney’s declaration that 
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he would brand China a currency manipulator on his first day in office, Obama filed suit 
in the World Trade Organization against China (Kadlec, 2012).  
The dominance of negativity and its relative one-sidedness suggests that this is an 
issue on which we should expect persuasive influence. While typically individuals are 
exposed to contrasting sides of an issue or counterbalanced valence, in the case of China 
before the 2012 election, there was more of a “one-sided flow,” with individuals largely 
hearing negatively-valenced messaging. According to Zaller’s seminal theory (1992), this 
should lead to a “mainstreaming,” with public opinion shifting in the direction of the 
message consensus (here, negative valence). Moreover, the political “outbidding” over 
China means that even if more partisan media outlets like Fox News and MSNBC 
differed with regard to who they said would be tougher on China—Obama or Romney—
across these outlets there was still a unified, singular message: America needs to stand up 
to China.
10
 As a result, even in a time of heightened coverage, it would be difficult for 
individuals to select their media on the basis of how the outlets covered China.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
Heightened coverage, more negatively-valenced coverage, and relatively one-
sided negative coverage of China during the 2012 election should provide a fertile ground 
for documenting media effects. This convergence leads to the key question addressed by 
this study: Did changes in the valence of media coverage of China during the 2012 
                                                          
10
 An illustrative microcosm of this type of political outbidding is taking place in the 2016 Ohio senate 
election. Incumbent Senator Portman has accused Governor Strickland of being “weak on China” and set 
up a website—weakonchina.com—to highlight Strickland’s failures. Concurrently, Governor Strickland 
has produced an ad in which Senator Portman’s face is superimposed on the body of a Chinese gymnast 
performing a “triple-aerial flip-flop” and described Portman as “the best Senator China’s ever had”. He also 
built the website makingchinagreatagain.com to redirect visitors to Senator Portman’s website (Watson, 
2016). 
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election cycle cause changes in opinion about China? If there was a period of negatively-
valenced coverage of China in advance of the election, were those who were exposed to 
this negatively-valenced media coverage more likely to hold negative opinions about 
China? Negatively-valenced media about China encompasses any media which presents 
China primarily in a negative light: as a poor actor on the world stage, as a human rights 
abuser, or as a country which hurts American economically, among other depictions. 
Conceptually, it’s the type of media coverage that causes individuals to feel badly about 
China and to worry about China’s effect on America or on their own lives. A raised sense 
of anxiety about China and a heightened belief that China harms the United States are 
natural results of coverage that fixates on the problems China poses to the United States 
and the need to more aggressively “stand up” to the country. Essentially, this is a sense of 
threat, and leads me to my first hypothesis: 
H1: An increase in the proportion of negatively-valenced coverage about China in 
an individual’s news diet will cause that individual to feel more threatened by 
China. 
 
Although likely a much smaller segment of the newshole about China, does 
positive coverage—and changes in it—affect opinions in the same way as negative 
coverage? Here, positively-valenced coverage encompasses all coverage where China is 
presented as a responsible, helpful world power on the global stage, as bringing positive 
economic changes and developments to the United States, and the like. Essentially, this 
type of coverage is that which causes individuals to feel positively about China and to 
sense that China brings benefits to the United States. This leads me to my second 
hypothesis: 
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H2: An increase in the proportion of positively-valenced coverage about China in 
an individual’s news diet will cause that individual to feel less threatened by 
China 
 
Notably, these hypotheses are about valence, not about amount of coverage. Nonetheless, 
I expect media effects to be easier to locate in this particular time period because of the 
increased likelihood that average Americans are exposed to China-related content. 
However, my hypotheses presume that media valence is likely to have an effect on 
opinion, whether individuals see a lot of references to China or only a few. 
 
Data and methods 
 
Survey sample 
 
To test this hypothesis, I rely on the Institute for the Study of Citizens and Politics 
(ISCAP) 2012 election study data. These data were collected using GfK’s probability-
based online panel. GfK recruits a nationally representative sample of adults, ages 18 and 
older, using address-based sampling methods, providing the vast majority of the non-
institutionalized population a known chance of selection into the sample. Participants 
who lack internet access are provided access for free, along with the necessary hardware, 
in exchange for answering periodic surveys. After joining the panel, participants answer a 
series of demographic questions and become a part of the pool from which samples are 
drawn for particular studies. When they are selected for a given survey, respondents are 
contacted via email with the invitation and, if they have not completed the survey within 
three days, re-contacted to encourage participation. Rewards such as raffles and financial 
remuneration are used to incentivize cooperation.  
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I used a two-wave panel, with the first wave collected before the 2012 presidential 
election (October 19-29) and the second wave between the election and the inauguration 
(November 14- January 29). The pre-election survey had a cooperation rate of 72%, with 
a total of 2,606 completes.
11 
Whereas the first wave of the ISCAP panel was released to 
all respondents at one moment (and completed within 10 days of the release), the second 
wave was randomly released over a 10-week period to those who had completed the pre-
election survey; 10% of the respondents were contacted every two weeks for a period of 
10 weeks (e.g., roughly 260 people were contacted on November 14 and given two weeks 
to complete the survey, then another 260 people were contacted on November 28 and 
given two weeks to complete the survey, and so on until all original respondents were 
contacted).
12 
The cooperation rate for the post-election survey (N=2,471) was 95%, 
meaning that 95% of the pre-election survey (wave 1) participated in the second 
wave.
13,14
 The median time to complete each wave of the survey was 23 and 22 minutes, 
respectively.  
                                                          
11
 GfK online surveys compare quite well with telephone and face-to-face surveys in terms of the 
representativeness of the samples with the American adult population (Chang & Krosnick, 2009). 
Moreover, online surveys may provide higher quality responses, including lower levels of social 
desirability bias, compared to telephone surveys (Chang & Krosnick, 2009). The ISCAP sample compares 
favorably with the Current Population Survey, conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (see Appendix 
IV). Applying population weights to the descriptive analyses does not change the results appreciably. The 
design effect due to weighting is 1.45 and 1.44 for each wave, respectively.  
12
 From a domestic standpoint, the election was the key event in the United States between the two survey 
waves. Aside from this, the most notable event in the time period was the Newton, Massachusetts school 
shooting and subsequent discussions of gun legislation. Work by Pew corroborates that the shooting was 
the event that Americans were following most closely on the news (Pew Research Center, 2013), and it is 
unlikely to have affected attitudes toward China. Yet, while the election was the key event in the United 
States, in China events were unfolding as well. Critically, China underwent a leadership transition from Hu 
Jintao to Xi Jinping. However, with the exception of this major change in power, there were no other 
dramatic events in the bilateral relationship, nor changes in Chinese foreign policy or trade policy. While it 
is reasonable to be concerned about differences between the waves, any changes in how China is covered 
will be measured by my coding the media content between the two waves. 
13
 The cooperation rate across periods in wave 2 varied slightly from a low of 90% in week 9 to a high of 
97% in weeks 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6.  
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Dependent variable 
My hypotheses predict that negatively-valenced coverage of China will cause 
individuals to hold more negative opinions of the country. In this particular case, I look at 
whether or not negatively-valenced coverage of China increases the threat that people 
perceive from the country. I do this for two reasons. First, this outlook is closely related 
to favorability; those with more unfavorable views of China tend to see it as more of a 
threat to the United States, to think that trade with China does not benefit the United 
States, and to think that the United States should get tougher on China (Pew Research 
Center, 2015). Second, one of the greatest problems in Sino-U.S. relations is the growth 
of mutual distrust (Lieberthal & Wang, 2012). In particular, some analysts have 
contended that fear of a rising China may narrow the options available for elites in their 
negotiations with China and may contribute to more aggressive policies or even put the 
two countries on a path toward war (G. Allison, 2015; Gilsinan, 2015; Johnston, 2013).  
The research relies on two key dependent variables. Both measures—HIGH 
THREAT and THREE-PART CHANGE IN PERCEIVED CHINA THREAT—are created using the 
same question, which measures perceived threat from China. The survey question is a 
seven-point scale, asked in both waves: “There are different views about China. Some 
people see China as more of an opportunity for new markets and economic investment, 
while others see it as a threat to our jobs and security. Still others are somewhere in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
14
 The 5% who did not complete the post-election survey look comparable to the rest of the sample with 
regard to their wave 1 opinion of China: 10% say China is more of an opportunity for new markets and 
investment (scale points 1, 2, 3), 20% choose the middle point (4), 49% say China is more of a threat to 
jobs and security (scale points 5, 6, 7), and 17% say they don’t know. These differences are within the 
margin of error for the survey. 
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between. Which view is closest to your own?”15 Respondents then placed themselves on 
the scale using an interactive slider or responded that they did not know, with higher 
values indicating a greater degree of perceived threat. Both of the endpoints on the scale 
were labeled, but not the midpoint.  
I use this seven-point variable to create a binary dependent variable HIGH THREAT. 
The dependent variable HIGH THREAT equals 1 when an individual says China is “more of 
a threat to our jobs and security” (scale points 5, 6, 7) and equals 0 in all other cases, 
including “don’t know” (Table 3.1). This binary dependent variable treats those who 
express low or medium threat and those who express no opinion as conceptually 
equivalent.
16
 I do this for theoretical reasons. When people feel threatened, they tend to 
know it. On a question like this, which is not sensitive (and is unlikely to make people 
feel uncomfortable and thus to back away from answering it), offering a “don’t know” 
response suggests low cognitive engagement with the idea of threat from China. Given 
that Americans are relatively more negative toward China than most other countries (Pew 
Research Center, 2014) and the likely preponderance of negative coverage in the pre-
election period, anyone who is unable or unwilling to offer an opinion about China seems 
much more likely to perceive little or no threat from China than high threat. There is a 
                                                          
15
 Similar measures have been used previously. For instance, on the Transatlantic Trends 2012 Survey 
(fielded in June of that year), Americans were able to choose, using a dichotomous scale, between the two 
statements that form the endpoints of the seven-point scale used here. They were also able to volunteer 
“both,” which was not a possible response option on the ISCAP panel. By a two-to-one margin in the 
Transatlantic Trends data, Americans believed China represented more of an economic threat (59%) than 
an economic opportunity (30%); 5% volunteered that it was both and 5% did not know or had no opinion.  
16
 A substantial percentage of the sample (16% in each wave, respectively) does not have a clear opinion on 
China or is unwilling to answer the question. This is consistent with many other questions about foreign 
policy attitudes, as well as with past research on American opinion of China, which indicates a great deal of 
ambivalence and a low degree of knowledge about the country (Gries, Crowson, & Cai, 2011; Tien & 
Nathan, 2001).   
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statistically significant difference between the means of the pre-election and post-election 
levels of HIGH THREAT, based on a paired t-test (p < 0.01). Nonetheless, the actual 
difference is relatively small. 
 Table 3.1. High Threat from China, Pre- and Post-2012 Presidential Election 
Question wording: “There are different views about China. Some people see China as more of an 
opportunity for new markets and economic investment, while others see it as a threat to our jobs and 
security. Still others are somewhere in between. Which view is closest to your own?” 
Not high threat (1-4, 9) 
49.8% 
(N=1,297) 
51.6% 
(N=1,276) 
High threat (5, 6, 7) 
50.2% 
(N=1,309) 
48.4% 
(N=1,195) 
Note: HIGH THREAT is measured using the seven-point interactive scale with labeled endpoints and the 
question above. Individuals are coded as “high threat” if they select values above the midpoint of the scale 
(5,6, 7) and as “not high threat” otherwise (1-4, and don’t know). There is a statistically significant 
difference between the means of the pre-election and post-election levels of perceived China threat, based 
on a paired t-test (p < 0.01). The data shown is unweighted; post-stratification weights do not significantly 
alter the marginal distribution. 
 
I create a second dependent variable, THREE-PART CHANGE IN PERCEIVED CHINA 
THREAT, in order to explore not only whether perceived threat from China changed at all 
during the electoral period, but, if so, in what direction (Table 3.2). This is important, as 
my second hypothesis predicts that individuals will become less threatened if positively-
valenced coverage increases. This variable takes on values of -1 for those whose 
perceived threat decreased from pre-election to post-election, a value of 0 for those 
whose perceived threat remained constant from pre- to post-election, and 1 for those 
whose perceived threat from China increased during the election season. Notably, this 
THREE-PART CHANGE IN PERCEIVED CHINA THREAT is based directly on the seven-point 
survey question and the accompanying raw scores, not on the binary variable HIGH 
THREAT introduced above. For example, if an individual responded with a “4” in wave 1 
and then a “3” in wave 2 on the seven-point scale, they would be coded as perceiving less 
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threat from pre- to post-election.
17
 Examining the dependent variable in this way, I see 
that 4-in-10 Americans decreased in their perceived threat over-time.  
It is also worth noting that most of the shifts in perceived threat were relatively 
minor. The vast majority (87%) of those who perceived less threat from China from pre- 
to post-election slipped only one or two scale points on the seven-point scale. The same 
pattern holds for those who perceived more threat: 85% changed in their threat perception 
only one or two points. Nonetheless, these minor shifts can be substantively significant; 
13% shifted over the midpoint of the scale, from perceiving China as more of a threat to 
American jobs and security to more of an opportunity for new markets and economic 
investment. 
Table 3.2. Three-Part Change in Perceived China Threat, Pre- and Post-2012 
Presidential Election 
Question wording: “There are different views about China. Some people see China as more of an 
opportunity for new markets and economic investment, while others see it as a threat to our jobs and 
security. Still others are somewhere in between. Which view is closest to your own?” 
Perceive less threat from pre- to post-election (-1) 
38.5%  
(N=952) 
No change in perceived threat (0) 
41.7%  
(N=1,031) 
Perceive more threat from pre- to post-election (+1) 
19.7%  
(N=488) 
Note: Three-part change in perceived China threat is measured using the seven-point interactive scale with 
labeled endpoints and the question above. It is a difference score, where a person is given a 1 if they have a 
higher perceived threat post-election than pre-election, a 0 if their perceived threat remains unchanged 
between the waves, and a -1 if they have a lower perceived threat post-election than pre-election. The data 
shown is unweighted; post-stratification weights do not significantly alter the marginal distribution. 
 
Independent variable: media valence 
 
Most previous persuasion studies have used media measures that cannot reliably 
account for individual media exposure. For example, many studies have relied simply on 
                                                          
17
 In contrast, this individual would be scored as “not high threat” in both waves using the binary dependent 
variable, HIGH THREAT. 
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self-reported measures of how much an individual watches television (Semetko et al., 
1992). Others have asked people how many minutes they spend a day, on average, 
watching news about a particular country (Willnat et al., 2013). But, self-reported media 
measures of this sort—particularly about a given country (e.g., “How much do you read 
news about China?”)—are much more likely to be measures of general political interest, 
or specific interest in China. While there remains some debate in the literature about the 
best way to measure media exposure (Dilliplane, Goldman, & Mutz, 2013; LaCour & 
Vavreck, 2014; Prior, 2009a, 2009b) one thing is clear: without a measure that takes into 
account what people watch, rather than just the amount of news they consume, it is 
impossible to investigate how the content an individual sees affects his or her opinions.  
To address this concern, I rely upon a program-level, list-based measure to 
capture exposure to 45 individual political TV programs (Dilliplane et al., 2013). As part 
of the ISCAP panel, respondents were shown four different lists, each containing 13 
television shows, and asked: “Which of the following programs do you watch regularly 
on television? Please check any that you watch at least once a month.” The listed 
programs were selected based on their rating as the most popular according to Nielsen 
Media Research, yielding a variety of potential sources, from traditional network 
newscasts to cable programs, political talk shows, and political satire (see Appendix III 
for a full list of included programs).
18
 Previous studies demonstrate that this measure has 
high levels of predictive validity as a measure of exposure to political news (Dilliplane et 
                                                          
18
 While this program list includes a number of non-traditional political news shows, such as Ellen, The 
View, Saturday Night Life, The Daily Show, and others, it does not include strictly fictional shows, which 
may depict China. Future work would benefit from examining these shows, as well, as there may be 
references to the country or Chinese stereotypes on these types of media.  
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al., 2013). Changes in this measure of exposure predict changes in candidate knowledge 
over the course of a campaign. Further it demonstrates high reliability based on the more 
exacting Heise measure (Heise, 1969).
19 
There is also a strong positive relationship 
between the number of shows individuals report watching and the total amount of news 
they consume, according to viewership data (LaCour & Vavreck, 2014).
20
   
 To create the ultimate independent variable of valence, I merge information about 
which programs individuals report watching with an original content analysis. To do this, 
I use the program STAT!—Searchable Television as Text—to query a database that 
contains the closed-caption text of 23 of the 45 television shows individuals were asked 
about on the ISCAP panel.
 
Because not all of the 45 programs were available via closed 
captioning and accessible via STAT!, I downloaded transcripts of the remaining shows 
from three additional sources: LexisNexis, Newsbank, and Factiva.
21
 I examined all 
transcripts for the two-week period prior to wave 1 and wave 2, respectively.  
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 Using the Heise (1969) method, Dilliplane, Goldman, and Mutz found that the program list measure had 
a true-score reliability as good or better than previous media measures, including total number of political 
TV programs watched per week, total minutes of TV watched per week, and total days of TV watched per 
week. The average true-score reliability across all 49 political programs was 0.88 (2013). 
20
 Some have criticized the measure for its continued reliance on self-reported data, the cognitive burden 
imposed on the respondent to figure out what “news” is, and its exclusion of many types of political news 
content because of the limited shows included on the lists (Prior, 2013). For purposes of this project, 
however, these limitations are somewhat tempered because I am comparing individuals to themselves. 
Individuals are likely to consistently over- or under-report exposure over time, and their fundamental 
understanding of the question is unlikely to differ in the months between the two waves. While these flaws 
may add a great deal of noise to the independent variables, as individuals may have seen China-related 
content that I do not capture via this measure, they likely report viewership similarly at both points in 
time—meaning that the bias is consistent. Another criticism of the measure is that it treats individuals who 
watch the same number of programs but very different amounts of the program the same (Prior, 2013). 
However, again, as I am not interested in comparisons across viewers, but rather changes in one 
individual’s opinions as content changes, this is not a significant problem for this study.  
21
 Even using these four different sources, there were four shows for which there were no transcripts 
available: The View, Jimmy Kimmel Live, The Late Show with David Letterman, and the Late Late Show 
with Craig Ferguson. 
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 I chose to use three key search terms: China, Chinese, and Beijing—the same 
three terms that nearly all content analyses focused on China have already used (X. Wang 
& Shoemaker, 2011; Willnat & Luo, 2011; Willnat et al., 2013).
22
 Using STAT! for the 
programs available via SnapStream and hand-coding for the others, I captured 50 words 
on either side of one of these three keywords (see Appendix II for the full coding 
scheme). The word China, Chinese, or Beijing plus the adjacent 100 words is considered 
a single China reference. If there were multiple references within a given program, even 
as part of the same news segment (e.g., a five-minute story about a new campaign ad 
related to China), I coded the valence of each reference separately, as long as the 
keywords were more than 50 words apart from one another. In each case, the valence was 
coded as negative (-1), neutral (0), or positive (1).
23 
A second independent coder coded a 
randomly selected 10% of the references, yielding a Krippendorff’s alpha reliability 
coefficient of 0.83. 
 I use these coded references to create a number of independent variables that take 
into account a given individual’s media diet. Because each individual was asked to name 
the television programs that he or she watched, I used the content of those programs to 
create a COUNT OF CHINA REFERENCES that were aired during the two weeks prior to the 
survey period on the programs that each individual reported watching. For example, if an 
individual reported watching 60 Minutes and The Colbert Show, his or her COUNT OF 
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 These three terms are highly precise at generating only references that are relevant to the question at 
hand—coverage of the country, China—with one notable exception: the expression “a bull in a china 
shop.” This reference, which occurred only 18 times over the course of the study period, was excluded. 
23
 For example, if one news program featured a five-minute discussion of a new advertisement and 
mentioned the word China three times, I would code each one of those three references, even though they 
were all part of the same general news segment, as long as they were separated from one another by more 
than 50 words. Each score would then be summed and contribute to an individual’s COUNT OF CHINA 
REFERENCES. 
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CHINA REFERENCES would be all of the references to China aired on those two particular 
programs, and not on the other programs.
 24
 I choose a period of two weeks because I 
expect these effects to be relatively short-term. Not only are most media effects relatively 
short-term (Zaller, 1996, 2002), but it is especially likely in this type of domain, as 
individuals typically know and care little about foreign affairs (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 
1997; Pew Research Center, 2007; Rosenau, 1961). As a result, they are likely to have 
relatively more malleable attitudes toward foreign countries, influenced heavily by the 
media climate of the day. In many ways, this resembles Zaller’s model of opinion 
formation, wherein attitudes are viewed as a sample of what individuals have received 
and accepted (1992). In this instance, if negative media coverage of China has declined, 
then there will be less reception of that narrative, and this shift should be reflected in 
attitudes.  
In this same manner, I created scores for the PERCENT OF POSITIVE CHINA 
REFERENCES, PERCENT OF NEUTRAL CHINA REFERENCES, and the PERCENT OF NEGATIVE 
CHINA REFERENCES an individual may have seen as part of the total count of references to 
China that aired on the programs that he or she typically watched (Table 3.3). If 
individuals had no references as part of their news consumption (e.g. COUNT OF CHINA 
REFERENCES for that individual equals zero), the individual was also assigned a zero for 
his or her percentages. 
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 In contrast to studies that use set-top boxes or viewership data (e.g., LaCour and Vavreck, 2014), I am 
only able to examine the valence of all references to China across the programs an individual reports 
watching, rather than narrowing it to only the China-related references when a given individual had his or 
her TV on. 
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Table 3.3. Measuring Media Exposure and Valence  
Independent variable Wave Mean Median Min Max SE 
Count of China references* 
Pre-election  15.18 3 0 253 0.65 
Post-election 3.78 0 0 181 0.22 
Percent of positive China*  
       references 
Pre-election  3.01 0 0 100 0.20 
Post-election 4.66 0 0 100 0.30 
Percent of negative China  
       references* 
Pre-election  19.65 0 0 100 0.54 
Post-election 12.89 0 0 100 0.57 
Percent of neutral China  
       references* 
Pre-election  46.63 50 0 100 0.89 
Post-election 28.64 0 0 100 0.85 
Note: A “China reference” is any reference to China, Chinese, or Beijing. For each individual, the count of China 
references are all those that aired two weeks before his or her survey date on the television programs that he or she 
reported watching. The valence of each reference was coded as positive (+1), negative (-1), or neutral (0). The 
percent of positive, neutral, and negative China references are the total number of positive, negative, or neutral over 
the count that the individual may have seen.  * indicates a statistically significant difference (p  < 0.05) from pre- to 
post-election using a two-tailed t-test.  
 
Finally, in order to test my hypotheses, it is necessary to create each of these 
variables at two points in time. For the first wave—collected before the 2012 election—
this was straightforward. All individuals were surveyed at the same time, so I coded 
references to China in the two weeks preceding the election. However, because the 
second wave was randomly released to respondents over more than two months, I need to 
account for changes in the media environment during that period. Thus each of the 
variables described above is calculated using the references to China on the programs that 
he or she watched in the two weeks preceding when he or she took the second wave of 
the survey.  
Even when the topic was the same, the valence of references often varied. For 
example, in the lead-up to the election, one event that received a great deal of coverage 
was a series of ads that Mitt Romney aired, suggesting that a Chrysler automotive factory 
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was leaving Ohio and moving to China.
25
 Many references were explicitly negative. For 
example, Rachel Maddow, host of The Rachel Maddow Show, on October 26, discussed 
Romney’s policy as projected in the Chrysler ads, declaring: “He has a stance on China, 
which is a country that is ripping our heart out. We do nothing to protect ourselves, and 
so we’re being trampled…” 
The valence with which China was covered in other segments was more neutral, 
simply discussing the facts of the misleading ads—even if the valence of the candidate 
coverage was sometimes substantially more negative. One example is The Ed Show on 
October 26:  
It’s not surprising Mitt Romney would lie about car manufacturing jobs going to 
China. If he admits the truth, he’s finished in Ohio. So, he’s out there actually 
creating a story, telling people that a plant is going to be shut down by Chrysler 
and the jobs are going overseas. Nothing could be further from the truth. This is 
just falling right into the hands of the Obama campaign.  
 
While a minority, some references to the issue were even positive, discussing how 
factories opening in China indicate economic progress for the United States.
26
 On 
MSNBC Live on October 26,
 
the hosts declared:  
This is a misreading of a Bloomberg Report that was reporting good news. Global 
demand for Jeeps has risen to the point where they can sell more in China and they 
want to build Jeeps over there. This is good news for American companies, not bad 
news. They are not shipping American jobs overseas. This doesn’t mean less work for 
Americans. This means they are adding, that they are expanding overseas. Thanks to 
the auto bailout, Chrysler stuck around to win again. 
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 This claim proved to be false, as Chrysler was opening a factory in China to cater to the increasing 
Chinese demand, rather than shuttering its Ohio factory and outsourcing jobs.  
26
 Notably, even neutral and positive references that refute the claims in the ads still mention China in 
conjunction with issues like job loss and outsourcing.  
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Fixed effects models 
In order to examine how the PERCENT OF POSITIVE CHINA REFERENCES, PERCENT 
OF NEUTRAL CHINA REFERENCES, and the PERCENT OF NEGATIVE CHINA REFERENCES affect 
HIGH THREAT and THREE-PART CHANGE IN PERCEIVED CHINA THREAT, I rely upon the 
panel data described above, specifically testing how changes in valence of coverage of 
China is related to change in perceived threat from China. Outside of an experiment, 
fixed effects models of within-person change are the strongest possible test of causality 
(P. D. Allison, 2009). Whereas in most observational designs, one has to measure and 
control for all possible spurious causes of association, in a fixed effects model, each 
respondent serves as his or her own control. As a result, stable characteristics cannot 
produce spurious associations. While spuriousness due to other variables that change over 
time is still a problem, it is possible to use variables that represent the passage of time 
(WAVE) to control for the sum-total of everything else that changed between the election 
and the inauguration, making it unnecessary to include each and every time-varying 
variable that could cause spurious associations.  
 
The effects of media coverage on perceived threat 
Before turning to the key hypotheses in the paper about the effects of the valence 
of coverage, it’s important to confirm the anecdotal evidence discussed above: that there 
was not only more coverage of China before the 2012 election, but also that it was 
substantially more negative. To do this, I looked systematically at overall media coverage 
both before the election and during the pre-inauguration period (rather than just what was 
consumed by the random sample, which I will turn to next). First, the content analysis 
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reveals that the sheer amount of coverage of China was higher during the election period 
than in the post-election period. Substantially more references to China appeared in 
advance of the election than in the weeks between the election and the inauguration. 
Whereas there were between 152 and 227 references to China per week in the two weeks 
preceding the election, the number fell precipitously in post-election weeks, down to a 
low of 16 in late December. Even the once-in-a-decade leadership transition in China 
received relatively little coverage. The only major spike in references following the 
election was a week-long period in which all the Fox News programs “debriefed” the 
election—focusing in great detail on many programs about the Chrysler ads discussed 
earlier (Figure 3.1). 
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This increase happened because the majority of references to China in the lead-up 
to the election involved some reference to the campaign. This total includes not only the 
campaign ads, but also campaign speeches, talk show hosts’ analyses of the candidates’ 
platforms, and even excerpts from the debates.
27
 The majority of this coverage—
particularly in advance of the election—was negative. For example, in the weeks 
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 Independent coding indicates that China was referenced two times in the first debate, and 11 times in 
each of the next two debates. Countries were coded as mentioned if the people (e.g., Chinese), capital (e.g., 
Beijing), or country name were mentioned. China was also the most referenced country in both Romney 
and Obama’s speeches; only Iran was covered nearly as much.   
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Figure 3.1. More China-Related References Pre- than Post-2012 
Election, Mainly Campaign-Related 
Count % of references related to the campaign
Note: China references are any references to "Beijing," "China," or "Chinese" across 41 of the top Nielsen-
ranked political television programs, coded as part of an original content analysis. References are coded as 
campaign-related if they mention the presidential candidates, debates, campaign ads, or the election. 
Election 
Xi 
Jinping 
assumes 
Fox programs do election recap 
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preceding the election, between 44% and 54% of all references were negative, a number 
that drops precipitously afterward, excluding key spikes such as the Fox News recap. 
Notably, there was very little positive coverage in either time period (Figure 3.2). 
 
 
However, my independent variables are not about media coverage in general, but 
rather about what individuals were likely to have been exposed to, given the particular 
programs that they watched. Returning to Table 3.3, we can examine individual media 
exposure and valence. First, we see that that there were statistically significant changes 
between the pre- and post-election period in what people may have been exposed to. The 
average number of references to China in an individual’s media diet decreased 
substantially from pre- to post-election. The variance was also extremely large; some 
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Figure 3.2. Majority of Pre-Election Coverage Was 
Negatively-Valenced; Negative and Neutral Coverage 
Always Susbstantially Greater than Positive 
% negative % neutral % positive
Note: China related references across 41 political television programs were coded for positive, 
neutral, or negative valence. A random sample of 10% of references were coded by a second coder 
and yielded a Krippendorff’s Alpha reliability coefficient of 0.83.   
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individuals saw a great deal of China-related coverage, even while the average individual 
saw a mere three references in advance of the election and none following it. Table 3.3 
also shows that the percentage of negative, positive, and neutral news that individuals 
were exposed to decreased substantially—and negative news always outpaced positive 
news as a percentage of an individual’s news diet.  
It’s also important to examine whether or not a perceived China threat did 
significantly change between the pre- and post-election period. Before the election, 
Americans had a slightly negative impression of China: on average, individuals saw 
China as more of a threat to U.S. jobs and security (the top end of the scale) than as a 
opportunity for new markets and investment (the bottom end of the scale). Following the 
election, individuals saw China as slightly less of a threat.
28
  
Having established that (1) there was a great deal more coverage of China in 
advance of the election, that (2) much of it was negative, and that (3) there was a shift in 
valence between the pre- and post-election periods, I can turn to my hypotheses that 
changes in media valence will produce corresponding changes in perceived threat from 
China, in the direction of the valence. I turn first to the fixed effects logistic model 
predicting changes in perceived HIGH THREAT (Table 3.4).
29 
Results indicate that an 
increase in the PERCENT OF NEGATIVE CHINA REFERENCES that one consumes as part of his 
or her news diet significantly increases the likelihood that he or she will perceive HIGH 
                                                          
28
 At Wave 1, the mean of the seven-point scale was 5.01 and the median was 5—both above the midpoint. 
At wave 2, the mean fell to 4.93. A paired two-tailed t-test indicates that the difference between them is 
statistically significant (p < 0.05). 
29
 Results here and throughout the rest of the analyses are unweighted. However, substantive findings are 
largely unaffected by using post-stratification weights. Weighted results can be found in Appendix V 
(Appendix Tables 5.1 and 5.2) and a description of the weighted and unweighted samples as well as a 
comparison to Current Population Survey (CPS) estimates can be found in Appendix IV. 
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THREAT from China (Model 2). This evidence offers suggestive support for my first 
hypothesis (H1). But, more counterintuitively, results also indicate that an increase in the 
PERCENT OF POSITIVE CHINA REFERENCES also increases the likelihood that an individual 
perceives HIGH THREAT, which runs counter to my second hypothesis (H2). 
 
Table 3.4. Explaining Change in Perceived High Threat from China (Binary) Using 
Media Exposure and Valence  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Wave -0.078* -0.105# 
 (0.041) (0.078) 
   
Percent of negative China references  0.623*** 
(0.161)   
   
Percent of positive China references  0.896** 
(0.328)   
   
Percent of neutral China references  0.062 
(0.098)   
   
Constant 0.556*** 0.637** 
 (0.307) (0.465) 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.001 0.008 
N 2,471 2,234 
Note: Results shown are from a fixed effects logistic regression model using two points in time: pre-
election and post-election. The dependent variable is a binary variable where those who say China is 
primarily a threat to jobs and security are coded as 1 and those who said otherwise are coded as 0. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Significance values are indicated with # p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** 
p<.001. 
 
One possible explanation for this surprising finding about the effect of positive 
coverage may be found in the types of coverage that were positively-valenced. In 
particular, most of them present a situation in which both the United States and China are 
benefiting economically. For example, the positive reference discussed earlier was about 
a report of Chrysler not shipping jobs to China, but rather manufacturing Jeeps in China 
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because of growing global demand—an implied “win-win” situation for the two 
countries. Similarly, the Fox Report with Shepard Smith discussed Chinese investment in 
the United States with a Los Angeles realtor:  
From California to New York, the Chinese are paying cash for high-end multi-
million dollar homes with special kitchens, in-law suites, the like. It’s been 
fantastic for the U.S. housing market because we have not suffered as other 
communities have. In fact, our property values increased. Forty percent of these 
houses they buy are investment properties, and sometimes they buy two or three 
at a time in foreclosure states like Nevada and Arizona. 
 
While not explicit, the subtext in this real estate example is that the Chinese are also 
extremely wealthy—so wealthy that they are moving overseas to buy the homes in the 
United States that many Americans cannot afford. Thus despite this being positively-
valenced and showing benefits for the United States, it nonetheless may be leading 
individuals to think about how much of an economic win China is getting.  
Given that the vast majority of coverage of China, especially before the election, 
was about the economy, positive coverage may simply remind people about the link 
between China and the economy—which for many, is likely to be knee-jerk negative. 
Research shows that negating a frame may still activate it; for example, Richard Nixon 
declaring himself not to be a crook still causes people to think about him in the context of 
scandal (Lakoff, 2005). In the case of media coverage of China, talking about China in a 
positive context may not register with individuals; they may have no mental framework 
with which to consider China and the economy positively. Rather, positive references like 
that on The Rachel Maddow Show discussed earlier (“…This is good news for American 
companies, not bad news. They are not shipping American jobs overseas…”) may simply 
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remind individuals that China and unpopular concepts like America job loss and 
outsourcing are linked.  
This argument is important, because other research shows that Americans tend to 
view trade in a zero-sum context (Mutz & Kim, 2016). Half of Americans believe that if 
trade helps one country, it hurts another—and this is particularly true with regard to jobs. 
In fact, only 11% think that trade is a “gain-gain” proposition (Mutz & Kim, 2016). For 
the half of Americans who view trade through the lens of intergroup competition, both 
countries benefiting from trade is actually less appealing than America benefiting more 
than a foreign country.  
 
Alternate specifications 
Because the second wave of the survey was rolled out randomly over a 10-week 
period, it may be important to take into account when the respondent completed his or her 
second survey. As Figure 3.1 indicates, there are some notable differences in how much 
China was covered during the period between the election and inauguration. While most 
weeks had relatively little coverage, Fox News flooded the airwaves with election recap 
information during one particular week. Moreover, major events like the once-a-decade 
leadership change took place in China between the two waves. This means that even with 
a control variable for changes in valence of China coverage, there may also be cause to 
control for time period in order to account for major differences in the topics of coverage 
across the 10-week period. One way to examine these differences is to control for the 
time period in which people completed their second survey. In Table 3.5 Model 1, I 
control for these differences in time period by introducing a dummy variable for the 
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month in which the second survey wave took place. Results indicate that there is no 
independent effect for the month in which the survey took place. Moreover, controlling 
for this temporal variation does not affect the earlier substantive findings.   
Table 3.5. Explaining Change in Perceived High Threat from China (Binary) Using 
Media Exposure and Valence – Additional Specifications 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Wave -0.091# -0.091# -0.088# -0.252*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.068) 
     
Percent of negative China references 0.519*** 0.523*** 0.530*** 0.119 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.154) (0.161) 
     
Percent of positive China references 0.960*** 0.966*** 1.026*** 0.643* 
 (0.268) (0.269) (0.308) (0.281) 
     
Percent of neutral China references 0.107 0.108 0.032 -0.305* 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.094) (0.127) 
     
Month of second survey  
         (1=Nov, 2=Dec, 3=Jan) 
0.066 
(0.048) 
   
    
Battleground state  0.150# 0.054  
  (0.085) (0.120)  
     
Battleground state x percent of  
        negative China references 
  -0.036 
(0.291) 
 
    
Battleground state x percent of  
        positive China references 
  -0.252 
(0.624) 
 
    
Battleground state x percent of  
        neutral China references 
  0.302 
(0.184) 
 
    
Constant 0.392 0.486 0.494 2.139*** 
 (0.390) (0.378) (0.379) (0.576) 
Observations 2078 2078 2078 1367 
R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Note: Results shown are from a fixed effects logistic regression model using two points in time: pre-
election and post-election. The dependent variable is a binary variable where those who say China is 
primarily a threat to jobs and security are coded as 1 and those who said otherwise are coded as 0. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Significance values are indicated with # p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** 
p<.001. 
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Given the regularity with which China was highlighted as part of the campaign, 
including in advertisements, it is possible that individuals living in “swing states”—
places where campaigns spent more money to try to influence voters—would have been 
exposed to more and different China-related content. To test whether those living in 
battleground states were more affected by changes in media valence of China-related 
coverage, I created a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent lived in a 
swing state or not. My list of swing states includes the 11 states considered toss-ups by 
polling aggregator Real Clear Politics during the two weeks prior to election day: 
Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin (“2012 Election Maps - Battle for White House,” 
2012). Results in Model 2 indicate that those who lived in one of these 11 states (27% of 
the population) were slightly more likely to increase in threat between the two waves than 
were those living elsewhere. However, as the interactions in Model 3 indicate, while 
people in battleground states increased in threat more between the two waves than those 
outside of battleground states, they did not react differently to changes in media valence. 
Increases in negatively- and positively-valenced coverage of China led to an increase in 
perceived threat from China for all individuals. 
 Finally, it’s important to note that even in the pre-election time period—a time of 
relatively increased China-related coverage—many Americans still were not exposed to 
any content about China. Prior to the election, 35% saw no references; between the 
election and the inauguration, the percentage whose television diet included no references 
rose to 54%. Notably, there are theoretical reasons that even those with no television 
exposure to China-related coverage might change their perceived threat from China 
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during the time period, including changes in the general atmosphere as the China-bashing 
frenzy died down or changes in other media.
30
 But, as the key independent variables in 
this study are changes in media valence in an individual’s media are changes in valence 
in an individual’s regular media. For this reason, it’s important to examine separately 
how changes in media valence affect only those exposed to at least some coverage of 
China in the pre-election period.  
Results in Model 4 indicate that for this group of individuals, results are slightly 
different. Whereas changes in the amount of positively-valenced coverage affect these 
individuals in the same way as those whose television media diet included no references 
to China, negatively-valenced media no longer appears to have an independent effect. 
Additionally, an increase in the percent of neutrally-valenced China related references 
leads to a decrease in perceived threat over time. In other words, as the proportion of an 
individual’s news diet that fixates on China features ordinary or neutrally-valenced 
events—such as Xi Jinping taking power, Beijing’s votes in the Security Council, and 
other factual, less emotionally-charged stories—their perceived threat levels decrease. 
These neutral stories appear to help counterbalance the threatening nature of the 
negatively- and positively-valenced coverage. 
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 Notably, my media measures only capture changes in the valence of China-related coverage on 
television. For individuals who only consumed radio or newspapers (or, who consumed those other media 
in addition to a television diet that lacked China-related references), changes in valence in their media diet 
would not be captured. Yet, if we expect changes in the valence on those platforms to largely mirror those 
found on television, then this type of individual might change with regard to perceived China threat, but yet 
have zeroes on each of my key independent variables. Beyond this, one might also think of the theoretical 
work on the “two-step flow” and the effects of media as translated through interpersonal communication 
(Katz, 1957). If China-bashing occupied a relatively large segment of the pre-election newshole, it may 
have come up around the water cooler at work or in ordinary conversation more in the pre-election period 
than the pre-inauguration period.  
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Given the counter-intuitive nature of the effects of positively-valenced coverage, 
it is also worth examining changes in threat, more generally—as the previous analyses 
simply looked at whether people’s perceived threat increased, or not. To do this, I turn to 
my alternate dependent variable: THREE-PART CHANGE IN PERCEIVED CHINA THREAT.
31
 
Once again, my independent variables represent a change over time; in each case, the 
percent of each type of references at Wave 2 is subtracted from Wave 1, with positive 
scores representing an increase over time and negative ones a decrease over time. 
Because the dependent variable is a three-part variable, I use ordered logistic regression 
to predict the change in perceived threat from China on the basis of the changes in 
differently valenced China references. These results are presented in Table 3.6.  
Turning first to Model 1, as the PERCENT OF NEUTRAL REFERENCES in a given 
individual’s news diet increases over time, their perceived threat from China 
decreases. Once again, neutrally-valenced references to China appear to 
counterbalance the effects of positively- and negatively-valenced coverage, which 
earlier results suggest push in the same direction. This trend is most clearly visible in 
Figure 3.3, which displays predicted probabilities for the changes in perceived threat 
as a function of the change in PERCENT OF NEUTRAL REFERENCES, with the change in 
positive and negative China-related references set at their means.  
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 Because it is impossible for those who were already at the top end of the seven-point scale to become 
more threatened by China (22.1%), nor for those who were at the bottom end of the scale (2.6%) to become 
less threatened, I also ran these regressions using Wave 1 attitudes as a control variable. Substantive results 
are largely unchanged and can be found in Appendix V.  
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Table 3.6. Explaining Change in Perceived China Threat (Three-Part Change Scale) 
Using Media Exposure and Valence 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Change in percent of negative  
     China references 
-0.155 
(0.140) 
-0.124 
(0.142) 
-1.457* 
(0.715) 
 
Change in percent of positive  
     China references 
-0.178 
(0.249) 
-0.253 
(0.256) 
0.416 
(1.093) 
 
Change in percent of neutral  
     China references 
-0.222* 
(0.100) 
-0.223* 
(0.100) 
-0.646* 
(0.325) 
 
Change in count of China  
     references 
 -0.002 
(0.002) 
 
   
Saw any pre-election China  
     related references 
  -0.078 
(0.096) 
   
Saw any pre-election  
     references x change in  
     percent negative 
  1.400# 
(0.732) 
   
Saw any pre-election  
     references x change in  
     percent positive 
  -0.511 
(1.124) 
   
Saw any pre-election  
     references x change in  
     percent neutral 
  0.484 
(0.346) 
Cut 1 -0.386*** -0.365*** -0.468*** 
 (0.048) (0.051) (0.076) 
Cut 2 1.431*** 1.454*** 1.353*** 
 (0.058) (0.061) (0.082) 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.001 0.002 0.003 
N 2,085 2,085 2,085 
Note: Results shown are from an ordered logistic regression. The dependent variable is a three-point 
variable where -1 is those whose perceived threat from China decreased from pre- to post-election, 0 is 
those who had no change, and +1 is those whose threat perception increased. The key independent 
variables are difference scores, where the percent of positive/negative/neutral references at Wave 2 are 
subtracted from Wave 1, and positive scores represent an increase over time and negative ones a 
decrease over time. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance values are indicated with # p<.10, * 
p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  
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Note: The graph is the predicted probabilities for the ordered logistic model presented in Table 3.6 Model 1. 
It represents the predicted probabilities for perceived China threat as the percent of neutral China references 
varies—with all other variables in the model set to their means. The relationship is significant at the p < 
0.05 level, indicating that as the percent of neutral China references in an individual’s news diet increases 
over time, their perceived threat level decreases. 
 
However, since these scores are entirely based on the proportion of an 
individual’s news diet, and since we know from the previous examination that the 
sheer amount of coverage of China that individuals saw decreased from the pre-
election to post-election times, it’s also important to examine whether this relationship 
is affected by the amount of coverage an individual saw. Model 2 introduces a control 
variable for the CHANGE IN COUNT OF CHINA REFERENCES that an individual saw 
between the pre- and post-election period. Once again, as the PERCENT OF NEUTRAL 
REFERENCES in an individual’s media diet increases, his or her perceived threat levels 
decrease. 
Once again, it is important to examine only the individuals whose media diet 
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included at least some China related references in the pre-election period. To examine 
the effects of valence only among those who likely saw some content, I created a 
dummy variable for having a diet that contained at least one China-related reference 
before the election—SAW ANY PRE-ELECTION REFERENCES—and interacted it with 
changes in percent negative, neutral, and positive coverage. These results, shown in 
Model 3, indicate that among those who likely saw at least some content, an increase 
in the percent of negatively-valenced media led individuals to be more likely to 
experience an increase in China-related threat—consistent with my hypothesis (H1). 
In contrast, there is no effect for an increase in positively-valenced references (H2).  
Results presented here offer suggestive evidence that negatively-valenced 
coverage of China affects perceived threat from China. However, counterintuitively, 
positively-valenced media has a similar impact. Additionally, the percent of negative, 
neutral, and positive valence in an individual’s media diet appears to affect the 
likelihood that an individual’s opinion changes. Neutral news plays a key role that I 
did not hypothesize, likely due to the unexpected finding that positive- and negatively-
valenced news do not counterbalance, but both lead to higher perceived threat.   
 
Limitations 
 
While not all hypotheses are fully confirmed, results suggest that changes in 
media valence do affect perceived threat from China—and I find these results despite 
one of the key limitations of this study: the noisiness of the independent variables. In 
particular, while the program-level measure is an improvement over past studies, 
utilizing what individuals were likely to have been exposed to in their own, unique 
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media diets, it is still just that—what they were likely exposed to. Without asking 
about not only what particular shows people regularly watch (the measure used in this 
study)—but also which dates and times they watched them (and, more to the point, 
whether or not they actually paid attention to the content, rather than flipping between 
stations, muting, and so on), the measure has a great deal of noise. Additionally, the 
program-list measure asks only about particular shows and necessarily excludes some 
content like special reports and election returns (LaCour & Vavreck, 2014; Prior, 
2013). Moreover, individuals may have seen a great deal of content about China on 
programs that they did not believe qualified as “news” when answering the survey 
question (including fictional programs), which would be excluded from my measures.  
A further limitation of the study is the content analysis. While there was high 
inter-coder reliability, I designed the coding schema and later taught a second coder 
how to implement it. Both she and I are highly-educated, left-leaning individuals, 
residing in Washington D.C. (and I work on Chinese politics for a living). It may be 
the case that what I think to be positively-valenced coverage of China—and that I 
conveyed to her as part of the coding schema—simply would not be registered as such 
by people with different backgrounds. Future research might benefit from developing 
the coding paradigm in a more “bottom-up” approach, ideally with a more varied set 
of coders.  
Moreover, the content analysis appears to have suffered from one other, 
unforeseen problem: there was a great deal of overlap between the “affective” 
categories (positive and negative) and whether or not the content affected other 
countries—and particularly the United States. For example, whereas a simple 
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reference to China having a great deal of pollution was coded as neutral—a simple, 
factual statement—if the pollution was said to affect its neighbors (e.g. by blowing 
over the border), it was coded as negative. Similarly, references to China’s votes in the 
United Nations were coded as neutrally-valenced, given their factual nature—unless 
the coded reference emphasized how those votes affected America, North Korea, or 
other powers. The tendency to code content that had implications for the United States 
as positively- or negatively-valenced is particularly important in the context of the 
positively-valenced coverage. A post-hoc examination of the counter-intuitive findings 
that positively-valenced coverage is related to an increase in perceived threat from 
China suggests that more than 90% of the positive references not only were economic, 
but were about how America benefits from China’s economy. Given the discussion 
earlier about how Americans may not see economic gains in a “win-win” context, it 
suggests that some of the relationship between positively-valenced coverage of China 
and perceived threat from China may be due to the fact that what was coded as 
“positive” was content about Sino-U.S. economic relations—a fraught concept, likely 
primarily understood by respondents as negative. 
 Additionally, while perceived threat is an important concept, particularly with 
regard to China and the 2012 election cycle, this study relies on a single dependent 
variable. Future work would benefit from examining how media valence affects other 
measures, including favorability, perceptions of bilateral relations, and so on—most of 
which tend to be highly correlated, but nonetheless may be differently affected by 
media coverage. Finally, while the fixed effects models allow me to document changes 
in perceived threat between the pre- and post-election time period and represent a 
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substantial advance over previous methodology, helping to guard against issues of 
ecological fallacy and selective exposure, I nonetheless can only document change 
between these two particular points in time. Future research would benefit from 
understanding how media valence affects attitudes over a longer period, for it would 
give greater insight about how truly long-lasting are the relationships between media 
valence and public opinion of foreign countries.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Results from this study offer some suggestive evidence that media valence 
influences public opinion about foreign countries. More specifically, the analysis 
conducted indicates that the increase in negatively-valenced coverage of China in 
advance of the United States presidential elections affected the opinions that Americans 
hold of China—increasing the degree to which they perceived China to be a threat. This 
result suggests, just as one recent scholar has noted, that, “it is a problem to draw 
conclusions about media effects on China’s image in the news from a cross-sectional 
survey of public opinion without any accompanying analysis of the news conducted in 
the period leading up to the survey” (Semetko, 2016). American public opinion of China 
appears at least somewhat sensitive to how the country is depicted in the media. 
Moreover, the relatively prevalent, one-sided, anxiety-provoking, negative coverage that 
flooded the pre-election media in the United States appears to have—at least 
temporarily—damaged China’s ratings. 
The importance of media valence in affecting public opinion of foreign countries 
also raises a number of potentially important implications for the United States, as China 
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has been increasing its public relations campaigns in the United States in an effort to shift 
the way it is portrayed in U.S. media. For example, only this spring, China’s State 
Council Information Office interviewed five western public relations companies to design 
a campaign to shift the media narrative surrounding China in order to boost its image 
(Tham & Miller, 2016). Annually, China spends between $7 billion and $10 billion on 
subsidies for media outlets to reach non-Chinese foreigners (Brady, 2015), in addition to 
running public relations campaigns in the United States, airing commercials (X. Wang & 
Shoemaker, 2011; J. Zhang & Cameron, 2003), and publishing ads in major periodicals 
like The New York Times. And, beyond even these activities, there may also be many 
secret ones. China has recently been accused of making covert purchases, including a 
radio station that covers the D.C. Beltway area (Qing & Shiffman, 2015). 
Concern about the these efforts is growing in Washington; in March, the Senate 
introduced the Countering Information Warfare Act of 2016 (S.2692)—a bill that follows 
from the long American history countering Russian propaganda, but for the first time 
ever, explicitly references China (Portman, 2016a). It calls for the establishment of the 
Center for Information Analysis and Response—a group that will be tasked with 
monitoring media and propaganda efforts, coordinating in part with the Broadcasting 
Board of Governors, highlighting the important role they believe media to play. As 
Senator Portman, one of the sponsors of the bill, summarized:  
[There’s an] urgent need to counter…the extremely sophisticated, comprehensive, 
and long-term efforts by nation-states to manipulate and control information in 
order to achieve their national objectives…These countries spend vast sums of 
money on advanced broadcast and digital media capabilities, targeted 
campaigns…and other efforts to influence key audiences and populations. China 
spends billions annual on its foreign propaganda efforts, while RT, Russia’s state-
funded 24-7 international news channel reportedly spends $400 million annually 
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just on its Washington Bureau alone. Just one bureau. By contrast, the FY17 
budget request for international broadcasting operations worldwide is only about 
$768 million total (Chu, 2016; Portman, 2016b). 
 
Results from this project suggest that some of Washington’s worry may be well-
placed; the valence of media about foreign countries does appear to affect American 
public opinion. The Chinese, the Russians, or others spending money in America to 
change the media narrative may well end up affecting how Americans feel about their 
countries, if individuals are exposed to these messages. However, results also suggest that 
it may be more difficult to lead Americans to feel more positively about foreign countries 
via positively-valenced media than foreign governments and media outlets likely hope or 
expect. For many of these countries, there may be little bang for the buck—particularly if 
they try to negate the very things that may lead Americans to feel anxious about them. 
This study also suggests that at least in the case of China, it may be particularly hard to 
influence American opinion positively during presidential campaign seasons.
32
 Yet, even 
with this small amount of solace, this study indicates that it is consequential to focus on 
how media portray foreign countries, as the tenor in which they are discussed has 
noticeable effects on how Americans feel. 
Moreover, as will be discussed more in the following two experimental chapters, 
the effects of media valence on public opinion appear to be influential. Negatively-
valenced media cause individuals to hold negative opinions not only of China, but also of 
                                                          
32
 One potentially interesting route for countries to take in their propaganda efforts, suggested by this study, 
would be to attempt to flood the media with neutral stories. Rather than saying that China is good for the 
United States economically, China might benefit from more stories about non-economic topics. With a 
growth of stories about Chinese culture, history, cuisine, ordinary votes in the United Nations, leaders’ 
backgrounds, or the like, the effects of positively and negatively-valenced media might be somewhat 
mitigated. It might also help individuals create a more varied mental picture of China, leading them to see it 
in more than just economic terms—an important change, as results here suggest that the link between China 
and the economy is almost always negative. 
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Chinese people. There also appear to be spillover effects: negatively-valenced media 
about China cause individuals to feel more negatively about Japanese people as well, and 
can even lead to discrimination against Chinese citizens or native Asian individuals in the 
context of domestic college admissions.  
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CHAPTER 4 – THE CAUSAL IMPACT OF POLITICAL ADS ON PUBLIC OPINION OF 
CHINA DURING THE 2012 ELECTION 
 
Given the difficulties in establishing media effects, experiments play an especially 
important role in providing convincing causal evidence. For example, with media effects, 
there is always the possibility that individuals are only watching media that are congruent 
with their existing beliefs—a phenomenon communication scholars refer to as “selective 
exposure.” In this case, the worry would be that individuals who feel threatened by China 
are seeking out negatively-valenced information, thus making any observed relationship 
potentially spurious. In order to better demonstrate causality and to help rule out spurious 
relationships, an experimental design is preferable. Also, with regard to China in 
particular, it remains unclear whether the negative attention the media and politicians 
focus on the country stems from a general assessment that Americans hold negative 
sentiments toward China—and thus they are pandering to the public—or whether the 
negative focus is causing individuals to feel unfavorably toward China.
33
  
Today, elites in China often wring their hands about whether American political 
rhetoric about China and corresponding news coverage of the country is causing 
Americans to feel more negative about their country—and their citizens. During the 2012 
U.S. presidential election, Xinhua, the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, 
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 Most theories of how elites, the media, and public opinion interrelate suggest that elites influence what 
the media cover and how they present key issues.  This influence, in turn, affects how the public feels about 
these topics (see, for example, Entman’s 2003 model of cascade activation or Baum and Potters’s 2008 
supply-and-demand model). Because of the media’s tendency to emphasize official information and 
authoritative sources (Baum & Groeling, 2009; Bennett, 1994; Livingston & Eachus, 1995), media tend to 
respond to elite discourse, covering the tenor of elite rhetoric on whatever issue elites are publicly 
debating—sometimes called “indexing” (Baum & Groeling, 2009; Bennett, 1990; Berinsky, 2009).  Media 
coverage also tends to change in response to elite shifts in opinion (Baum & Groeling, 2009; Hallin, 1984) 
and public opinion often appears to be responsive to these shifts (Baum & Groeling, 2009; Berinsky, 2009; 
Page & Shapiro, 1992).  
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bemoaned the effects American political rhetoric about China was having on views of 
China. Following the second debate, the newspaper declared,  
The presidential campaign reflects an alarming scenario in which China bashing 
has become a ritual. This ritual, however, negatively impacts China-U.S. relations 
and leaves Americans with the impression that China is responsible for their 
country’s decline (Jie, 2012).  
 
The more nationalistic Global Times argued, “Their speeches are misleading the 
American public, who will have more complaints or even resentment toward China.” The 
op-ed also cautioned about the negative consequences of presidential campaign rhetoric 
for international relations, warning: “With mutual discontent accumulating, the slogans 
politicians have chanted may become real actions. Many international conflicts stem from 
the showmanship of politicians” (“Election Rhetoric Drives China to Speak Out,” 2012). 
To date, nearly all research about the effects of media on attitudes toward foreign 
countries has been cross-sectional, and thus unable to demonstrate that the media have a 
causal effect on these opinions. In this chapter, I discuss the previous literature on how 
media affect favorability of foreign countries and experimentally test my hypotheses 
about the causal relationship between negatively-valenced media about China and 
American public opinion of China.  
The limited existing causal evidence 
 
 As explained in more detail in Chapter 2, few studies of how media exposure 
affects public opinion toward specific foreign countries have explored how the valence of 
coverage affects attitudes, focusing instead on agenda-setting, priming, and framing. 
Moreover, few studies of persuasion have gone beyond cross-sectional associations to 
make a strong causal case. Yet some research—including the fixed effects results in 
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Chapter 3—suggests a link between negatively-valenced media and negative opinions of 
China, even if the causal link remains vulnerable to alternative interpretations (see, for 
example: Brewer, 2006; X. Wang & Shoemaker, 2011b; and Willnat et al., 2013b).  
Thus I use an experimental design and hypothesize the following: 
H1: Negatively-valenced media about China will cause individuals to hold more 
unfavorable opinions of the country. 
 
Broadening this focus, one might also expect that negatively-valenced media 
about a country would cause individuals to hold more negative opinions of people from 
that country—yet this has not been studied. Watching more media about China affects the 
degree to which people believe they are informed about China (“subjective knowledge”), 
which in turn affects favorable opinions toward Chinese people (Gries, Crowson, and 
Cai, 2011). But it remains unclear whether there is a direct relationship between media 
exposure and American favorability toward Chinese people. Moreover, these findings 
hinge on an extremely blunt media measure: self-reports of the number of stories an 
individual read about China. Such a measure seems more likely to tap interest in China 
than actual exposure to particular media messages.  
Although there is a dearth of evidence to link media valence with opinions of 
foreign publics, many scholars have found that individuals’ opinions of foreign countries 
and of foreign peoples tend to be closely correlated, even while opinions of the people of 
that country tend to be more positive, on average (Chiozza, 2009; Gries, Crowson, & Cai, 
2011; Isernia, 2006). Thus I hypothesize the following: 
H2: Negatively-valenced media about China will cause individuals to hold more 
unfavorable opinions of the Chinese people. 
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One question that emerges is whether negatively-valenced media about China 
affects views of more than just China and Chinese people. People’s opinions about 
foreign policy tend to be structured by core values like isolationism, ethnocentrism, and 
anti-militarism (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987).
34
 This means that opinions about disparate 
public policy issues and countries are heavily conditioned by these underlying attitudes. 
Similarly, generalized international trust—or the degree to which individuals believe that 
America can trust other nations—affects how Americans perceive specific nations and 
whether they find them friendly or threatening (Brewer, Gross, Aday, & Willnat, 2004). 
To the degree that negatively-valenced media about China may lead individuals to feel 
more negative about international engagement, broadly defined, or to distrust foreign 
nations, it may also lead individuals to feel less favorably toward other foreign countries 
and peoples—especially those that are seen as military or economic competition. One 
framing experiment found, for example, that when participants read a news report about 
conflict between the United States and China, they were more supportive of Russia 
joining NATO, perhaps because individuals saw it as a way to counter a rising China 
(Brewer, 2006). There also appears to be a great deal of consistency in how people 
evaluate foreign peoples; those who dislike immigrants from one country tend to also 
dislike immigrants from most countries (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Sniderman, 
Peri, de Figueiredo Jr, & Piazza, 2000). 
However, even if favorability is affected by more general beliefs about 
isolationism, ethnocentrism, and the like, it does not necessarily follow that negatively-
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 Many scholars have emphasized the important role of isolationism and internationalism in structuring 
belief systems. For example, Sobel (2001) argues that American public opinion of foreign policy in the 
modern era is best seen as cycles of internationalism and isolationism. 
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valenced media stories about China should cause individuals to feel differently about all 
foreign countries and peoples. Rather, I hypothesize that if negatively-valenced media 
stories about China do cause individuals to hold more negative sentiments toward 
countries and peoples other than China, that it should particularly affect countries and 
peoples that are perceived as most similar to China—especially racially. Numerous 
historic examples give rise to this hypothesis. For example, during the 1980s and early 
1990s the media regularly harped on Japan and the threat it posed to the United States 
and to the American economy—a period now regularly referred to as “Japan bashing” (F. 
H. Wu, 2012). The time period was characterized by a large trade imbalance with Japan 
and negative media coverage of the country, much of which speculated about why 
America was losing ground and falling behind (Cummings, 1989; Morris, 2013). This 
contributed to a series of high-profile incidents of racial intolerance against Japanese 
citizens and Asian Americans, more generally. For example, in 1990 in Los Angeles, the 
Human Relations Commission reported a 150% increase in anti-Asian hate incidents and 
similar increases were reported in other major urban areas (Iino, 1994).  
This brings me to my third hypothesis:  
H3: Negatively-valenced media about China will cause individuals to hold more 
unfavorable opinions of countries and peoples that are perceived as racially similar to 
China, but will not affect opinions of other foreign countries and peoples. 
 
A key question is why negatively-valenced media about China should cause these 
changes in favorability. The simplest explanation, of course, is that individuals believe 
the information given to them from the media sources with which they interface. For 
example, if negatively-valenced media coverage declares that China is stealing 
Americans jobs or U.S. intellectual property, individuals then believe those things to be 
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true and think less of China as a result. But, above and beyond this, much of the 
negatively-valenced media about China appears to have been specifically designed to 
produce anxiety about the country. During the course of the 2012 presidential campaign, 
for example, Republican and Democratic strategists described how ads featuring China 
were designed to play into the public’s sense of economic anxiety, featuring music to 
heighten anxiety and presenting content that focused on how Americans were being 
duped, manipulated, and cheated (Harwood, 2012). Trey Hardin, a Republican political 
strategist even declared that the campaigns brought up China because the issue raised 
“the most influential emotion driving voters: fear” (Caldwell, 2012).35 Moreover, content 
analyses indicate that a much of the coverage of China depicts it as a threat to America, 
in conflict with the U.S. or other countries, or as a general economic threat (Peng, 2004; 
Seib & Powers, 2010; Stone & Xiao, 2007; Willnat et al., 2013; J. Zhang & Cameron, 
2003; L. Zhang, 2010).
36
 Drawing upon this, I hypothesize: 
H4: Anxiety about China mediates the relationship between negatively-valenced 
media about China and unfavorable opinions of the country and people.   
 
Finally, if anxiety about China mediates the relationship between negatively-
valenced media and unfavorable opinions of China and Chinese people, then people more 
prone to feel anxiety and more responsive to threats should be even more likely to 
increase their negative sentiments toward China. In particular, I expect authoritarians—or 
those who tend toward conformity, obedience to authority, and outgroup aggression 
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 He added, “It is not clear that most voters truly understand the economic significance of China, but 
playing the fear card doesn’t necessarily require that tutorial by either campaign” (Caldwell, 2012). 
36
 The content analysis in the previous chapter indicated significantly more negative content than positive, 
and a great deal of it depicted China as an economic competitor to the United States.  
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(Hetherington & Suhay, 2011)—to increase unfavorable opinions of China and the 
Chinese more than non-authoritarians following exposure to negatively-valenced media. 
Authoritarians experience unusually high levels of anxiety (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, 
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1988; Duckitt, 2001; Hetherington & Suhay, 
2011; Lipset, 1959; Oesterreich, 2005). As one scholar describes it,  
Authoritarianism is … a personal normative ‘worldview’ about the social value of 
obedience and conformity (or freedom and difference), the prudent and just 
balance between group authority and individual autonomy, and the appropriate 
uses of (or limits on) that authority. This worldview induces both personal 
coercion of and bias against different others (racial and ethnic outgroups, political 
dissidents, moral ‘deviants’) as political demands for authoritative constraints on 
their behavior (Stenner, 2009). 
 
This attitude can be “activated”: those with latent authoritarian predispositions are 
particularly likely to react to threats and then to have their latent preferences manifest in 
expressions of intolerant behavior or attitudes (Stenner, 2005, 2009). As Stenner puts it, 
the authoritarian’s “defensive arsenal” involves differentiating and defending “us” in 
conditions that appear to threaten “us” by excluding and discriminating against “them”— 
racial and ethnic minorities, political dissidents, and moral deviants (2005, 2009). This 
leads me to my final hypothesis: 
H5: Authoritarianism moderates the relationship between negatively-valenced 
media about China and unfavorable opinions of the country, such that more 
authoritarian individuals will increase their unfavorable opinions following 
exposure to negatively-valenced media more than non-authoritarians.  
 
Research design 
 
To test these hypotheses experimentally, I rely on a between-subjects experiment 
conducted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), October 17-19, 2014. Individuals 
were paid 70 cents for their participation in the human intelligence task (HIT) titled: 
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“Watch a short ad and answer some questions—roughly 5 minutes”. They were told that 
the HIT was a survey about politics and education. Participation was limited to those with 
an American IP address and an MTurk lifetime approval rating of 90% or higher; 2,053 
individuals completed the survey, which took an average of 10 minutes.  
Because MTurk is a platform where individuals self-administer surveys, there can 
be some issues with the data quality. First, in self-administered surveys, the experimenter 
lacks full control over and knowledge about whether the respondent was exposed to the 
treatment. Second, individuals may “satisfice”—or complete the survey quickly without 
cognitively engaging with the questions. This latter problem is particularly acute on 
MTurk, since individuals are paid for each survey they complete and able to take multiple 
surveys in quick succession, which may incentivize them to rush through each one to 
generate more income (Berinsky, Margolis, & Sances, 2014; Chandler, Mueller, & 
Paolacci, 2014; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). 
In order to ensure that everyone in my sample was actually exposed to the 
treatment ad, I exclude all individuals who were unable to correctly identify the sponsor 
of the ad that they saw (N=112) and all those who said they could not clearly hear the ad 
(N=68). Additionally, to guard against satisficing, I used a pre-determined cutoff and 
excluded all individuals whose survey completion time was more than two standard 
deviations away from the average time (N=148).
37
 Because the experiment focuses on 
opinion toward China and Chinese—as well as those who are racially similar—I also 
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 Evidence suggests that particularly short response times relative to the average often indicate low data 
quality and that excluding those who rush through the survey may reduce random noise and improve data 
quality, while not substantially altering the marginal distributions and multivariate models (Greszki, Meyer, 
& Schoen, 2015). 
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excluded those who self-identified as Asian (N=152).
38 
Chi-square goodness of fit tests 
indicate that with the exception of whiteness—where exclusions were purposeful—the 
exclusions occurred randomly across conditions (Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1. Mechanical Turk Sample Demographics 
 All participants Final sample for analysis 
Male 50% 48% 
White* 75% 82% 
Black 8% 8% 
Hispanic 7% 7% 
Democrat (including leaners) 56% 54% 
Voted for Obama 51% 48% 
N =  2053 1629 
Note: Respondents were excluded if their response time was more than two standard 
deviations from the average time and if they were unable to correctly identify the sponsor of 
the ad or reported that they were not able to hear it clearly. Those who self-identified as Asian 
were also excluded. * chi-square goodness of fit statistics indicates that the two samples were 
only significantly different (p > .05) with regard to race, where exceptions were purposeful.   
 
The experiment began with a series of demographic questions, including age, 
gender, race, partisanship, and vote choice in 2012 (see above for a comparison of the 
demographics of those individuals who completed the survey and those used in the final 
analysis). As part of this pre-test, individuals were also asked a battery of four questions 
that are regularly used to measure authoritarianism on the American National Election 
Survey. Respondents judged which of two traits across four dimensions concerning 
childrearing is more important: “respect for elders” versus “independence,” “obedience” 
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 If I specified in advance that Asians would be excluded from the task, it might incentivize them to lie in 
order to participate. Rather, it is preferable to allow anyone to participate in the HIT, restricting the sample 
to my target population after collecting the data. 
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versus “self-reliance,” and so on (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). The non-authoritarian 
response in each dichotomy is assigned a zero and the authoritarian response a one, and 
the items are summed. Individuals are considered highly authoritarian if they chose the 
authoritarian trait in three or more of the four pairings (20% of the sample; see Appendix 
VI for the full list of items).
39
 
Following this pre-test, individuals were exposed to a political advertisement 
aired by either Obama or Romney during the course of the 2012 campaign, either 
featuring negatively-valenced coverage of China (in the case of the treatment condition) 
or non-China related coverage (in the case of the control conditions). Individuals 
typically look to trusted opinion leaders to form their opinions on foreign policy issues 
(Baum & Groeling, 2009; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Potter & Baum, 2016; Rahn, 
1993). Thus, in order to strengthen the treatment and to eliminate concerns about counter-
arguing and motivated reasoning (Taber & Lodge, 2006), individuals were exposed to ads 
aired by the candidate whom they supported, using their self-reported 2012 vote (or 
partisanship, in the case of non-voters). For example, those who voted for Romney saw 
Romney-sponsored ads (either a treatment ad or a control, described below), those who 
voted for Obama saw Obama-sponsored ads, and those who did not vote were assigned 
based on reported partisanship. In the case of non-voters who were pure independents, 
respondents were randomly assigned to either Obama or Romney ads.  
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 I use this pre-determined cutoff because it is the most commonly employed in the literature about 
authoritarianism and displays convergent and predictive validity with a number of other traits thought to be 
associated with authoritarianism (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Taub, 2016).  
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Treatments 
I focus on political ads as my stimulus because they were extremely prevalent 
during the campaign (“Bill for China Ads in U.S. Election: $54.3 Million,” 2012) and 
because using actual media content produced by the campaigns increases the 
generalizability of my findings, allowing me to assess the impact that these ads are likely 
to have had in the real world. Additionally, by using negatively-valenced content about 
China that comes from trusted sources, I am able to strengthen the treatment, exposing 
individuals to messages emanating from like-minded candidates, boosting the likelihood 
that individuals will be affected by the short ad.  
 I use four ads—two as treatment and two as control. The full text of the videos is 
available in Appendix VI. The treatment videos are campaign ads that featured China as 
direct economic competition for the United States. For example, in Obama’s video, 
entitled “The Cheaters,” he says, “Mitt Romney has never stood up to the cheaters in 
China. All he’s done is send them our jobs”. In Romney’s video entitled, “Stand up to 
China,” again the focus is on which candidate would be tougher on China, and China is 
presented as “stealing American ideas and technology.”  
The treatment videos are 30-seconds long and feature ominous background music, 
images of American factories closing, and stereotypical images of Chinese factories. The 
control videos—one from each candidate’s actual repertoire of ads—focus on each 
candidate’s position on women’s issues. They are chosen because they are in support of 
the same candidate, but feature no discussion of any foreign countries nor any images of 
Asians. The Obama control ad, “Decision,” shows women discussing Romney’s plan to 
eliminate Planned Parenthood funding. The women in the ad argue that he cannot 
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understand the mindset of a woman who needs to visit the clinics, nor the importance of 
contraceptives to women. In the Romney control ad, “Humanity,” women discuss how 
Obama does not understand the importance of family in the way Romney does, saying 
that Romney respects and understands the importance of family values. In addition to 
featuring two women giving their opinions on the respective candidates and their gender 
policies, both presentations also have images of Obama and Romney. These similarities 
allow me to be confident that any difference in attitude toward China and Chinese—as 
well as toward other countries and peoples—results from negatively-valenced China 
coverage, not general exposure to political advertising or visual representations of either 
candidate. 
 
Dependent variables 
After watching one ad, individuals were asked their opinion of China using an 11-
point scale ranging from very unfavorable (-5) to very favorable (5) (see Appendix VI for 
all question wording). They were also asked two related questions about (1) whether 
China’s emergence as a superpower is bad or good for the United States, and (2) whether 
China is more of a harm to American jobs and security or more of a beneficial economic 
marketplace. This last question also served as the dependent variable in Chapter 3. Items 
were standardized, and averaged into a reliable index (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74), where 
higher scores mean that individuals have a more POSITIVE OPINION OF CHINA. 
In order to test whether negatively-valenced media affect opinions of countries 
other than China, the favorability question was embedded in a randomly ordered battery 
about Japan, Brazil, and India. These countries are carefully selected to allow me to 
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evaluate whether negatively-valenced media about China affects opinions of all countries 
or only certain countries. As discussed above, I expect that if negatively-valenced media 
about China affects other countries, this media is most likely to affect attitudes toward 
Japan—a country that is racially similar to China, and whose historical prominence in 
American media during the period of “Japan bashing” prompted discrimination against 
Asian Americans (Morris, 2013). Yet, to isolate whether the source of concern is based 
on Japan’s racial similarity to the China or on its potential status as a competitor of the 
United States, I contrast Japan with Brazil and India. These latter two countries, along 
with China, are considered to be part of an elite group of rising economies—the BRICS 
(an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).
40
 Following assessments 
of country favorability, individuals were asked a second question, using the same 
(randomly ordered) scale, about opinions toward Japanese, Chinese, Brazilians, and 
Indians.
41
 
Finally, individuals answered three questions that measured their ANXIETY ABOUT 
CHINA. First, they were asked to self-report their anxiety following the advertisement they 
saw. They were also asked whether they believed that China is a threat to the United 
States, and, if so, how much of a threat, and whether they believe that ordinary 
Americans are negatively affected by China. Items were standardized, and averaged into 
a reliable index (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70). The full survey protocol can be found in 
Appendix VI.  
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 Notably, India is also regularly depicted as a major destination for outsourced American jobs in the 
domestic media and was often mentioned alongside China in campaign ads as an economic competitor to 
the United States. 
41
 There are no order effects for either this randomly ordered battery or the previously described one for 
country favorability. 
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Results 
 
I use between-subjects analysis of variance to evaluate my first two hypotheses: 
1) that negatively-valenced media about China decreases POSITIVE OPINION OF CHINA (H1) 
and 2) that negatively-valenced media about China decreases favorability toward the 
Chinese people (H2).
42
 As shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, I find strong support for both H1 
and H2; negatively-valenced media about China decreases POSITIVE OPINION OF CHINA 
(F=7.56, p < 0.01) and decreases favorability toward Chinese people (F=8.21, p < 0.05) 
relative to the control condition. This finding is notable, since in the control condition, 
without exposure to negatively-valenced media about China, the country already receives 
a lower—and statistically significant—rating than each of the other three countries 
evaluated: Brazil, Japan, and India (Figure 4.1). The Chinese people are also held in low 
regard relative to Brazilians and Indians in the control condition (Figure 4.2).
43
 Yet 
despite receiving the lowest rating without exposure, the negatively-valenced content in 
the campaign ad is enough to drive evaluations of China—and the Chinese—down even 
further. 
                                                          
42
 I evaluate opinion of China in two ways—using a reliable index POSITIVE OPINION OF CHINA as well as a 
single, 11-point scale ranging from very unfavorable (-5) to very favorable (5). The latter allows for greater 
comparability with other countries and is presented in the charts below, though I return in greater detail to 
the index when examining my moderation and mediation hypotheses below. I only assess unfavorable 
opinion of Chinese using the latter. As a convention for clarity, in this chapter I will refer to indices in 
capital letters. 
43
 There is a statistically significant difference between views of Indians and Chinese using a one-tailed 
hypothesis test (p < .05).  
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Figure 4.1. Favorability of China, Japan Depressed by 
Negatively-Valenced Media about China 
Control Negatively valenced media about China
Note: Mechanical Turk survey experiement, N=1,629. Mean favorability is presented using a scale from 
very unfavorable (-5) to very favorable (5). * denotes statistically significant differences between the 
control and treatment where p < 0.05.  
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Figure 4.2. Favorability of Chinese, Japanese 
Depressed by Negatively-Valenced Media about 
China 
Control Negatively valenced media about China
Note: Mechanical Turk survey experiement, N=1,629. Mean favorability is presented using a 
scale from very unfavorable (-5) to very favorable (5). * denotes statistically significant 
differences between the control and treatment where p < 0.05.  
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The question then becomes whether the negatively-valenced media about China 
depresses more than just evaluations of China and Chinese people, instead affecting other 
countries—and particularly countries that are racially similar to China (H3). Using the 
11-point favorability scale for each of the four countries, it is clear that these ads—which 
significantly depress opinions of both China and the Chinese—have no effect on 
evaluations of Brazil (F=0.02, p  > 0.05), India (F=0.27, p  > 0.05), or the people from 
either of these two countries (F=0.70, p > 0.05 and F=1.42, p > 0.05, respectively). 
However, they do significantly lower evaluations of Japan (F=5.03, p < 0.05) and 
Japanese people (F=6.17, p < 0.05). This confirms my third hypothesis and indicates that 
these ads do not cause a general negativity toward all peoples and countries—even 
though Brazil and India are also both large, developing economies that could credibly be 
seen as economic competitors to the United States. Rather, there appears to be a racial 
dimension to the relationship—something that will be explored in more detail in the next 
chapter.
44
 It is also worth noting that Japan and China are at different ends of the 
spectrum; whereas individuals had the most negative opinion toward China of the four 
countries, they had the most positive opinion of Japan. Yet, negatively-valenced media 
significantly affected both a well-liked and a relatively disliked country in similar ways.  
My fourth hypothesis interrogates the mechanism underlying these findings: 
whether the relationship between negatively-valenced media about China and POSITIVE 
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 Importantly, individuals were asked to evaluate countries and peoples using only words (e.g., Japan and  
Japanese), not photos. Thus it is reassuring that there is a statistically significant interaction between 
negatively-valenced media about China and education such that more educated people are more likely to 
have unfavorable opinions of Japan and Japanese following the treatment than less educated people. This 
likely results from the fact that only more educated people are likely aware that Chinese and Japanese are 
routinely grouped together as “Asian” (or, in much more antiquated parlance, “Oriental”). Without a fair 
degree of international knowledge, such knowledge about foreign countries and peoples would be unlikely. 
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OPINION OF CHINA is mediated by ANXIETY ABOUT CHINA (Figure 4.3). Testing this 
hypothesis requires a few steps. First, having already demonstrated that negatively-
valenced media about China decreases POSITIVE OPINION OF CHINA (H1), I next need to 
demonstrate that negatively-valenced media about China affects ANXIETY ABOUT CHINA, 
which between-subjects analysis of variance indicates is the case (F=3.95, p < 0.001; 
Figure 4.4). Then, I must show that the effect of negatively-valenced media on POSITIVE 
OPINION OF CHINA declines with the inclusion of ANXIETY ABOUT CHINA in the model.
45
 
Results strongly indicate that this shift is the case; the coefficient on negatively-valenced 
media falls from -0.110 to 0.003 and is no longer statistically significant once anxiety 
about China is included (p > 0.05; Table 4.2, Model 3).  
 
While these steps indicate the likelihood of mediation using the traditional 
method pioneered by Baron and Kenny (1986), a formal test is still necessary to conclude 
that my hypothesis is supported, because their classic test of mediation has been criticized 
for a lack of statistical power and for an incorrect approach to estimating the sampling 
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 Because POSITIVE OPINION OF CHINA and ANXIETY ABOUT CHINA are both measured post-treatment, it is 
impossible to discern if there is a causal relationship between them. This limitation of mediation analysis in 
experiments is discussed more fully in Bullock, Green, and Ha (2010). 
Positive opinion of  
China  
(dependent variable) 
Negatively-valenced 
media about China 
(treatment) 
 
Anxiety about China 
(mediator) 
 
Figure 4.3. Diagram of Mediation Model 
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distribution of an indirect effect (Hayes, 2009; Hayes, Preacher, & Myers, 2011; 
MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002).  
 
 
Following Preacher and Hayes (2004), I test for the hypothesized indirect effect, 
using bootstrapped standard errors to produce a confidence interval for the estimated 
indirect effect size. The resulting 95% confidence interval, based on 1,000 resamples, 
ranges from -0.172 to -0.056. Since this interval does not include zero, there is statistical 
evidence that negatively-valenced China media about China influences ANXIETY ABOUT 
CHINA, which in turn affects POSITIVE OPINION OF CHINA. Not only is my hypothesis 
confirmed—that ANXIETY ABOUT CHINA mediates the observed relationship—but results 
indicate nearly all of the total effect of negatively-valenced media on POSITIVE OPINION 
OF CHINA is mediated by ANXIETY ABOUT CHINA.  
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Anxiety Positive opinion of China
Figure 4.4. Negatively-Valenced Media about China 
Increases Anxiety, Decreases Positive Opinion of China  
Control Negatively valenced media about China
Note: Mechanical Turk survey experiment, N=1,629. The anxiety about China index is an average of 
the Z-scores of three questions: self-reported anxiety, whether individuals believe China is a threat to 
the U.S., and whether they believe ordinary Americans are negatively affected by China; higher 
values indicate more anxiety (Cronbach's alpha = 0.70). The anxiety about China index ranges from -
1.41 to 1.99. The positive opinion of China index is the average of the Z-scores of three questions: 
favorability, whether China is more harmful to jobs and security or a beneficial economic market, and 
whether China's emergence as a superpower is bad or good  for the United States (Cronbach's alpha 
= 0.74). The positive opinion of China index ranges from -1.97 to 1.94. ). In both cases, differences are 
statistically significant (p< 0.05).  
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Table 4.2. Anxiety about China Mediates the Relationship between Negatively-
Valenced Media about China and Positive Opinion of China  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent variable Positive opinion 
of China 
Anxiety 
about China 
Positive opinion 
of China 
Negatively-valenced media 
about China (0=control, 
1=treatment) 
-0.110** 
(0.040) 
0.139*** 
(0.035) 
0.003 
(0.028) 
 
Anxiety about China   -0.816** 
(0.019)    
    
Constant 0.055 -0.070** -0.001 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.019) 
N 1,629 1,629 1,629 
R
2
 0.005 0.010 0.512 
Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from ordinary least squares regression analysis. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable, positive opinion of China, is an average of the Z-
scores of three questions: favorability, whether China is more of harmful to jobs and security or a 
beneficial economic market, and whether China’s emerge as a superpower is bad or good for the 
United States (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74). The positive opinion of China index ranges from -1.97 to 
1.94. Negatively-valenced media about China is a dummy variable presenting whether the 
individual was in the control condition or exposed to the treatment—negatively-valenced media 
about China. Anxiety about China is an average of the Z-scores of three questions: self-reported 
anxiety, whether individuals believe China is a threat to the U.S., and whether they believe ordinary 
Americans are negatively affected by China; higher values indicate more anxiety about China 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70). The anxiety about China index ranges from -1.41 to 1.99. Significance 
values are indicated with # p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
My fifth and final hypothesis is that POSITIVE OPINION OF CHINA will decrease 
following exposure to negatively-valenced China-related media more among 
authoritarians than among non-authoritarians. Before testing this moderation hypothesis, 
it is worth examining whether authoritarians are, indeed, more anxious following 
exposure to negatively-valenced media about China. Results indicate that they are 
(F=13.76, p < 0.01). Even in the control condition, authoritarians are slightly more 
anxious about China, but the magnitude of the difference between non-authoritarians and 
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authoritarians is more than seven times as large after exposure to negatively-valenced 
media about China.
46
  
Having confirmed that authoritarians do appear to be more prone to anxious 
reactions than non-authoritarians, I move on to test my moderation hypothesis. The 
results of this moderation test indicate that there is a statistically significant interaction 
between exposure to negatively-valenced media about China and authoritarianism 
(F=6.68, p < 0.01; Figure 4.5). Those high in authoritarianism responded more strongly 
to the experimental treatments and their POSITIVE OPINION OF CHINA decreased more 
following exposure to the negatively-valenced China related content.   
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 In the control condition, non-authoritarians have a mean anxiety about China of -0.08, compared to -0.04 
for authoritarians. In the treatment condition, non-authoritarians have a mean anxiety about China of 0.01, 
compared to 0.301 for authoritarians. 
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Figure 4.5. Authoritarians' Opinion of China More Affected 
by Negatively-Valenced Media about China 
Low authoritarian High authoritarian
Note: Mechanical Turk survey experiement, N=1,629. The positive opinion of China index is the average 
of the Z-scores of three questions: favorability, whether China is more harmful to American jobs and 
security ora beneficial economic market, and whether China's emergence as a superpower is bad or 
good for Americans (alpha = 0.74). This variable ranges from -1.97 to 1.94. High authoritarianism is an 
additive index of whether individuals prefer discipline and respect to independence in child-rearing; 
high authoritarians are those who choose the authoritarian trait in three or more of the four forced 
dicohotomies. The interaction between negatively-valenced media about China and high-
authoritarianism is statistically significant (F=6.68, p < .01). 
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Results from this experiment offer strong evidence that exposure to negatively-
valenced media about a country can cause unfavorable opinions of both that country and 
its citizens. It lends support to the concerns raised by the Chinese government—that anti-
China rhetoric during the course of the U.S. campaign may cause people to believe that 
China a threat, and to hold more negative opinions of the country. These changes in 
opinion are visible despite the fact that this experiment posed a difficult test of this 
hypothesis. Namely, a mere 30-seconds of exposure significantly depressed opinions 
toward a country and its people that were already seen in a relatively negative light 
compared to other countries. Moreover, prior to exposure, most Americans were likely 
familiar with China, likely having been exposed to more rhetoric about it than other 
countries in the year leading up to the experiment, due to frequent campaign rhetoric.
47
  
Limitations 
 
While these results offer some of the first causal evidence of the effects of 
negatively-valenced media on opinions of foreign countries and peoples, nonetheless 
there are some limitations to my findings. First, there are issues of external validity. 
Mechanical Turk is not a probability sample, and users of the platform may not be 
representative of the American population as a whole.
48
 The sample in this survey, for 
example, leans more Democratic than the population as a whole. Estimates from a Pew 
Research Center survey conducted December 8-13, 2015 indicate that 46% of the 
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 Some subjects likely had already even seen the treatment videos, thus making their robust effects even 
more notable. 
48
 For certain experiments, MTurkers have been shown to be more representative of the U.S. population 
than in-person convenience samples (like those composed of college sophomores). In addition, average 
treatment effects found using this platform are often comparable to those obtained using more traditional 
samples (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012).  
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American public identifies as Democrats or leans Democratic, whereas that affiliation is 
54% of the sample employed here. Moreover, the sample employed here is more 
educated than the American public as a whole. Whereas 55% of the sample has a 
bachelor’s degree, 2014 CPS data indicates that no more than 35% of the American 
public has completed college.  
However, to the degree that these differences might bias results, they likely lead 
to smaller effects than we would observe in the population as a whole. Results in this 
experiment as well as in the broader literature suggest that Republicans respond more to 
threats than do Democrats (Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014; Lilienfeld & Latzman, 
2014). Less educated people also tend to be more susceptible to the persuasive effects of 
media messages (Petty & Cacioppo, 2012; Wood & Kallgren, 1988; Wood, Kallgren, & 
Preisler, 1985). While Mechanical Turk samples also tend to be slightly younger than the 
general population, there is no theoretical or empirical reason that I would expect age to 
affect the magnitude of the effects. 
The treatments may also affect the external generalizability of the experiment. 
While the ads used are quite comparable to other ads aired at the time, nonetheless, I 
relied on only two treatment advertisements.
49
 These ads may have been unique in some 
way and caused the observed results in a manner that other political advertisements (or 
more general media coverage) would not. The negatively-valenced media about China 
used as a treatment in this study also caused anxiety about China, and not all negatively-
valenced media will necessarily prompt such a reaction. Moreover, the negatively-
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 The ads also reflect the same types of rhetoric and tenor that I found in my content analysis in Chapter 3. 
Even the visuals in these particular ads are similar in many ways to other ads aired at the same time, as well 
as those aired in state and local races in 2012. 
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valenced media treatment in this study was about an economic topic, rather than human 
rights, the military, or other subjects. From a theoretical perspective, I expect media 
valence to affect favorability of China across all of these topics, but that assumption is 
not tested in this study.  
Additionally, while results here suggest that anxiety about China mediated the 
relationship between negatively-valenced political ads and opinion of China, there are 
severe limitations to the mediation analysis discussed above. In particular, the mediator—
ANXIETY ABOUT CHINA—was not independently manipulated. Although the treatment was 
randomly assigned, ensuring that it is not related to any unobserved factors that would 
threaten causal inference, the same cannot be said about the mediator; ANXIETY ABOUT 
CHINA may be systematically related to unobserved factors (Bullock, Green, & Ha, 
2010).
50
 As a result, estimates of the degree of mediation may be biased, and may 
overstate the extent of the mediation. Nonetheless, results do clearly demonstrate that 
these negatively-valenced advertisements about China caused individuals to feel more 
anxious about China. Even if this feeling does not mediate the resulting change in 
favorability, it suggests that political strategists during the 2012 presidential election who 
attempted to play on people’s fears were able to do so successfully. 
A further limitation of the mediation analysis is the extremely strong relationship 
between the mediator and the dependent variable. They are highly correlated (r=-0.71), 
suggesting strong conceptual overlap. Future research would benefit from measuring 
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 In experimental parlance, what I need to be able to demonstrate in order to guard against biased 
mediation results is that cov(e1 , e3) = 0 when considering the following three mediation equations: Mi = α1 
+ aXi + ei1 , Yi = α2 + cXi + ei2 , and Yi = α3 + dXi + bMi + ei3. That is, I need to be able to show why 
unobserved factors that affect the mediator are uncorrelated with unobserved factors that affect negative 
opinion of China. 
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anxiety using alternate survey measures as well as other, non-survey indicators (e.g., 
biometric data). 
The controlled nature of this experimental setting, in contrast to the real-world 
context, might also affect generalizability. Whereas individuals may encounter political 
advertisements in myriad ways—and, given typical campaign outlays, most likely on 
television (Lieberman & Lieberman, 2015; Tadena, 2015)—in the experiment I 
conducted, individuals saw the political advertisement on a computer screen. By design 
they were also unable to skip the advertisement. While some may have muted it, paid 
little attention, or even left the room during the short manipulation, they likely paid more 
attention to the ad by virtue of it being in an online experimental context than they would 
have had they encountered it while channel-surfing or during casual television viewing. 
This heightened attention may have increased the persuasiveness of the media.  
But, besides attentiveness, it seems unlikely that the setting would substantially 
affect results. For example, observers have noted a growth of political advertisements 
online, including on Hulu and other online television platforms (Barnard & Kreiss, 2013; 
May, 2010). Moreover, over half of Americans consume news online (Mitchell, 
Gottfried, Kiley, & Matsa, 2014), suggesting that viewing negatively-valenced media 
about China on a computer may increasingly mimic real-world exposure to media content 
about China. Additionally, research on campaign expenditures suggests that digital ad 
spending is likely to surpass traditional broadcast spending beginning in 2016, so online 
advertising akin to this experiment may soon become the norm (Lieberman & Lieberman, 
2015; Tadena, 2015). 
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Finally—as is the case with all experiments—this study cannot answer the 
question of who in the public is likely to be exposed to these ads outside of the 
experimental context. However, the sheer prevalence of these ads and of this rhetoric 
during the campaign (“Candidates Get Tough on China During the Second 2012 
Presidential Debate,” 2012), coupled with results from other, nationally representative 
research, suggest that even in a non-experimental context, a large majority of individuals 
were likely exposed to at least some negative rhetoric about China. The two treatment 
ads, for example, were aired in nine battleground states for more than two weeks each; 
cumulatively, potential exposure is even higher when considering online advertising and 
media markets which sprawl across state borders.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite these limitations, this study offers evidence that negatively-valenced 
media about China cause people to perceive the country as more threatening, and to view 
the country and the people dwelling in it less favorably. Results highlight the power that 
media can have on how Americans regard a foreign country or foreign peoples. This 
study’s findings have important consequences for Sino-U.S. relations. A great deal of 
research suggests that messages that increase anxiety and threat perception also affect 
policy attitudes. Exposure to threatening stimuli that cause anxiety has been linked to 
increased risk aversion (Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & 
Fischhoff, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2001), greater support for the use of force (Holsti, 
2009; Page & Shapiro, 1992), a willingness to suspend civil liberties (Berinsky, 2009; 
Mueller, 1988), and a preference for more restrictive government policies (Lerner et al., 
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2003). One study, for example, found that perceived threats of terrorism led individuals 
to support precautionary, isolationist policies (Lerner et al., 2003) 
 Insofar as negatively-valenced media coverage of China increases the sense that 
China is a threat to the United States, there is reason to believe that media may also cause 
people to be less supportive of cooperative policies of engagement with China. This trend 
may particularly apply in the economic arena, where negative opinions of a country affect 
support for trade with that country (Pew Research Center, 2014; Sabet, 2013). The 
Chinese government has already foreseen these problems. As one Xinhua editorial 
cautioned,  
During the year-long presidential campaign, both Obama and his GOP rival 
Romney put a lot of energy into discrediting China, unfairly calling Beijing a 
trade cheater, currency manipulator, a U.S. job stealer and a rules breaker. Now 
that the most pressing task confronting America is to energize the economic 
recovery and slash stubbornly high unemployment, the new Obama 
administration perhaps should bear in mind that a stronger and more dynamic 
China-U.S. relationship, especially in trade, will not only provide U.S. investment 
with rich business opportunities, but also help to revive the sagging global 
economy (Richburg & Juan, 2012). 
 
Results in this experiment indicate that negatively-valenced media used as part of 
an ordinary campaign may actually hamstring elected politicians, restricting their 
available options for cooperation, should they seek it—something that President Obama 
arguably has been doing as part of his continued “pivot to Asia” policy in his second 
term. As one China-watcher noted,  
[the candidates] outdid each other on promises to get (or stay) tough…Neither 
candidate spent much time reminding voters of less convenient facts: China and 
America are inextricably linked, with nearly five hundred billion dollars a year in 
trade that drives the global economy; they are intensely involved in fashioning 
joint responses to global crises from North Korea to Iran to Syria; and they are 
taking slow but necessary steps to stem tensions over cyberwarfare and military 
intentions” (Osnos, 2012).  
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With such a clear need to collaborate with China, media that cause negative 
feelings toward China and its people may inadvertently prevent or limit future 
cooperation (Lieberthal & Wang, 2012). This study suggests that future campaigns ought 
to use caution when “playing the China card” during the electoral campaign. While it 
may be an effective vote-getting tool in the short term, the long-term harm done to the 
budding Sino-U.S. “great power relationship” may not be worth the costs. Further, as the 
next chapter will discuss in more detail, tolerance for Asians overseas and within the 
United States may suffer as well.   
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CHAPTER 5 – DO POLITICAL ADS FUEL DISCRIMINATION? THE EFFECTS OF 
NEGATIVELY-VALENCED MEDIA ABOUT CHINA ON VIEWS OF CHINESE AND 
ASIAN STUDENTS 
 
As negatively-valenced media about China increases and campaigns focus more 
attention on America’s competition with China, it raises the question of whether an 
information environment flooded with negative rhetoric and imagery of China might be 
leading to discrimination against Asian Americans. Recent examples of high-profile 
racist statements suggest that a fear of China may be leading to a backlash against Asian 
Americans. For example, a Democratic super-PAC tweeted that jobs were leaving 
Kentucky because of who had Senator McConnell’s ear—Elaine Chao, a Taiwanese-
American, his wife and former secretary of labor (Memmott, 2013). More recently, Fox 
News commentator Bob Beckel declared, “Chinese are the single biggest threat to the 
national security of the U.S.…as usual, we bring them over here and teach a bunch of 
Chinamen, uh, Chinese people, how to do computers, and then they go back to China and 
hack us” (“China Joins Furor Over Fox News Host’s ‘Chinaman’ Comments,” 2014). 
Even more extreme was the recent arrest of an Asian American professor—chair of 
Temple University’s physics department—based on limited and flawed information 
suggesting he was “stealing” sensitive secrets for China.  
These and other examples raise important questions: Do media that present China 
in a negative light cause individuals to discriminate against Chinese? Do they affect not 
only Chinese citizens, but Asians—even Asian Americans—too? Discrimination has two 
important components: the first is either a tendency to attribute negative characteristics to 
a group or a reluctance to attribute positive characteristics to a group (Sniderman et al., 
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2000). The second is differential treatment on the basis of group membership that 
disadvantages the group (Blank, Dabady, & Citro, 2004). Here, the question is whether 
negatively-valenced media about China (which the previous chapter shows raises the 
specter of threat from China) leads people to view and treat Chinese—and Asians—
differently solely because of their nationality or race. 
Using a unique survey experiment, this chapter demonstrates that the negatively-
valenced ads about China aired during the course of the 2012 presidential campaign led 
individuals to evaluate Chinese nationals and Asians more negatively. In the following 
sections, I review the literature about discrimination against Asians and describe the 
experiment that I use to test these hypotheses, as well as results. I conclude with a 
discussion of the implications of these findings for a diverse and tolerant American 
society. 
Discrimination against Asians  
 
One extreme example motivates the hypotheses for this study: the hate crime 
death of Vincent Chin in Detroit in 1982. During the 1980s and 1990s, extremely 
negative coverage of Japan flooded the media. America’s trade imbalance with Japan was 
a constant in the media and in the political rhetoric of the day; media and elites fixated on 
Japan’s “unfair” trade practices, their advantages, and how America was losing and 
falling behind (Cummings, 1989; Morris, 2013). This appears to have prompted a great 
deal of anti-Asian racial intolerance, with a massive increase in Asians reporting 
harassment during that period (Iino, 1994). Most shockingly, many observers believe it 
contributed to the killing of Vincent Chin—a young Chinese-American, assumed by his 
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attackers to be a Japanese foreigner. He was bludgeoned to death with a baseball bat by 
individuals yelling racial slurs and accusing him of harming the local Detoit auto industry 
and causing them to be out of work (F. H. Wu, 2012).     
There are no systematic empirical studies of the impact of negatively-valenced 
media about foreign countries on treatment of citizens from that country. However, the 
historical pattern from the “Japan bashing” period suggests that negatively-valenced 
media about Japan may have contributed to Americans attributing more negative 
characteristics to Japanese people, and treating the group differently. While 
discrimination can take a number of forms—with the case of Vincent Chin being one of 
the most extreme—the historical example of Japan leads me to my first hypothesis: 
H1: Negatively-valenced media about China will encourage individuals to 
discriminate against Chinese citizens. 
 
The case of Vincent Chin also raises the question of whether negatively-valenced media 
about one country may actually cause discrimination against not only citizens of the 
country that is presented negatively in the media, but against anyone who is seen to be 
racially similar—regardless of citizenship. A pervasive finding in research on Asian 
Americans in the United States is that regardless of their actual citizenship, whites tend to 
view Asians as less “American” because of their race (Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Devos & 
Banaji, 2005; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997; Stroessner, 1996; Tuan, 1998). 
For example, average Americans consider white European actress Kate Winslet more 
American than the Asian American actress, Lucy Liu, using Implicit Association Tests 
(Devos & Ma, 2008). Asian Americans also face some of the strongest social barriers to 
assimilation, consistently being viewed as “outsiders” or “foreigners,” regardless of how 
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long they have been in the United States (Devos & Heng, 2009; Devos & Ma, 2008; 
Liang, Li, & Kim, 2004; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2010). This tendency for Americans 
to perceive Asians as foreign, even when they are American citizens, is sometimes 
referred to as “identity denial” and such questions as “where are you really from” are 
frequently referred to as “micro-aggressions” (Ong, Burrow, Fuller-Rowell, Ja, & Sue, 
2013; Sue, Bucceri, Lin, Nadal, & Torino, 2009; F. H. Wu, 2003).
51
   
Most Americans also cannot differentiate between Asians from different countries 
in the region (Hourihan, Benjamin, & Liu, 2012).
52
 This is not a new phenomenon; TIME 
and Life Magazine in the 1940s published articles such as “How to Tell your Chinese 
Friends from the Japs” (Y. Wang, 2015). Surveys suggest that this “lumping”—as it is 
sometimes called—persists today (Committee of 100, 2009; Kuo, 2016; Lipin, 2014). 
Relatively recent instances of discrimination exemplify this. For example, Wen Ho Lee, a 
Los Alamos physicist who was arrested and held in solitary confinement because of  
incorrect allegations that he had passed nuclear secrets to China, is not only a naturalized 
American citizen, but Taiwanese (F. H. Wu, 2016).
53
 Because Americans have difficulty 
differentiating among Asians from different countries and even American citizens of 
Asian heritage tend to be seen as “foreign,” I believe negatively-valenced media coverage 
of China will affect opinions about and attitudes toward more than just Chinese nationals. 
                                                          
51
 During the 2016 presidential campaign, for example, an Asian American student at Harvard stood up to 
ask a question and Donald Trump cut him off, asking, “Are you from South Korea?” to which the student 
replied that he was born in Texas and raised in Colorado (Mo, 2015). 
52
 In fact, the entire existence of a field of study about “Asian Americans” suggests the routine conflation of 
disparate ethnic groups. 
53
 Xiaoxing Xi, the chair of the Temple University physics department discussed earlier, as well as Sherry 
Chen, an employee of the National Weather Service, and Guoqing Cao and Dan Li, two chemists at Eli 
Lilly are all examples of American citizens of Chinese heritage accused of crimes and later exonerated (F. 
H. Wu, 2016). 
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Moreover, results in the previous chapter indicate that negatively-valenced media about 
China cause individuals to feel more negatively toward not only Chinese citizens, but 
also Japanese citizens—a racially similar group. Thus I hypothesize the following: 
H2: Negatively-valenced media about China will encourage individuals to 
discriminate against Asians, regardless of nationality. 
 
Methods  
 
To test these hypotheses experimentally, I rely on the experiment conducted on 
MTurk, described in more detail in Chapter 4. However, whereas for the previous 
experiment I only excluded self-identifying Asians, here, because the domain is 
university admissions—an arena replete with complicated racial dynamics involving 
affirmative action—I only include white Americans.54 Outside of this difference, the 
pretest questions, treatments (a between subjects factor manipulating exposure to 
negatively-valenced media about China), and data quality checks (whether individuals 
clearly heard the ads, could identify the sponsors, and were within two standard 
deviations of average completion time) are identical to those described in the previous 
chapter. 
 
Dependent variable 
While there are a number of ways to explore these hypotheses about 
discrimination, I focus here on university admissions. I do this for two reasons. First, it is 
a context in which I can use subtler measures. Rather than directly asking people whether 
they would like to limit the number of Chinese or Asians who can attend U.S. colleges, I 
                                                          
54
 If I specified in advance that only white Americans would be included in the task, it might incentivize 
those of other races to lie about their race in order to participate. Rather, it is preferable to allow anyone to 
participate in the HIT, restricting the sample to my target population after collecting the data. 
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use less overt evaluation tasks. This is similar, in many ways, to field experiments which 
use resumes to evaluate sex or racial discrimination (Huddy & Feldman, 2009; Newman, 
1978; Newman & Krzystofiak, 1979; Stewart & Perlow, 2001).  
Second, universities are a particularly policy-relevant domain. As noted earlier, 
some of the high-profile racist comments about Chinese and discrimination against them 
has taken place in the university context. Moreover, only recently, the U.S. State 
Department proposed a rule to ban foreign students from research projects and classes 
they deem to contain vital information for national security, including: munitions, nuclear 
engineering, and satellite technology (Edwards, 2016). More than 60 universities 
including Stanford, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania—all of which receive 
government research grants—criticized the proposal, arguing that it tips the balance too 
far in favor of national security against academic freedom. While restrictions thus far 
only target particular fields of study, it suggests the importance of evaluating how 
negatively-valenced rhetoric about China affects discrimination in the university context.  
The dependent variables, discrimination against Chinese and Asians, are based on 
a Latin Square design. Individuals were asked to think of themselves as admissions 
officers at an elite university who must rate the QUALITY of applicants who have applied 
to join next year’s freshman class, on a scale ranging from 0 (very poor) to 10 (excellent). 
Each respondent was presented with student profiles, one at a time. What I term “a 
profile” is a set of stable characteristics: GPA, an intended major, and a brief description 
of the student’s extracurricular activities. These were pretested to ensure that they were 
comparably strong (see Appendix VII). For example, “profile 1” is a student with a 3.81 
GPA, who desires to major in political science, and who was a member of Model United 
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Nations and debate, among other activities. Four slightly different profiles were rotated 
through the Latin Square design so that different treatment characteristics (race and 
nationality) are associated with the varying profiles. 
 Two characteristics of the candidate are randomly assigned to these profiles: race 
(Asian / White) and nationality (Chinese / American). Race is manipulated via 
photograph, and nationality is stated in the text. The photographs used to manipulate race 
were chosen to maximize comparability. The four photos are all head-shots of college-
aged men wearing suits in front of the same background. They were pretested using a 
separate Amazon Mechanical Turk tasking in September 2014, and results indicate no 
difference in perceived attractiveness across the photos (see Appendix VII for all pretest 
results).  
This design yields a 2 x 2 structure, race by nationality, providing four unique 
combinations (Table 5.1). Each one of these “combinations” has three characteristics 
which rotate together: a photograph (the race manipulation), a stated nationality (the 
nationality manipulation), and a name. For example, the Asian American (AA) student 
has the photo presented below (Figures 5.1 and 5.2) and is always called “Vince Xu”. 
The White American student (WA) is always called “Gregory Walsh” and is an all-
American blonde with blue eyes (see pictures in Appendix VI). These composites (name, 
photo to manipulate race, and text to manipulate nationality) then rotate across the 
profiles (that is, the stable characteristics of GPA, intended major, and activities) to form 
the Latin Square (Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.1. Two-by-Two Experimental Design 
 
 
 
NATIONALITY 
 
 
 RACE 
Asian White 
American Asian American (AA) White American (WA) 
Chinese Asian Chinese (AC) White Chinese (WC) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1.  Example Profile for the Asian American Student (Profile 1) 
Name, 
nationality, and 
photo are one 
unit that rotate 
together as part 
of the Latin 
Square design, 
associating with 
different 
“profiles,” or 
stable student 
characteristics. 
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While the white Chinese cell may seem strange, it has two advantages. First, this 
type of individual is increasingly common in a globalized world. Children of academics, 
reporters, diplomats, and the like may be raised overseas and apply to U.S. universities 
with non-American citizenship and a phenotype that appears closer to Caucasian 
Americans. Second, it’s worth noting that no race is specified; rather, the manipulation is 
solely based on the photograph. While it is unlikely that any respondents were thinking in 
these terms, there are, in fact, millions of Chinese who identify as one of the 55 ethnic 
minority groups in the country—including the Uyghurs, who are regularly described as 
having “Western” or “Caucasian” features (Rudelson & Rudelson, 1997). Third, it allows 
for a fully-crossed design in terms of race and nationality. By design, I can separate the 
GPA, intended 
major, and activities 
comprise a student 
“profile.” These 
particular 
characteristics are 
“profile 3,” 
regardless of the 
condition and 
accompanying 
name, photo 
(manipulating race), 
and stated 
nationality. 
Figure 5.2.  Example Profile for the Asian American Student (Condition 2) 
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effects of race and nationality—determining the degree to which Asian race and Chinese 
nationality—or both—are affecting perceived candidate quality.  
Table 5.2. Latin Square Design (Race/Nationality) 
 Profile 1 Profile 2 Profile 3 Profile 4 
Condition 1 AA WA AC WC 
Condition 2 WA AC AA WC 
Condition 3 AC WC WA AA 
Condition 4 WC AA AC WA 
Note: “Profile” refers to a series of student characteristics— a GPA, proposed major, and 
extracurricular activities. These are stable; e.g. in profile 1, the student is always described as having a 
GPA of 3.81, desiring to study biology, and as a member of Model UN and the National Honor 
Society. The name, photo, and picture then rotate, as a unit, across the profiles in the order described 
above (e.g., the Asian American student named Vince is associated with profile 1 in condition 1 and 
with profile 3 in condition 2). Race is manipulated using the photo (Asian / White) and nationality 
(Chinese / American) is explicitly written as a descriptor of each student.  
AA =Asian American; WA = White American; WC = White Chinese; AC = Asian Chinese 
 
A Latin Square is a modified block design that has two particular benefits in the 
context of this experiment. First, although profiles have been pre-tested to be roughly 
equally strong, and the pictures equally attractive, this modified block design allows me 
to look at the effects of the manipulated factors—race and nationality—while removing 
the extra variation that comes due to any residual differences in the profiles. For example, 
individuals in condition 1 see the Asian American student (AA) described with profile 1 
(Figure 5.1), while those in condition 2 see the Asian American student described with 
profile 3 (Figure 5.2). By presenting the crossed factors with each one of the profiles, I 
am able to assess the degree to which the manipulated factors are driving the differences 
in candidate evaluation and to remove any effects driven by profile differences. Because 
each subject’s evaluation of each candidate can be compared within-person, this is a far 
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more sensitive measure of discrimination than what a between-subjects design would 
normally offer. 
Additionally, because this is a within-subject design, each individual is asked to 
evaluate multiple profiles. By rotating respondents through all possible race by 
nationality combinations, it is possible to compare each individual’s reactions across the 
four conditions. This is advantageous when studying something subjective like perceived 
quality of a student, because individual differences may be sizable, thus making the 
within-group variance extremely large. The Latin Square design allows me to compare 
each subject to his or her own mean candidate evaluation across the four conditions. This 
juxtaposition allows me to find more precise effects. In addition, because it is nested 
within a between-subjects design, I can evaluate whether negatively-valenced media 
about China (the between-subjects factor) cause greater differences between evaluations 
of white and Asian students (one within-subjects factor, race) or American and Chinese 
students (the other within-subjects factor, nationality). 
It is important to emphasize that race is only manipulated visually, via 
photograph. Individuals are never described as being ethnically Chinese or ethnically 
Caucasian. While I specifically chose Chinese sounding names, it is unlikely that most 
respondents can identify the differences between stereotypically Chinese, Korean, or 
Japanese names. As a result, in many ways we can view the intersection of American 
nationality and Chinese ethnicity as a more general test of whether Asian Americans—
above and beyond just Chinese-Americans – are reacted to differently.   
Finally, in addition to the four candidates comprising the Latin Square, 
individuals were asked to evaluate two other profiles, one of an African-American 
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student and one of a Caucasian-looking Brazilian student. These cases were included to 
help prevent hypothesis guessing by virtue of depicting non-Asian races and nationalities 
other than Chinese. The photos and profiles for these two students were also pre-tested to 
be equally attractive and strong, respectively. However, these “candidates” were not 
manipulated within the design like the four previously described. The African-American 
student was always depicted not only with the same name, picture, and nationality, but 
also with the same GPA, intended major, and activities. The same was true of the 
Brazilian student. As a result, while I can examine differences in evaluations of those two 
profiles between the treatment and control condition, I cannot isolate the degree to which 
these evaluations were influenced by race and nationality, since the stable profile 
characteristics may have influenced their relative ratings. 
I analyze this design using analysis of variance, accounting for the between-
subjects factor (exposure to negative campaign ads about China), the within-subjects 
factors (race and nationality) and their interactions. 
 
Results 
 
The first hypothesis I test is whether negatively-valenced media about China 
encourages people to discriminate against Chinese citizens (H1). I find support for this 
hypothesis. Evaluations of applicants with Chinese nationality are lower for individuals 
who have seen negatively-valenced media about China than for those who have not (F = 
9.00, p < 0.05; Figure 5.3). Notably, this is simply an evaluation of the quality of 
applicants. It suggests that in the presence of negatively-valenced media about China, 
individuals are less willing to ascribe positive characteristics to Chinese nationals.  
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This raises the question of whether other foreign nationals are evaluated more 
negatively, as well. Perhaps negatively-valenced media about China leads individuals to 
want to retrench; to prioritize domestic citizens about foreigners, even if those foreigners 
are not Chinese. One of the profiles that respondents evaluated to prevent hypothesis 
guessing was a Brazilian citizen. As with the other profiles, his race was not stated, but 
he appears to be Caucasian (see Appendix VI for the photograph and profile). This 
profile was not part of the Latin square, and thus within-subject comparisons of the 
Brazilian citizen to the Chinese citizens are not possible (because I cannot partial out the 
difference due to the particularities of his described GPA, proposed major, or other 
factors). Nonetheless, I can evaluate whether those who saw negatively-valenced media 
about China evaluated the Brazilian candidate less favorably than those who saw only the 
control ad. Between-subjects analysis of variance indicates that they do (F = 6.80, p < 
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Source: MTurk survey, N=1,337. Average quality is a rating for each profile, from 0 (very poor) to 10 (excellent).  
Analysis of variance indicates a statistically significant interaction between exposure to negatively-valenced media 
about China and candidate evaluations by nationality (F=9.001, p < 0.01); estimated marginal means are 
presented. 
Figure 5.3. Individuals Evaluate Chinese Applicant Quality  More 
Negatively Following Exposure to Negatively-Valenced Media about China 
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0.01).
55
 Average quality ratings of the Brazilian student’s profile fall from 8.05 on an 11-
point scale to 7.8. This is a notable decrease, given that the treatment was exclusively 
about China and had no reference to Brazil or Brazilians. This suggests that negatively-
valenced media about China may have negative consequences for foreign publics who are 
not Chinese as well as for those who are Chinese.  
This brings me to my second hypothesis: whether negatively-valenced media 
about China encourages people to discriminate against Asians – regardless of citizenship. 
Results confirm my hypothesis: evaluations of Asian applicant quality are lower among 
individuals who were exposed to the negatively-valenced media about China than those 
who saw the political advertisements about women’s issues (F = 6.70, p < 0.05; Figure 
5.4). This is the case despite that one of the Asian students evaluated was described as an 
American citizen (Vince, presented above in Figures 5.1 and 5.2) and his race was primed 
solely via photo (meaning he could have been Korean-American, Japanese-American, or 
any other Asian background).  
                                                          
55
 This is notably distinct from how negatively-valenced media coverage of China affects opinion of Brazil 
and of Brazilians as a general group, examined in Chapter 4 (favorability of both decreased, but the change 
was not statistically significant). This may be due, in part, to the fact that the negatively-valenced coverage 
of China primed anxiety. While this anxiety may not affect Brazil and Brazilians—neither of which are 
necessarily seen as threatening to the United States—it may still cause people to be more protectionist, or 
inward-facing (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). As a result, individuals may evaluate any 
foreign national students more negatively because those foreigners could be seen as taking an Americans’ 
spot.  
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In many ways, this is a hard test of the effects of negatively-valenced media about 
China, as it runs counter to stereotypes. Americans tend to perceive Asians as more 
qualified academically and as a “model minority” (Chou & Feagin, 2015; Lin, Kwan, 
Cheung, & Fiske, 2005; Wong, Lai, Nagasawa, & Lin, 1998; F. H. Wu, 2003). Whites, 
on average, believe Asians are smarter and harder working than other ethnic groups, 
including their own (Samson, 2013). They also see them as more competent, prepared, 
motivated, and likely to succeed than other races (Chou & Feagin, 2015; Lin et al., 2005; 
Wong et al., 1998). This “model-minority” stereotype is evident even in the control 
condition of this experiment; averaging across all four of the profile conditions, the two 
students who are “Asian” in their photographs are assigned the highest average quality 
ratings. This makes the statistically significant decrease in perceived applicant quality for 
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Source: MTurk survey, N=1,337. Average quality is a rating for each profile, from 0 (very poor) to 10 (excellent).  
Analysis of variance indicates a statistically significant interaction between exposure to negatively-valenced media 
about China and candidate evaluations by race (F=6.695, p < 0.01); estimated marginal means are presented. 
Figure 5.4. Individuals Evaluate Asian Applicant Quality More Negatively 
Following Exposure to Negatively-Valenced Media about China 
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Asians after only 30-seconds of negatively-valenced media about China particularly 
striking. Additionally, college admissions are notoriously competitive; the most elite 
schools admit around 6% of applicants, turning away many thousands of strong 
candidates, suggesting that even the slightest difference in evaluations could potentially 
mean rejection for a given candidate.  
I find these lowered evaluations of Chinese and Asian students even when their 
profiles have no references to them studying topics that are “sensitive” for national 
security. It suggests that if they were said to be studying such topics—e.g., focusing on 
issues targeted by the new U.S. State Department restrictions, including munitions, 
nuclear engineering, or satellite technology—discrimination might be even more severe. 
For example, a recent survey finds that 41% of Americans think that Chinese immigrants 
and Chinese-Americans working for the U.S. government and U.S. companies as 
researchers, scientists, or engineers pose a security risk to the United States—and 22% of 
Chinese-Americans even think the same (Committee of 100, 2016). Moreover, even 
before China became a regular fixture in political dialogues as a threat to the United 
States, one study found that people were less likely to want to hire qualified Asian 
Americans to national security jobs because of a tendency to view them as less loyal to 
the United States (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2010).  
 
Limitations  
 
While these results offer the first causal evidence of the effects of negatively-
valenced media about China on discrimination against Chinese and Asians, nonetheless 
some limitations persist. First, I conducted this experiment with a non-probability sample 
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on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Individuals who completed the survey are not necessarily 
representative of the types of people who work in college admissions or human resources 
offices evaluating applications.
56
 External generalizability is limited by the laboratory 
nature of this study, where individuals watched the negatively-valenced media about 
China immediately before evaluating candidates. Results here suggest the importance of a 
field experiment, such as sending actual resumes or applications to actual evaluators, as 
is commonly done to more subtly and naturally measure discrimination.  
Additionally, the profiles that I showed following the negatively-valenced media 
about China may have caused some to “hypothesis guess,” answering questions with the 
assumption that they knew what I was measuring. The greatest concern here would be 
that individuals would guess that I wanted to see whether they would rate Chinese 
students differently following negatively-valenced media about China and thus they 
provided a “desired” answer instead of their “true” answer. However, this could prompt 
two different types of responses. First, it could lead some to avoid providing a socially 
undesirable, discriminatory view—thus under-reporting their true levels of discrimination 
so as not to appear racist. Alternatively, hypothesis-guessing could lead to individuals 
over-reporting discrimination in order to please the interviewer, if they assume the 
negatively-valenced media about China was designed to prompt negative evaluations of 
Chinese and Asians.
57
 To guard against either of these possibilities, I had respondents 
                                                          
56
 While there is no way to know the demographics of those who regularly perform tasks of this sort, the 
biases in this sample—that it is more Democratic and more educated than the general public—may, in 
many ways, be relatively comparable to those working in admissions offices, as the field of higher 
education tends to exhibit these same skews (Zipp & Fenwick, 2006). 
57
 This latter threat is a legitimate concern because of the Mechanical Turk platform, where researchers 
evaluating the respondents after they complete their task and their personal rating then determines whether 
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evaluate the African-American student immediately following exposure to the ads, 
hopefully mitigating any sense that this study was specifically about China. However, 
even if this was not enough, these two forms of potential bias are pushing in opposite 
directions, potentially cancelling one another out. Moreover, if anything, issues of social 
desirability and under-reporting discrimination for fear of appearing racist would 
minimize real effects or lead to null effects. 
 Finally, while the internal validity of the experiment is strong, given that the 
treatments were actually aired during the course of the 2012 presidential campaign, I only 
relied on two of them. Results may not generalize to other forms of negatively-valenced 
media about China, such as ads that do not mention the challenge that China poses to the 
United States economically. Moreover, the treatment videos appear to have changed 
individuals’ mood-states and to have generated anxiety about China (as evidenced in the 
previous chapter), thus negatively-valenced media about China that doesn’t prompt these 
emotional reactions may have lesser or different effects.  
Conclusion 
  
Results from this experiment indicate that negatively-valenced media about China 
can encourage individuals to discriminate against both Chinese nationals and Asians. 
They offer strong evidence that when politicians like Obama and Romney campaign 
about the dangers of foreign countries, there can be important, unintended consequences. 
Raising anxiety about China may lead to discrimination in America—a country home to 
an increasingly large number of immigrants from China, as well as a growing number of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the individual’s are able to perform subsequent Human Intelligence Tasks. MTurk participations are known 
to care greatly about how the survey researchers perceive them. 
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Asian American citizens (Cohn & Caumont, 2016). This experiment lends credence to a 
recent scholar’s comment that “whenever U.S.-Chinese relations get chilly, Chinese 
Americans get pneumonia” (Lipin, 2014).  
With a multitude of Americans engaged in some form of evaluation as part of 
their jobs—whether evaluating interns, prospective employees, people for promotion, 
contractors to hire, or the like—the tendency to evaluate Chinese and Asians more 
negatively because of anti-China rhetoric in the political climate is severe. Indeed, over 
the last five years the number of racially Chinese individuals inaccurately accused of 
spying for the People’s Republic of China has dramatically increased (Perlroth, 2015), 
including many who work in U.S. government positions (Bhattacharjee, 2015). In 2015, 
the FBI investigated 53% more intellectual property cases—and the majority of the 
increase targeted Chinese businesses and individuals (Edwards, 2016). More than half of 
the prosecutions under the Economic Espionage Act since 2013 have involved Chinese 
citizens—and the number of indictments has jumped more than 30% in the past year. Yet 
many of these cases have been “false positives”—accusations against Chinese or 
Chinese-Americans that are unfounded, suggesting discrimination based on race 
(Bhattacharjee, 2015; Perlroth, 2015). 
Of course, there is the possibility of a real threat from China; politicians 
campaigning about “standing up to China” may see a real and pressing need to counter 
China, economically or militarily. However, as one scholar recently contended, a real 
threat of espionage from China is 
An argument for, not against, solid investigation techniques and smart exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion…the response should be, with the same strength of 
principle as with other groups, that the handful of people who have violated the 
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law should not compromise the full citizenship of the millions who are no 
different than coworkers and neighbors. They deserve due process. The guilt of 
strangers who happen to be of similar ancestry does not impugn their innocence. 
Saying otherwise is the essence of racial profiling (F. H. Wu, 2016). 
 
While we thankfully have had not had another case as extreme as the murder of Vincent 
Chin, many real harms have befallen Americans incorrectly accused of spying for China, 
targeted because of their nationality and race (McCabe, Roebuck, & Snyder, 2016). The 
pervasiveness of negatively-valenced media about China and politicians campaigning on 
an anti-China platforms suggest the very real possibility of growing discrimination 
against Chinese and Asians in this country.  
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CHAPTER 6 – EXPANDING THE CASE: OTHER COUNTRIES, TIME PERIODS, AND 
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF “PLAYING THE CHINA CARD”  
One key contribution of this dissertation is that it unites a disciplinary divide. 
Communication scholars have focused on how countries influence what is reported and 
how their country is reported on by the media. Examples include the seminal studies by 
Manheim and Albritton about how public relations campaigns affect how much and what 
type of coverage a country receives in the U.S. media (1984); later studies also include 
some particularly about China (S. Lee & Hong, 2012; X. Wang & Shoemaker, 2011; J. 
Zhang & Cameron, 2003). Yet this literature stops short of showing how media valence 
affects public opinion. Conversely, political scientists have historically ignored the 
media’s role in forming public opinion, focusing only on how country favorability affects 
foreign policy attitudes and public policy (Berinsky, 2009; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990; 
Page & Bouton, 2008). This dissertation steps into the gap, exploring how media 
coverage of foreign countries affects broad attitudes toward those countries (see Figure 
6.1).  
 
 
 
In this project, I have shown that the valence with which the media covers China 
affects American public opinion of China and Chinese people—as well as discrimination 
toward Chinese and Asians. By filling this gap, this dissertation suggests that public 
Public relations 
campaign by 
country A in 
country B 
Media coverage 
of country A in 
country B 
Opinion of 
country A in 
country B 
Foreign policy of 
country B toward 
country A 
Figure 6.1 Schema of Existing Scholarship on Media, Opinion toward Foreign 
Countries, and Policy 
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relations campaigns launched by a country can potentially have important and far-
reaching consequences. If a country is successfully able to affect how it is covered in a 
foreign press, it may be able to affect public opinion, and, in turn, foreign policy 
preferences. But, the focus here has been narrow: on one country during one particular 
election season. In this conclusion, I discuss how the media effects documented in this 
project may or may not generalize to other countries and time periods. I conclude by 
highlighting the ways in which changes in public opinion about foreign countries may 
translate into public policy changes.  
 
Generalizing to other countries and time periods  
 
In investigating how media valence affects opinions of foreign countries, I have 
focused on the case of China and the 2012 pre-electoral presidential context. This choice 
raises two important questions: (1) would these results hold in other time periods, and (2) 
in what ways might we expect the relationship between media valence and opinion to be 
similar or different for countries other than China?  
With regard to the first question, one needs only to look at more recent races to 
see that China bashing remains an integral part of many campaigns. For instance, in the 
2014 Senate elections, journalists suggested that because the Democrats were tired of 
looking soft on ISIS and Ebola, they opted to dial up the China threat, trying to castigate 
Republicans as un-American for supporting trade with the economic superpower 
(Saletan, 2014). More recently, 2016 presidential candidate Donald Trump suggested that 
China was trying to “suck the blood” out of the United States (Hong, 2015) and proposed 
extremely high tariffs on China (Haberman, 2016). Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton 
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took a sheet right out of the 2012 playbook—echoing the rhetoric in my experimental 
treatment—saying that America has to “stand up” to China to make it stop “unfair trade 
practices that kill U.S. jobs” (Miller, 2015). She even wrote an op-ed piece for The 
Portland Press Herald, calling China out for “underhanded and unfair trade practices,” 
“abuses,” and “cheating”—all of which she says are “destructive” for American workers 
and cause the American middle class to “pay the price” (2016).58 One commentator to a 
New York Times article captured much of this sentiment in his response to an article 
“What Donald Trump Gets Pretty Much Right, and Completely Wrong About China,” 
declaring: 
For too long now … China has been the whipping boy of the world, particularly 
for the US. One can’t go through a week without reading, hearing about China, be 
it unfair trade practice or any negative reports about that country. The volume gets 
louder and louder every four years when presidential candidates need to drive 
their followers into a frenzy to propel themselves up the margin and capture the 
number of delegate to secure their own political seat in the [White House]. It 
doesn’t matter that as long as the villains are non-Americans, especially if it is 
China, these future leaders of ours will have no qualms to portrait the imaginary 
‘villains’ as the common enemies just to show that they are wise and brave 
enough to tell the ‘truth’. The problem is, it is not the demagogues who do the 
demagoguing that worry me, it is us, the people who listen and believe (Irwin, 
2016).
59
 
 
In fact, the effects of China bashing have increasingly been a focus of the 2016 
election, as academics, journalists, and observers have tried to grapple with what factors 
                                                          
58
 Before the field narrowed substantially, other candidates also offered their two cents on how to be tough 
on China. Governor Scott Walker called for President Xi’s September invitation to the United States to be 
revoked, Governor Chris Christie promised “cyberwarfare like [China] has never been seen before” 
(Rauhala, 2015), and Senator Marco Rubio  described China as a “danger to our national security,” 
criticizing Obama for “appeasing” China’s leaders—much as Romney had criticized Obama in 2012 
(Mullany, 2015; Sanger, 2015). 
59
 This article prompted more than 500 comments within 12 hours of publication, and many of them were 
racially charged and negatively-valenced toward China, even while simultaneously criticizing Trump. For 
example, Harry in Michigan declared, “the bottom line is we are in an economic war and we are losing 
badly. Trumpolini is only stating the obvious…from aspirin to rare earth minerals China has many 
monopolies and you can’t reverse them with mere threats of tariffs…For all we know [his] campaign is 
financed by the Chinese themselves” (Irwin, 2016).   
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have led to Trump’s overwhelming success. Many are pointing to the “China threat” as 
part of the the politics of fear and nationalism that are contributing to Trump’s 
dominance. Adam Joyce in St. Louis, another commentator to the above newspaper 
article declared,  
Trump knows his likely supporters are fearful of China, poorly informed, and 
long for someone to dumb down complex geopolitical issues to a few convenient 
scapegoats for job loss. Trump gives them that and then some, and they 
enthusiastically punch ballots (and protestors) for him in droves (Irwin, 2016). 
 
 However, even if results likely generalize to other presidential campaign seasons, 
it’s important to consider whether the valence of media about China (or any other 
country) would have a similar impact on public opinion if it were not part of a campaign. 
The content analysis in Chapter 3 indicates that there is likely to be much more coverage 
of China—and, particularly, more negative coverage—immediately before an election. 
There also are likely to be more references to China’s effect on the United States; for 
example, how China harms the U.S. economy and jobs, rather than Chinese domestic 
politics, more broadly. There is certainly a possibility that individuals are more affected 
by negatively-valenced media about China when they explicitly reference the United 
States as a competitor, as implied by the Brewer (2006) framing study, discussed earlier. 
Similarly, effects may be strongest when the topic of the negatively-valenced media is 
economic, rather than social or political—something untested in this project. From a 
theoretical perspective, however, there is no reason that media valence would only affect 
public opinion when focused on certain topics and not others, assuming that individuals 
pay equal attention to different topics.   
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The answer to the second question— in what ways might we expect the 
relationship between media valence and opinion to be similar or different for countries 
other than China—is more complicated. As discussed in Chapter 1, there is reason to 
believe that China is a particularly difficult test, given that Americans likely know more 
and have more stable opinions about China than many other countries. Strong 
predispositions typically reduce media effects by increasing one’s resistance to 
disconfirming information (Chong & Druckman, 2007). In framing studies, for example, 
there is evidence that frames have greater effects on less knowledgeable individuals 
(Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001; Kinder & Sanders, 1990).   
Extrapolating from this situation and treating China as a hard test, there is reason 
to believe that the media should affect American opinion of other countries as well. 
Effects are likely to be even larger when people know little about a given country and 
have fewer preconceived notions on which to fall back when forming their assessments. 
For example, many commentators and country-branding experts point to the “Borat 
phenomenon,” arguing that because most Americans knew nothing about Kazakhstan 
prior to the release of the popular film, it became the only image of the place and people 
they could conjure (Pollak & Babej, 2006; van Ham, 2008). While such major motion 
pictures about relatively unknown foreign countries remain rare, they nonetheless suggest 
that media effects may be stronger when people know less.  
Yet, some of the factor that make China a “hard test” may also make it unique in 
ways that affect generalizability. First, at least some of the ways in which China is 
regularly depicted appear to generate anxiety, as discussed in Chapter 4. Second, much of 
the coverage likely focuses on how China affects the United States—something that may 
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not be the case when examining other countries.  Third, Americans have many 
preconceptions about how China affects the United States economically—for example, a 
majority erroneously assume that China is the largest holder of U.S. debt (rather than 
Japan) and is the United States’ largest trade partner (rather than Canada) (Guisinger, 
2011; Thorson, 2015). Taken together this suggests that even if there were a great deal of 
negatively-valenced coverage of Japan or Canada—even focused on their effects on the 
United States’ economy—the resulting change in opinion may still be more limited in 
part because people don’t realize their relative importance or perceive them as threats in 
the way that they do China. 
 
The effects of public opinion on public policy 
 
The degree to which China-bashing continues in 2016 raises an important 
question: What are the effects of American public opinion about China on public policy? 
For example, Trump recently accused China of “raping” the United States (Appelbaum, 
2016). He also delivered a series of China bashing speeches in Nevada in advance of the 
February caucus, declaring, “The greatest debt in the history of the world is what China 
has done to us. They’ve taken our jobs, they’ve taken our money, they’ve taken 
everything. They’ve rebuilt China with our money” (Nash, 2016). Results from this 
project suggest that stump speeches like these, and the corresponding media coverage, 
may stand to increase unfavorable opinion of China and the Chinese people. Yet China is 
Nevada’s second largest trading partner, with exports to China totaling nearly $600 
million. The state also had nearly 200,000 visitors from China in 2014—a 153% increase 
from 2009 (Nash, 2016)—raising the question of how unfavorable perceptions may affect 
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these very real bilateral ties and interpersonal interactions.  
The 2016 election has also led many to think about the ways in which China may 
be affecting the rise of right-leaning candidates. Gordon Hanson, an economist and 
author of The China Syndrome writes, “the recipe for populism seems pretty clear: take a 
surge in manufacturing imports from China and continued automation in the U.S. 
workplace and add a tepid macroeconomy. The result is a combustible stew sure to sour 
the stomach of party leaders nationwide” (Edsall, 2016). On the same topic, Jared 
Bernstein, a senior fellow at the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities declared,  
the intersection of inequality driven by real wage/income stagnation and the fact 
that the folks perceived to have blown the damn economy up not only recovered 
first, but got government assistance in the form of bailouts to do so. If you’re in the 
anxious middle and that doesn’t deeply piss you off, you’re an unusually forgiving 
person…the core theme of Republican establishment lore has been to demonize not 
unregulated finance or trade or inequality, but ‘the other’—e.g., the immigrant or 
minority taking your job and claiming unneeded government support (Edsall, 
2016). 
 
Related work has focused on how districts hit hardest by trade from China have elected 
more ideologically extreme leaders (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, & Majlesi, 2016; Che, Lu, 
Pierce, Schott, & Tao, 2016; Schwartz & Bui, 2016). Implicit in this argument is that 
trade with China affects American public opinion and thus voting behavior. The authors 
declare,  
Clues for a connection between changes in the U.S. economy and the growing 
ideological divide in Congress come, fittingly enough, from the politicians 
themselves. In the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, candidates from the extremes 
of both parties have singled out China as a principle cause for U.S. economic 
malaise. China bashing is now a popular pastime as much among liberal Democrats 
as among Tea Party Republicans…we show this political showmanship [affects 
elections] (Autor et al., 2016) 
 
While the underlying mechanism in this study is not teased out and there are likely 
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numerous factors at work, this research raises the very real possibility that negatively-
valenced media about China and corresponding changes in public opinion of China can 
affect elections. 
This finding also highlights the limited scope of the dissertation: namely, this 
project stops short of investigating how public opinion translates into public policy. My 
research cannot show, for example, that more negative opinions of China lead to more 
aggressive U.S. foreign policy toward China. For the most part, this caveat is a common 
limitation of public opinion research. Early public opinion researchers actually took 
solace in the idea that public opinion didn’t affect public policy, given initial suppositions 
that Americans knew and cared little about foreign policy (Holsti, 2009), nonetheless, 
researchers have recently come to different conclusions.
60
 For example, scholars have 
suggested that foreign policy attitudes can affect vote choice—though they do not do so 
in all elections (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida, 1989). Similarly, scholars have 
increasingly considered how public opinion might constrain elites (Canes-Wrone, 2010; 
Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000; Sobel, 2001) and might translate into policies (Bartels, 1991; 
Jacobs & Page, 2005; Soroka & Wlezien, 2009; Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson, 1995).  
They have also addressed situations under which opinion may affect or constrain 
policy.
61
 
                                                          
60
 Scholars have also increasingly argued that even if individuals typically don’t know much about politics 
or foreign policy, they are nonetheless rational because individuals can rely upon elites and informational 
shortcuts (heuristics) in order to overcome informational limitations. Scholars now largely characterize 
public opinion on foreign policy as relatively stable and consistent, responding rationally to large-scale 
events (Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, & Sharp, 2006; Potter & Baum, 2016).  
61
 Increasingly, public opinion scholars who are interested in explaining how public opinion affects public 
policy have focused more on moderators. Among suggested moderators are: (1) the level of threat, time 
available to respond, and leaders' beliefs about the value of public opinion (Foyle, 1999); (2) institutional 
structures, election timing, and differences in salience, coherence, structure, and intensity of citizens’ 
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Ultimately, this dissertation sides with the following adage: “No one believes that 
public opinion always determines public policy; few believe it never does” (Burstein, 
2003). Under some scenarios public opinion likely has little influence, whereas in others 
it may have a great deal of influence on how politicians behave. Certainly it could be 
purely situational factors that lead a politician to demur to the public, but it is important 
to consider what a public—consistently exposed to negative rhetoric about a country, 
prone to distrusting it, and generally negatively oriented toward it—will choose, if given 
the option. Public opinion may not always matter, but to the degree that it does, having 
publics in the two superpowers trust one another more than they currently do appears 
imperative.  
This seems particularly true in this current election season. Drawing upon the 
research in this project, we can expect that the negatively-valenced media coverage about 
China that has pervaded the 2016 presidential primary season has taken a negative toll on 
opinion of China. Yet, concurrently, there are a number of major bilateral priorities that 
such a downturn in opinion might harm. For example, some have questioned whether 
constant harping about America losing in trade to China may be turning the tide of 
opinion—both among the public and the candidates—against Obama’s signature foreign 
policy legislation, the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement (Harwood, 2016). 
Others have raised the question of whether “the surge in anti-China sentiment on the 
campaign trail cast a shadow over the Obama-Xi meeting, and [if] it could have ominous 
consequences for China’s relationship with the United States after Mr. Obama leaves 
                                                                                                                                                                             
attitudes toward particular policies (Canes-Wrone, 2010; Manza & Cook, 2002); (3) costs of 
responsiveness, and the alignment of special interest groups (Manza & Cook, 2002), and (4) whether the 
affluent hold the same opinion as the rest of the population (Gilens, 2012). 
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office” (Landler, 2016). China scholar Minxin Pei has argued, for example: “The Chinese 
are more worried [than they have been in past electoral cycles] because the anti-China 
rhetoric is happening not just in a political context but in the context of a deteriorating 
overall relationship in the last two years” (Landler, 2016).  
 Additionally, the rise of Trump has caused many to consider the role of 
authoritarian traits in the electorate. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, negatively-valenced 
media about China are particularly influential on those with latent authoritarian 
preferences. This is a large segment of the U.S. public: 19% of Americans are “very 
high” authoritarians, and another quarter are “high” authoritarians (Taub, 2016). Theories 
of authoritarian “activation” posit that when individuals with authoritarian traits  
perceive that the moral order is falling apart, the country is losing its coherence and 
cohesiveness, diversity is rising, and our leadership seems (to them) to be suspect 
or not up to the needs of the house, it is though a button is pushed on their forehead 
that says ‘in case of moral threat, lock down the borders, kick out those who are 
different, and punish those who are morally deviant’ (Haidt, 2016). 
 
Essentially, these arguments suggest that bigotry can be “activated”— and that it is 
precisely rhetoric like “China bashing” that elevates threat and anxiety and focuses on an 
enemy and a leadership failing to confront our enemy.  
 
The effects of public opinion on interpersonal relations 
 
Public policy is not the only domain of interest, however. Equally important, if 
not more so, is the effects that negatively-valenced opinion of China appears to be having 
on relationships between individuals in America. Asian Americans make up 5% of the 
U.S. population today (United States Census Bureau, 2014). Knowing how negatively-
valenced media about China affects not only Chinese in America, but Asians more 
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generally, is crucial. This insight is particularly true given the earlier era of “Japan 
bashing,” and the violence against and even death of Asian Americans (Morris, 2011; 
Wu, 2012). As one op-ed about the death of Chinese-American Vincent Chin in Detroit 
noted recently, that period was a time, “like now, [of] malaise, characterized by high 
unemployment, a slowing economy, and an Asian country rising to economic 
prominence” (Wu, 2012).  
Suspicion of China appears to be increasingly harming Asian Americans. The 
Justice Department had to issue new rules in April to give Washington prosecutors 
greater oversight and control over national security cases following several high-profile 
allegations against Chinese-Americans for spying turned out to be incorrect (Apuzzo, 
2016). Representative Judy Chu, a Democrat from California, declared, “the profiling 
must end; we cannot tolerate another case of Asian Americans being wrongfully 
suspected of espionage” (Apuzzo, 2016). More than half of the prosecutions under the 
Economic Espionage Act since 2013 have involved Chinese citizens—and the number of 
indictments has jumped more than 30% in the past year (Perlroth, 2015). The arrest of the 
Chairman of Temple University’s physics department, for example, prompted a longtime 
federal prosecutor to declare,  
If he was Canadian-American or French-American, or he was from the U.K., would 
this have gotten on the government’s radar? I don’t think so…it’s influenced by the 
politics of the time (Apuzzo, 2015).  
 
In China, the nationalistic Global Times has argued that such cases are part of the 
“China-U.S. information war,” declaring that as it continues, “there may be more Chinese 
framed as spies and jailed in the United States” (“Should We Show Gratitude or 
Sympathy to Su Bin?,” 2016). While hopefully far-fetched, there appears to be a sizable 
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minority of the public who agree with the importance of restricting “enemies” from the 
country—a role into which political rhetoric is increasingly relegating Chinese and 
Chinese-Americans (although lately Mexicans and Muslims have occupied that negative 
role). Most notably, a third of Trump’s supporters believe that Japanese internment 
during World War II was a good idea (Vavreck, 2016). 
There is also a growing body of evidence about policies being disproportionately 
enacted against Chinese investors and businesses. For example, for the third year in a 
row, China has accounted for the most notices in the Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United States (CFIUS), an inter-agency committee in the federal government used 
to oversee whether foreign direct investment in the United States comports with national 
security concerns (Hanemann & Rosen, 2016). Numerous deals have been blocked, 
including ones which most journalists believe are solely Chinese companies—unrelated 
to the government—pursuing profits (Hanemann & Rosen, 2016; Wong, 2016). One 
recently declared,  
As growth slows at home, more and more Chinese companies are looking to do 
deals in the United States. And they are increasingly running smack into the 
American national security apparatus. Such scrutiny will have implications for 
United States and China relations, as well as for mergers and acquisitions more 
broadly…This will be a debate that will primarily be about China (Solomon, 
2016). 
 
In line with the arguments in this dissertation, the Beijing Youth Daily, the official 
newspaper of the Communist Youth League committee in Beijing, recently contended 
that the 2016 presidential election may be a key factor in the discrimination they perceive 
against China’s telecom company, ZTE (Pengfei, 2016). Global Times has wondered the 
same of the CFIUS investigation into Syngenta in recent weeks, declaring that “in 
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addition to the United States’ suspicions about China, [election-related] China bashing 
has always served U.S. politicians well” (“U.S. Senators Put Pressure to Examine 
ChemChina’s Acquisition of Syngenta,” 2016). Ultimately, while many of these 
investigations and restrictions may be entirely legitimate on the grounds of national 
security, it seems remarkably likely—if not plausible—that Chinese businesses are 
subjected to greater scrutiny because of the perceived threat emanating from China.  
Outside of the specific effects documented in this project with regard to Chinese 
and Asians, this dissertation suggests the importance of investigating how politicians 
harping on a particular foreign country might affect the public from that country or those 
who are racially similar. For example, the 2016 presidential campaign has focused a great 
deal on Mexico, with comments ranging from Trump’s candidacy announcement where 
he lampooned Mexicans (“They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re 
rapists”; M. Y. H. Lee, 2015) to anti-NAFTA statements by both candidates (Kane, 2016; 
Montanaro, 2015) to discussions of building a wall along the Mexican border (Rappeport 
& Richtel, 2016). Results in my study suggest that this type of focus on Mexico may lead 
to discrimination against Mexicans—and likely against other Hispanics and Latin-
Americans. This is particularly consequential as the two parties discuss how to reform 
immigration and create policies about deporting illegal migrants. Evidence here indicates 
that this type of rhetoric may cause others—including legal migrants or American 
citizens of Mexican or Latino heritage—to be targeted, harassed, and discriminated 
against.  
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The importance of favorability of foreign countries and peoples 
  
 Beyond the potential effects on public policy and interpersonal relations, country 
favorability is interesting and important for its own sake. Countries spend millions of 
dollars both to boost and monitor their favorability. There also appear to be important 
downstream consequences to public opinion of foreign countries, offering credence to the 
notion that this governmental money might be spent on a useful end goal. When a 
country is more popular, individuals are more likely to evaluate the goods and products 
from that country favorably and to purchase those goods, suggesting that favorability can 
have effects on trade relations and gross domestic product (Amine et al., 2005; Klein et 
al., 1998).
 
Favorability also affects foreign policy attitudes. When individuals have 
positive attitudes toward a country, they are more likely to support that country’s policies 
(Page & Bouton, 2008). Negative opinions are related to supporting more aggressive 
policies toward that country (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990). Attitudes toward people have 
similar effects; when individuals have unfavorable opinions of the citizens in a country, 
they are more likely to support aggressive military action against it (Sides & Gross, 
forthcoming). Conversely, positive opinions of a country may lead to more willingness to 
provide assistance and intervene on their behalf (Berinsky, 2009).
 
 
Effects on the Sino-U.S. relationship 
 
Finally, the policy community is also very concerned that anti-China rhetoric 
during our elections is causing Chinese to have more negative views of the bilateral 
relationship (Dwoskin & Zhao, 2012). For example, the American primaries have 
attracted a great deal of attention in China, and many netizens criticize the fact that China 
125 
 
is a regular scapegoat (Guo, 2016). Prominent China scholars have bemoaned the 
“mutual strategic distrust” evident in Chinese and American publics, citing it as the 
greatest threat to the bilateral relationship—arguably the most important bilateral 
relationship in the world (Lieberthal & Wang, 2012). 
Negative rhetoric about China may also be creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
wherein condemning China for behaving aggressively leads it to become more so, 
because the option for a “peaceful rise” is blocked by hostile publics (Zimmerman, 
2014). A growing discourse about “punishing China” may be creating politicians who are 
inclined toward a new-era containment strategy in Asia—something many international 
relations scholars believe would be a “tragedy” in great power politics (Blackwell & 
Tellis, 2015; Chen, 2015). The growth in articles describing China as “assertive” and 
“aggressive” in American media—despite the fact that its international behavior has not 
fundamentally changed—may be narrowing the option-set available to both American 
and Chinese politicians (Johnston, 2013): 
Language can affect internal and public foreign policy debates. There is a long-
standing and rich literature on the role of the media in agenda-setting. What does 
agenda-setting mean in concrete terms? It means focusing attention on particular 
narratives, excluding others, and narrowing discourse. In the agenda-setting 
literature, it refers to the power of information entrepreneurs to tell people what to 
think about’ and ‘how to think about it.’ It can make or take away spaces for 
alternative descriptive and causal arguments, and thus the space for debates about 
effective policy. The prevailing description of the problem narrows acceptable 
options…In security dilemmas, discourses about Self and Other tend to simplify 
and to polarize as attribution errors multiply and ingroup-outgroup differentiation 
intensifies. The newly assertive China meme and the problematic analysis on 
which it is based suggest that the nature of the media-blogosphere interaction may 
become an important factor in explaining the speed and intensity of future 
security dilemma dynamics between states, including those between the United 
States and China (Johnston, 2013). 
 
This viewpoint is closely related to the argument that China and the United States 
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risk falling into a Thucydides trap. As Thucydides argued more than 2,400 years ago, “It 
was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this inspired in Sparta, that made war inevitable” 
(G. Allison, 2015). This argument suggests that negatively-valenced media about China 
and their effect on attitudes toward China may have very real consequences for foreign 
policy toward China, even increasing the risk of Sino-U.S. war. Today, Sparta is confined 
to the dustbin of history following centuries of war. Whether China and the United States 
follow in the steps of their Hellenic predecessors is yet to be determined, but may be 
influenced, at least in part, by how the American media portrays the rise of the world’s 
next superpower. 
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APPENDIX I – AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION OF CHINA OVER TIME  
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Appendix Figure 1. Unfavorable Opinions of China Have Increased around 
Presidential Elections 
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very 
unfavorable opinion of China. [%] 
Source: Pew Research Center surveys, 2005-2013 
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Appendix Figure 2. Americans Favored Getting Tougher on China around 2012 
Presidential Election 
In economic relations with China, percent who say it is more important to... [%] 
Source: Pew Research Center surveys, 2011-2014 
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APPENDIX II – MEDIA CODING WORKSHEET FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Show title: ________________________________________ 
Network: _________________________________________ 
Air date: __________________________________________ 
 
Valence (select one) 
 01  Positive 
 00  Negative 
 -01 Neutral 
 
Campaign/candidate (check if referenced; all applicable) 
 Romney 
 Obama 
 1
st
 debate 
 2
nd
 debate 
 3
rd
 debate 
 Vice presidential debate 
 
Topic 
 01-27 Economy  
 01 Currency manipulation 
 02 Cheating 
 03 Auto industry 
 04 Job loss (in America) 
 05 Factories closing  
 06 Trade war / trade sanctions 
 07 World Trade Organization  
 08 Investment  
 09 Cheap labor / wages  
 10 Tax loopholes / offshore investment  
 11 Made in China / assembled in China  
 12 Trade imbalance 
 13 Borrowing from the Bank of China / debt / deficit 
 14 Rise of China / second-largest economy   
 15 Pressure to play fair 
 16 Tough on / crack down on  
 17 Stealing (jobs, opportunities) 
 18 Outsourcing / outsourcer in chief / pioneer of outsourcing 
 19 Communism / Red China 
 20 Counterfeit goods 
 21 Competitor / adversary / buying things in our country 
 22 Flooding the market with cheap goods / dumping 
 23 Slowing growth / demand falling 
 24 Large market / lots of demand 
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 25 General reference to arguing/debating about China’s economy 
 26 Innovation 
 27 Insourcing (to America) / exports to China rising  
 
30-49 Politics and military 
 30 South China Sea / aggressive toward neighbors 
 31 Chen Guangcheng (human rights) 
 32 United Nations / Security Council votes  
 33 Xi Jinping / new CCP leadership  
 34 Ivory poaching / smuggling 
 35 Senkaku / Diaoyu islands   
 36 Political corruption / anti-corruption drive 
 37 Ambassador / Huntsman  
38 Navy / Army / weapons 
 39 Investment in weapons systems / missiles / drones  
 40 Xinjiang / terrorism  
 41 Taiwan  
 42 Dalai Lama / Tibet 
 43 East China Sea 
 44 International organizations (not the UN) / pivot to Asia 
 45 Authoritarian / dictatorship / communist 
 46 Cyber attacks / hacks  
 47 North Korea 
 48 Construction 
 49 Historic relations (Clinton scandal, Nixon opening) 
 
50–59 Social and societal issues 
50 Press and internet freedom / censorship  
51 Google and Baidu  
 52 Gender imbalance / female infanticide / adoption 
 53 Chinese students studying abroad 
 54 Trying to have children in America for citizenship  
 55 Elementary school knifing incident  
 56 Human rights 
 57 People (generally) 
 58 One-child policy 
 59 Education 
 
60-65 Environment and food safety 
 60 Typhoon Haiyan 
 61 Smog / pollution 
 62 Polluted food / lead in food 
 63 Acid rain  
 64 Carbon emissions / emission standards 
65 Green energy 
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APPENDIX III – LIST OF TELEVISION PROGRAMS IN ISCAP 2012 
 
 
Any local news program  
ABC World News with Diane Sawyer 
Today Show 
NBC Nightly News with Brian Williams                
Huckabee 
Good Morning America  
Person of Interest                  
CBS This Morning             
CNN Newsroom 
Jimmy Kimmel Live 
America This Morning                     
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart 
America’s Newsroom 
60 Minutes 
The Late Show with David Letterman 
The O'Reilly Factor   
ABC News: Nightline                              
The Talk 
The Ellen DeGeneres Show 
Face the Nation 
Frontline 
Hannity  
 
 
Chris Matthews Show 
The Rachel Maddow Show 
America Live with Megyn Kelly 
Meet the Press                 
MSNBC Live 
Special Report with Bret Baier 
Rock Center with Brian Williams 
CBS Sunday Morning 
The Ed Show 
20/20 
Tavis Smiley 
The Fox Report with Shepard Smith 
CBS Evening News with Scott Pelley                         
This Week with George Stephanopoulos                    
Dateline NBC 
The View 
On The Record with Greta Van Susteren 
The Colbert Report  
The Five 
Anderson Cooper 360                      
Saturday Night Live 
The Late Late Show with Craig  
       Ferguson 
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APPENDIX IV – ISCAP 2012 SAMPLE COMPOSITION VERSUS CPS 2012 
 
Appendix Table 4.1. Sample Representativeness: Comparison of Demographic 
Characteristics of Samples in the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the ISCAP 
2012 Panel Survey, Unweighted and Weighted 
a 
All CPS estimates provided have N=234,719
   
b 
All pre-election estimates provided have N=2,606
   
c 
All post-election estimates provided have N=2,471 
Note: GfK uses address-based sampling to recruit a random sample of Americans into their online panel. 
Panel demographic post-stratification adjustments were made using the October 2012 Current Population 
Survey to ensure that the panel is as representative as possible across seven factors: gender, age, race, 
Hispanic ethnicity, education, census region, and metropolitan area. Separate weights were calculated for 
each of the two waves. The post-election wave weights are used in the robustness tables in Appendix V. 
They range from a minimum of 0.19 to a maximum of 3.72 (they have a mean of 1 and a standard deviation 
of 0.66) and have a design effect of 1.4. 
 CPS ISCAP 2012 
  October  Pre-election Post-election 
 2012 Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
  % % % % % 
Sex      
Male 48.3 47.1 48.0 46.9 47.9 
Female 51.7
a
 52.9
b
 52.0 53.1
c
 52.1 
Age      
18-24 12.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.7 
25-44 34.6 38.0 39.4 37.4 39.9 
45-64 34.9 37.1 38.0 37.0 37.7 
65+ 17.7 23.1 23.8 23.8 20.7 
Race/ethnicity      
White non-Hispanic 66.5 70.1 67.5 70.3 67.6 
Black non-Hispanic 11.5 13.4 11.3 13.1 11.3 
Hispanic 14.8 9.8 13.9 9.8 13.9 
Other 7.3 6.8 7.2 6.8 7.2 
Education      
High school or less 43.2 41.3 41.5 41.7 41.4 
Some college/Associates 28.6 23.5 26.9 23.3 26.9 
Bachelor's degree 18.4 20.9 19.0 20.8 19.0 
Postgraduate degree 8.4 14.3 12.6 14.3 12.8 
Household income      
Less than $25K 18.7 19.9 22.6 19.9 22.2 
$25K-49,999 20.7 26.4 25.4 26.5 25.8 
$50K-74,999 16.1 21.9 21.8 21.7 21.3 
$75K-99,999 11.3 15.4 14.9 15.4 14.9 
$100K or more 25.9 16.5 15.4 16.6 15.8 
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 APPENDIX V – ROBUSTNESS TABLES FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
Appendix Table 5.1. Explaining Change in Perceived High Threat from China 
(Binary) Using Media Exposure and Valence - Weighted 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Wave -0.08 -0.105# 
 (0.051) (0.078) 
   
Percent of negative China references  0.623*** 
(0.161)   
   
Percent of positive China references  0.896** 
(0.328)   
   
Percent of neutral China references  0.062 
(0.098)   
   
Constant 0.586*** 0.637** 
 (0.383) (0.465) 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.000 0.009 
N 2,471 2,234 
Note: Results shown are from a fixed effects logistic regression model using two points in time: pre-
election and post-election. The dependent variable is a binary variable where those who say China is 
primarily a threat to jobs and security are coded as 1 and those who said otherwise are coded as 0. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses; post-stratification weights are employed. Significance values are 
indicated with # p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Appendix Table 5.2 Explaining Change in Perceived China Threat (Three-Part 
Change Scale) Using Media Exposure and Valence - Weighted 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Change in percent of negative  
     China references 
-0.016 
(0.173) 
-0.003 
(0.177) 
-0.107 
(1.499) 
 
Change in percent of positive  
     China references 
-0.102 
(0.339) 
-0.135 
(0.350) 
-0.411 
(1.384) 
 
Change in percent of neutral  
     China references 
-0.198# 
(0.122) 
-0.199# 
(0.122) 
-0.102 
(0.428) 
 
Change in count of China  
     references 
 -0.001 
(0.002) 
 
   
Saw any pre-election China  
     related references 
  0.041 
(0.116) 
   
Saw any pre-election  
     references x change in  
     percent negative 
  0.117 
(1.510) 
   
Saw any pre-election  
     references x change in  
     percent positive 
  0.344 
(1.431) 
   
Saw any pre-election  
     references x change in  
     percent neutral 
  -0.079 
(0.450) 
Cut 1 -0.486*** -0.476*** -0.462*** 
 (0.059) (0.064) (0.093) 
Cut 2 1.391*** 1.40*** 1.416*** 
 (0.071) (0.074) (0.099) 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.001 0.002 0.003 
N 2,033 2,033 2,033 
Note: Results shown are from an ordered logistic regression. The dependent variable is a three-point 
variable where -1 is those whose perceived threat from China decreased from pre- to post-election, 0 is 
those who had no change, and 1 is those whose threat perception increased. The key independent 
variables are difference scores, where the percent of positive/negative/neutral references at Wave 2 are 
subtracted from Wave 1, and positive scores represent an increase over time and negative ones a 
decrease over time. Standard errors are in parentheses and post-stratification weights are employed. 
Significance values are indicated with # p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Appendix Table 5.3. Explaining Change in Perceived China Threat (Three-Part 
Change Scale) Using Media Exposure and Valence Controlling for Pre-Election 
Attitude - Weighted 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Time  1 (7-pt) Perceived Threat from  
     China 
-0.375*** 
(0.026) 
-0.403*** 
(0.030) 
 
   
Change in percent of negative China  
     references 
 -0.049 
(0.190) 
  
   
Change in percent of positive China  
     references 
 0.069 
(0.419) 
  
   
Change in percent of neutral China  
     references 
 -0.326* 
(0.136) 
  
   
Cut 1 -2.83*** -2.90*** 
 (0.162) (0.181) 
Cut 2 -0.783*** -0.849*** 
 (0.157) (0.173) 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.051 0.059 
N 1,901 1,605 
Note: Results shown are from an ordered logistic regression. The dependent variable is a three-point 
variable where -1 is those whose perceived threat from China decreased from pre- to post-election, 0 is 
those who had no change, and 1 is those whose threat perception increased. The key independent 
variables are difference scores, where the percent of positive/negative/neutral references at Wave 2 are 
subtracted from Wave 1, so positive scores represent a decrease over time and negative ones an increase 
over time. Only those with a substantive pre-election opinion are included. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and post-stratification weights are included. Significance values are indicated with # p<.10, * 
p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  
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APPENDIX VI – EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN PROTOCOL 
 
Note: throughout this protocol, everything in italics is a note to readers and was not 
presented to the survey respondent. Everything not in italics was shown to the 
respondents.   
 
Thank you for agreeing to take this survey. Please note that participation in this survey is 
entirely voluntary. If at any time you would like to end the survey, please do so. As part 
of this survey, you will be shown a short advertisement and asked a series of questions 
about education and other opinions you may have. If you have any questions, please 
email the researcher at lsilver@asc.upenn.edu.  
 
Please note that following the study, you will be provided with a code that you must enter 
on Amazon's Mechanical Turk in order to receive payment. 
 
Please enter your Amazon Mechanical Turk ID [____________________________] 
 
Pretest demographics 
 
Are you a  
 Male 
 Female 
 
Do you consider yourself 
 White 
 Black or African American 
 Asian 
 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
 American Indian or Alaska Native 
 Other (please specify) [____________________________] 
 
Are you  
 Hispanic or Latino 
 Not Hispanic or Latino 
 
What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently enrolled, 
mark the previous grade or highest degree received. 
 Less than high school 
 Some high school, no diploma 
 High school graduate 
 Some college credit, but no degree 
 College graduate 
 Graduate degree 
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Are you currently 
 Employed 
 Out of work and looking for work 
 Out of work but not currently looking for work 
 A student 
 Retired 
 Unable to work 
 Homemaker 
 Other 
 
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a  
 Republican 
 Democrat 
 Independent 
 Another party (please specify) [____________________________] 
 
[If “Republican”] Would you call yourself a  
 Strong Republican 
 Not very strong Republican 
 
[If “Democrat”] Would you call yourself a  
 Strong Democrat 
 Not very strong Democrat 
 
[If “Independent/Another party”] Do you think of yourself as closer to the  
 Republican Party 
 Democrat Party 
 Neither of these 
 
Who did you vote for in the 2012 presidential election? 
 Mitt Romney 
 Barack Obama 
 I did not vote 
 Other (please specify) [____________________________] 
 
Authoritarianism  
 
Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person 
thinks that some are more important than others.  Please choose which of the following traits you 
find most desirable.  
 Independence 
 Respect for elders 
 
And which of these traits do you find more desirable? 
 Curiosity 
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 Good manners 
 
And which of these traits do you find more desirable? 
 Obedience 
 Self-reliance 
 
And finally, which of these traits do you find more desirable? 
 Considerate 
 Well-behaved 
 
Social dominance orientation 
 
To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
  
 Some groups of people are simply inferior to others. 
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the 
bottom. 
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. 
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
Treatment videos – negatively-valenced coverage of China  
Individuals were assigned either a treatment or a control video aired by the candidate who they 
voted for in 2012, using self-reported vote choice in the pre-test. If they did not vote or voted for a 
138 
 
third-party candidate, they were randomly assigned a treatment or control video from the 
candidate of the party with which they identified with or leaned. If they were true independents 
and did not vote in 2012, they were randomly assigned. 
 
Now you’re going to be shown a short (30 second) video. Please pay close attention, as 
there will be some questions about it later. 
 
Treatment – Obama campaign (“The Cheaters”) 
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_MI4YOICmuA] 
 
Mitt Romney: “It’s time to stand up to the cheaters and make sure we protect jobs for the 
American people”  
Voice over: “Mitt Romney- tough on China? Romney’s companies were called pioneers 
in shipping US manufacturing jobs overseas. He invested in firms that specialized in 
relocating jobs to low wage countries, like China. Even today part of Romney’s fortune is 
invested in China. Romney has never stood up to China. All he’s done is send them our 
jobs”  
Barack Obama: “I’m Barack Obama and I approved this message”  
 
Treatment – Romney campaign (“Stand up to China”)  
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUhKRV4Tq8A] 
Voice over: “Fewer Americans are working today than when President Obama took 
office. It doesn’t have to be this way, if Obama would stand up to China. China is 
stealing American ideas and technology, everything from computers to fighter jets. Seven 
times Obama could have taken action, seven times he said no. His policies cost us two 
million jobs. America had years to stand up to China. We can’t afford four more”  
Mitt Romney: “I’m Mitt Romney and I approved this message”  
 
Control – Obama campaign (“Decision”) 
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hPrFp5VhdnU] 
 
Barack Obama: “I’m Barack Obama and I approved this message”  
Woman 1: “I think Mitt Romney’s really out of touch with the average woman’s health 
issues”  
Woman 2: “This is not the 1950s, contraception is so important to women, it’s about a 
woman being able to make decisions”  
Woman 1: “I don’t remember anyone as extreme as Romney”  
Mitt Romney: “I’d cut off funding to Planned Parenthood”  
Woman 2: “I don’t think Mitt Romney can even understand the mindset of someone who 
has to go to Planned Parenthood”  
Mitt Romney: “Planned Parenthood, gonna get rid of that”  
Woman 1: “I think Mitt Romney would definitely drag us back”  
 
Control – Romney campaign (“Humanity”) 
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OPfRbp2zycc]  
 
Jane C. Edmonds, former Mitt Romney cabinet member: “I was just personally struck by 
his humanity”  
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Beth Lindstrom, former Mitt Romney cabinet member “He said, we need to take care of 
those who can’t take care of themselves, single mothers or women who are trying to get 
back to work. He is very very sensitive”  
Ellen Roy Herzfelder, former Mitt Romney cabinet member: “He totally gets working 
women, especially women who, like myself, had two young kids. I needed flexibility”  
Beth Lindstrom: “It’s so wonderful to have someone who you respect and work for that 
understands how important family is”  
Mitt Romney: “I’m Mitt Romney and I approved this message”  
 
Post-test 
 
Now I’m going to ask you to participate in a role-playing situation. Pretend you are an admissions 
officer at an elite university. I am going to show you a series of profiles of students applying to 
your school. Please read them carefully and evaluate their quality, and whether or not you think 
they should be admitted to the school.    
 
Each individual now sees six profiles. The profile content is presented in the same order depicted 
below, though the race and nationality of the candidate presented with each of the profiles varies 
in a Latin Square designed discussed in Chapter 5.  
Profile #1 
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Profile #2 
 
Profile #3 
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Profile #4 
 
Profile #5 
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Profile #6 
 
Admissions officers routinely have to make tough decisions, choosing between very strong 
candidates. Thinking back on the six profiles that you evaluated, please rank the students in order, 
from the one you would most like to admit (1) to the one you would least like to admit (6). 
The respondent will then drag the small profile pictures—which are presented in a random 
order—into their preferred order. 
Please take a moment to explain why you placed the students in that order. What types of things 
were you considering? [OPEN END] 
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Country favorability 
Now I’m going to ask you your opinions about a few foreign countries. Please tell me whether 
you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the following countries. [randomly ordered] 
India 
Very unfavorable                  Very favorable 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Japan 
Very unfavorable                  Very favorable 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
China 
Very unfavorable                  Very favorable 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Brazil 
Very unfavorable                  Very favorable 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
People favorability 
Now I’d like to ask you about the citizens who live in those countries. Please tell me whether you 
have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the following people. [randomly ordered] 
Indians 
Very unfavorable                  Very favorable 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Japanese 
Very unfavorable                  Very favorable 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Chinese 
Very unfavorable                  Very favorable 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3       4  5 
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Brazilians 
Very unfavorable                  Very favorable 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Limiting Asian Americans  
 
Do you support taking into account whether someone is Asian American when deciding 
whether to admit them? 
 Strongly support 
 Somewhat support 
 Neither support nor oppose 
 Somewhat oppose 
 Strongly oppose 
 
Admissions officers at universities should try and limit the number of Asian American 
students they admit each year. 
 Strongly support 
 Somewhat support 
 Neither support nor oppose 
 Somewhat oppose 
 Strongly oppose 
 
If Asian American students are making up a large percentage of a university’s class, steps 
should be taken to limit the number admitted in order to ensure campus diversity. 
 Strongly support 
 Somewhat support 
 Neither support nor oppose 
 Somewhat oppose 
 Strongly oppose 
 
Limiting foreigners 
  
Do you support a policy to limit the number of Asians who are not American citizens 
who can attend universities in the United States? 
 Strongly support 
 Somewhat support 
 Neither support nor oppose 
 Somewhat oppose 
 Strongly oppose 
 
I think it's important that American universities primarily admit Americans, not 
foreigners. 
 Strongly support 
 Somewhat support 
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 Neither support nor oppose 
 Somewhat oppose 
 Strongly oppose 
 
There should be fewer Chinese students admitted to U.S. colleges 
 Strongly support 
 Somewhat support 
 Neither support nor oppose 
 Somewhat oppose 
 Strongly oppose 
 
It is bad for the United States when Chinese come here for their college education. 
 Strongly support 
 Somewhat support 
 Neither support nor oppose 
 Somewhat oppose 
 Strongly oppose 
 
Thinking back to the ad you saw earlier, to what degree did it make you feel the following 
emotions? [sliders from not at all (1) to a great deal (5)] 
Anxiety  
Happy 
Sad 
Angry 
Who sponsored the ad you saw earlier?  
 Barack Obama 
 Mitt Romney 
 Hillary Clinton 
 John McCain 
 
In your opinion, how much of a threat are each of the following countries to the United States, if 
at all? [sliders from not a threat (0) to a very large threat (10)] 
Iran 
India 
China 
Russia  
There are different views about China. Some people see China as more of an opportunity for new 
markets and economic investment, while others see it as a threat to our jobs and security. Still 
others are somewhere in between. Which view is closer to your own? [sliders from China is more 
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of a terrific opportunity for new markets and investment (1) to China is strictly a threat to U.S. 
jobs and security (7)] 
To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement? I think that China's rise 
will negatively affect ordinary Americans.  
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
Do you think China’s power and influence is a threat to the United States, or not? 
 China is a threat to the United States 
 China is not a threat to the United States 
 
  [IF “THREAT”] Is China a very major threat, a somewhat major threat, a somewhat  
minor threat, or a very minor threat to the United States?  
 A very major threat 
 A somewhat major threat 
 A somewhat minor threat 
 A very minor threat 
 
Finally, thinking once again about the ad you saw earlier, please indicate the degree to which the 
following statement is true.  
I clearly heard all of the advertisement. 
 Strongly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
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APPENDIX VII – EXPERIMENTAL PRETESTS  
 
The following photos were pretested in September 2014 on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to 75 
participants. Each was given the following prompt: “We are interested in learning more about 
what makes a person’s headshot attractive to others. Because attraction is very subjective, there 
is no right or wrong answer. Please look at the following photos and rate how attractive you find 
each person using the scale provided.” Then, using a scale ranging from 0 (not attractive at all) to 
10 (extremely attractive), they rated a total of 16 photos—eight Asians and eight Caucasians. I 
selected the four photos that had the most similar average ratings. These are presented below with 
their ratings:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean: 5 / Median: 5                       Mean: 4.9  / Median: 5  
Mode: 6 /  Std. dev.: 2.2                    Mode: 5   /  Std. dev.: 2.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean: 4.6  /  Median: 5                        Mean: 4.5  / Median: 5  
Mode: 5  /   Std. dev.: 2.5                        Mode: 5    /  Std. dev.: 2.3 
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In addition to photos, applicant profiles were also pretested in September 2014 on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. A different 75 individuals were given the following prompt: “We are interested 
in learning more about what makes a person a successful applicant to university. This is very 
subjective and there is no right or wrong answer. Please look at the following short paragraphs 
about an applicant named John and rate how qualified you find each one of them using the scale 
provided.” Then, using a scale ranging from 0 (not at all qualified) to 10 (extremely qualified), 
they rated 10 profiles. I selected the four profiles that had the most similar average ratings.  
Below are the four profiles that I selected and their respective ratings; 
 
GPA: 3.91 
Intended major: Environmental Studies 
Activities: John is the captain of his high school’s varsity lacrosse team. He is also the president 
of the school’s Habitat for Humanity club and an active volunteer with the organization. 
Mean: 8.3 / Median: 9 / Mode: 10 / Std. dev: 1.7 
 
GPA: 3.81 
Intended major: Political Science 
Activities: John is a member of his high school’s Model United Nations and Model Congress 
teams. He is also president of his school’s debate team and a member of the National Honor 
Society. 
Mean: 8.3 / Median: 9 / Mode: 9 / Std. dev: 1.8 
 
GPA: 3.84 
Intended major: Journalism 
Activities: John is the Editor-in-Chief of his high school’s newspaper and has had one of his op-
eds published on Huffington Post’s website. He is also a member of his school’s tennis team. 
Mean: 8.2 / Median: 9 / Mode: 9 / Std. dev: 1.8 
 
GPA: 3.89 
Intended major: Biology 
Activities: John is the founder and president of his school’s first environmental club. Under his 
leadership, the school began a recycling program. He is also a member of the Future Business 
Leaders club. 
Mean: 8.2 / Median: 8 / Mode: 8 / Std. dev: 1.6 
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